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ABSTRACT 
INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN PALESTINE, 1945-1947 
David Anderson Charters 
This is a study of the relationship of political and 
military factors in the British counter-insurgency campaign 
in Palestine between 1945 and 1947. 
From 1920 to 1948 Great Britain held the League of 
Nations Mandate for Palestine under the terms of which 
Britain was to facilitate the creation in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jews. The Zionist movement believed 
that British policy towards the Arabs from 1939 violated the 
terms of the Mandate in respect of obligations to the Jews. 
Consequently, after the war Jewish insurgents initiated an 
armed struggle for national liberation. 
The insurgents used terrorism, subversion and prop- 
aganda to"make Palestine ungovernable by normal means and 
within acceptable limits in terms of human, political and 
financial costs. The British Government responded to the 
challenge with political initiatives and internal security 
operations. 
British political endeavours failed to produce a 
solution to the Palestine question because it proved 
impossible to reconcile British strategic interests in the 
Middle East, Arab claims to Palestine and Jewish aspirations 
to statehood. In the absence of a political settlement 
Britain could retain control of Palestine only by coercion. 
The security forces, however, lacked a relevant 
counter-insurgency doctrine and were weak in the critical 
field of intelligence. Consequently, they were unable to 
contain the insurgency. 
The failure of political efforts and the inability 
to control violence in Palestine coincided with a period of 
economic crisis and strategic reassessment in Britain. As 
a result, the British Government decided in September 1947 
to relinquish the Palestine Mandate. 
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To make war upon rebellion is messy and 
slow, like eating soup with a knife. 
. T. E. Lawrence, 1920. 
FOREWORD 
Between October 1945 and September 1947 the British 
Government and its security forces fought a violent, bit- 
ter and ultimately unsuccessful campaign against Jewish 
insurgents determined to establish an independent state in 
Palestine. The insurgents forced the British to fight a 
two-front war; a strategic/political battle for legitimacy-- 
the right to govern, and a tactical/military battle for 
control, the ability to govern. Britain lost both battles 
in Palestine. This study will attempt to explain why 
Britain was defeated. 
The evidence shows that Britain lost the strategic/ 
political battle because it was unable to reconcile British 
strategic interests in the Middle East with Arab claims to 
Palestine and with Jewish demands for an independent state. 
The absence of a political solution contributed directly to 
a major increase in the level of violence and forced the 
British to attempt to retain control of Palestine solely by 
coercion. The security forces' intelligence services, 
however, were inadequate for the task. They could neither 
penetrate and disrupt the insurgent organizations nor 
anticipate and prevent insurgent operations. Consequently, 
the security forces could not contain the violence and thus 
lost the tactical battle for control of Palestine. 
The central weakness of the British position lay in 
the absence of a counter-insurgency strategy. This was the 
result not only of the failure to develop a policy, which 
left the security forces to operate without a clear 
strategic objective. It was also the product of the pre- 
vailing state of British civil-military relations. Neither 
the government nor the army had a clear conception of the 
9 
interdependence of the political and military components of 
the campaign. Consequently, the British never developed a 
coordinated response to the insurgents' skilful combination 
of political and military warfare. 
10 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In February 1947 Arthur Creech-Jones, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, described the Palestine adminis- 
tration as 'virtually a besieged garrison'. 
1 Jewish 
insurgents had kidnapped army officers and had sabotaged 
the railways. British women and children had been evac- 
uated from Palestine and the remaining officials were 
forced to live and work in closely guarded security zones. 
Two and one-half divisions of troops were tied down on 
apparently endless, if not fruitless, internal security 
duties. Martial law appeared imminent. Unable to achieve 
a negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem, the 
British Government were preparing to turn over to the 
United Nations the responsibility for resolution of the 
difficult political question. 
This was hardly the outcome anticipated by the 
British politicians who had drafted the Balfour Declar- 
ation in 1917 and who had accepted a League of Nations 
Mandate to administer Palestine in 1920. In order to 
place in perspective the post-1945 period, it is essential 
to consider the evolution of the Palestine situation to 
that point. Britain acquired control of Palestine through 
military conquest during the First World War, but before 
the conquest was complete the British Government made 
1 Cabinet Paper (hereafter cited as CP) 59, 
'Memorandum by Secretaries of State for the Colonies, and 
for Foreign Affairs', 13 February 1947, Papers of the 
British Cabinet Office, Public Record Office, Kew, 
Middlesex (hereafter cited as CAB), 129/17. 
three separate and conflicting commitments with regard to 
the future of the Middle East and of Palestine in 
particular. 
First, in 1915 Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner 
for Egypt, promised Sharif Hussein of Mecca that in return 
for Arab assistance in the war against the Turks the 
British would recognize his claims to an Arab empire at 
the end of the war. Although the pledge gave the 
impression that Palestine was to be included in the 
promised area of Arab independence, the British Government 
apparently had no intention of ceding control of it once 
the conquest was complete. Instead, in 1916 the British 
entered into a secret treaty with France and Russia which 
would partition the Middle East into British and French 
protectorates and an independent Arab state. Finally, in 
1917 the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour com- 
mitted the British Government to the establishment in 
Palestine of'a 'national home' for the Jewish people. 
2 
Elizabeth Monroe has since concluded that solely 
in terms of British interests the Balfour Declaration was 
'one of the greatest mistakes in our imperial history'. 
3 
In the context of the agreements and understandings under- 
taken before 1917, she is undoubtedly correct. The terms 
of the original mandate for Palestine were framed to 
emphasize the mission of creating the Jewish national home. 
The British Government accepted responsibility for gener- 
ating the social, political and economic conditions con- 
ducive to establishment of the national home and for 
facilitating Jew-I h immigration and settlement in 
2 Aaron S. Klieman, 'Britain's War Aims in the 
Middle East in 1915', Journal of Contemporary History, III 
(1968), 237-51. The assurances were repeated to the Arabs 
in 1918. 
3 Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle 
East, 1914-1956 (London, 1963), p. 43. 
I.. ) 
Palestine. At the same time Britain was to safeguard the 
civil and religious rights of the indigenous population, 
and to ensure that Jewish immigration and settlement did 
not prejudice 'the rights and position of other sections 
of the population'. 
4 The mandate thus implied a dual 
obligation open to conflicting interpretation. It was 
challenged virtually from its inception. 
The problem was that, quite apart from the special 
circumstances surrounding Palestine, the creation of man- 
dates accorded neither with the wishes of the indigenous 
populations nor the wartime promises of independence to 
the Arabs; this discrepancy contributed directly to the 
outburst of violence in the area in 1920, and tends to 
lend weight to the accusations that Britain missed or 
underestimated the signs of Arab nationalism. 
5 In 
response to the disorder, however, the British Government 
attempted to honour belatedly its obligations to the 
Arabs. First, the British made Trans-Jordan a separate 
entity within the mandate--an amirate under the rule of 
Abdullah--and later installed Feisal as king of Iraq. 
Secondly, in 1921-22 the government modified the final 
terms of the Palestine Mandate in such a way as to 
de-emphasize the Jewish national home and to reassure the 
indigenous Arabs that they would not be assimilated by a 
large influx of Jews. The Arabs were informed that they 
would not be subordinated to the Jews, whose rate of 
immigration would be limited by the economic absorptive 
capacity of the country. 
6 However slight, the semantic 
4 
J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New 
York, 1950; repr. 1976), p. 18. 
5 Monroe, pp. 66-7,79,81; Jon Kimche, Seven 
Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1945-1952 (New-or Yk, 
1953), pp. 28-30,44-57. 
6 Hurewitz, pp. 20,21-2. 
13 
changes in the language defining the terms of the mandate 
were significant: they convinced the Arabs that they had 
a British guarantee that Palestine would not become a 
Jewish state. 
Arab fears were thus assuaged and while Jewish 
immigration slowed to a trickle in the 1920's communal 
conflict subsided. Hostility flared again in 1929, how- 
ever, over the question of religious rights in old 
Jerusalem. Although the Royal Commission sent to investi- 
gate concluded that the violence was the product of 
frustrated nationalism and revived fears of assimilation, 
7 
British policy began to waver. First, in 1930 the govern- 
ment issued a new White Paper which stated that Britain's 
dual obligations were of equal weight but not irreconcil- 
able, yet also recommended restrictions of Jewish immi- 
gration and land purchases. At the same time the British 
Government advised the Permanent Mandates Commission of 
the League of Nations that communal conflict made 
Palestinian self-government based on cooperation between 
Arabs and Jews impossible. Then, under pressure from the 
pro-Zionist lobby, the government reversed in 1931 its 
policy of the previous year and renounced any restriction 
on Jewish immigration or land acquisition. The policy 
remained uncertain because the government did not withdraw 
or replace the 1930 White Paper. 8 
In the next five years, particularly after the 
Nazi seizure of power in Germany, Jewish immigration 
increased substantially, exceeding 60,000 in 1935 alone. 
Once again Arab fears surfaced and manifested themselves 
7 House of Commons Command Paper number [3530], 
'Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine Disturbances 
of August 1929', pp. 161-2, British Parliamentary Papers, 
Session 1930. 
8 Monroe, p. 81; Hurewitz, pp. 22-3. 
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in violence; this time the resistance was organized and 
included a general strike. The Arabs set out to stop 
Jewish immigration and settlement completely, and to 
establish an independent Arab state. The British 
responded with a ponderous, though ultimately successful, 
counter-insurgency campaign and another Royal Commission. 
The Commission recommended in 1937 partition as a per- 
manent solution to the Palestine-problem, and the govern- 
ment concurred. An intense debate ensued and a second 
Commission was sent to Palestine'to examine the practical 
and technical-aspects of partition. The Jews cautiously 
accepted partition while the Arabs rejected it out of hand 
and continued their armed revolt. The debate, the 
intractability of the problem, the Arab resistance and 
the developing crisis in Europe combined to produce yet 
another change in British policy. In November 1938 the 
government rejected partition. Instead, it convened in 
February 1939 a conference in London attended by repre- 
sentatives of all parties to the dispute. The British 
Government advised all concerned that if the conference 
failed to resolve the issue, the government would impose 
its own solution; in the event, that is what occurred. 
In May 1939 the British Government proclaimed a new 
Palestine policy, in what became known as the White Paper. 
Its two main clauses provided for: evolution towards an 
independent Palestinian state within ten years; and 
restrictions on Jewish immigration--75,000 over the sub- 
sequent five years--and land purchases. 
9 
9 HC [5479,1 , 'Report of the Palestine Royal Commis- 
sion', BPP (1937); HC[6019], 'Palestine: A Statement of 
Policy, BPP (1939); Michael J. Cohen, Palestine: Retreat 
from the Mandate. The Making of British Policy, 1936-1945 
New Yor 191 p 10,33-49,62-85; Jo Marlowe, Rebel- 
lion in Palestine (London, 1946), passim; John Marlowe, The 
15 
At first examination the 1939 White Paper appears 
to be a further manifestation of the appeasement policy 
which characterized the years immediately preceding. Yet, 
in that it was a further attempt to resolve the contra- 
dictions of Britain's First World War diplomacy, its roots 
are longer and of a substance different from those of 
appeasement. Moreover, as Monroe has observed, the White 
Paper was a successful gesture of self-preservation which 
secured that flank of the empire for the duration of the 
war. 
10 The Arab revolt subsided, its political objectives 
very nearly achieved, and Britain turned its attention to 
the crisis in Europe, secure in the knowledge that the 
lines of communication of the empire, particularly the 
Suez Canal, were safe at least from internal threats. 
The White Paper policy produced grave consequences 
for Anglo-Jewish relations. At a time when developments 
in Europe appeared to threaten Jews in particular and 
Palestine possessed a thriving Jewish community apparently 
beyond the reach of the Nazis, the White Paper not only 
rejected the idea of a Jewish state; the immigration 
restrictions denied to European Jews fleeing persecution 
a relatively safe refuge. The holocaust, of course, lay 
in the future and for the time being the Jews had little 
choice but to ally themselves with Britain against the 
Nazis. But the lesson of the Arab rebellion was not lost 
upon certain extreme elements of the Palestinian Jewish 
community: Britain had capitulated to coercion and the 
Arabs had achieved their objectives; if the Arabs could 
succeed by using violence, the Jews could as well. Some 
of these Jews were frustrated sufficiently by the White 
Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate 
(London, 1959), p. 130: Hurewitz, pp. 77,78-80,82-5,. 
89-93. 
10 Monroe, pp. 88-9. 
I4 
Paper to consider armed revolt. Once the holocaust began 
the White Paper's immigration restrictions would be 
regarded by the Jewish extremists as connivance and com- 
plicity in genocide. Ultimately, they came to conclude 
that British rule in Palestine would have to be destroyed 
11 
The White Paper notwithstanding, the Jews still 
had many allies in the British Government, not the least 
of them. the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. But 
as Michael Cohen points out, once involved in directing 
the war Churchill did not feel free to impose his views 
on the ministers directly involved with Palestine policy, 
or to oppose the opinions of civil and military author- 
ities in the Middle East who warned almost unanimously of 
the dangers inherent in diverging from the White Paper 
policy. 
12 Churchill, nonetheless, made his own views very 
clear in notes to cabinet in April 1943: 
I cannot agree that the White Paper is "the firmly 
established policy" of His Majesty's Government. I 
have always regarded it as a gross breach of faith 
... in respect of obligations to which I was per- 
sonally a party. ... It runs until it is super- 
ce'ed. 13 
He felt he could not contemplate any absolute 
cessation of immigration into Palestine at the discretion 
of an Arab majority whose demands had been met by the 
British in 1939, but who had been of no use during the war 
and thus had created no new claims upon the allies. 
14 
Against a background of a receding German threat to the 
11 See Chapter V. 
12 Cohen, pp. 160-1. 
13 Churchill to Lord Privy Seal and Colonial Sec- 
retary, 18 April 1943, in Winston S. Churchill, The Second 
World War: The Hinge of Fate (London, 1956), IV, 758. 
14 War Cabinet Paper (hereafter cited as WCP) 178, 
'Note by Prime Minister', 28 April 1943, CAB 66/36. 
17 
Middle East and increasing Zionist agitation in Palestine, 
Britain and the United States in opposition to the exist- 
ing policy, the Cabinet appointed in July 1943 a sub- 
committee to consider and report to Cabinet on a new long- 
term policy for Palestine. Taking the 1937 Royal Com- 
mission report as a starting point, the committee recom- 
mended in December 1943 that the British Government adopt 
partition as the solution to the problem. While granting 
that the-Arabs might oppose the scheme, the committee 
recommended that the government accept the risks involved 
and implement partition whatever the opposition. The com- 
mittee felt their scheme met to the utmost practical 
extent the conflicting claims of Arabs and Jews. 
l5 
The Cabinet endorsed the report in January 1944, 
but the committee did not commence work on a final scheme 
until August. In the interim all the British representa- 
tives in the Middle East, with the exception of the High I 
Commissioner of Palestine, advised against partition in 
view of the likely effect on Anglo-Arab relations. Once 
again the government began to vacillate. In June 
Churchill, influenced perhaps by his advisers and the 
knowledge that an American election was shortly to occur, 
agreed that the Cabinet should postpone a decision on 
Palestine policy. When Jewish terrorists assassinated 
Lord Moyne, Minister Resident in the Middle East, in 
November 1944 Churchill directed that the committee's 
second report, concerning the technical details of par- 
tition, be held over to a more appropriate moment. 
16 
In February 1945 the Colonial Secretary, aware 
15 WCP 563, 'Report of War Cabinet Committee on 
Palestine', 20 December 1943, CAB 66/44; Cohen, pp. 161, 
163-4. 
16Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: 
Triumph and Tragedy (London, 1956T, VI, 546; Cohen, pp. 
171-9. 
Iý 
that the White Paper immigration quota would be exhausted 
before the end of the year, urged the Cabinet either to 
approve partition or to produce a better option. But the 
balance of opinion now opposed partition, the new High 
Commissioner and Lord Moyne's replacement adding their 
voices to the opposition. Sir Edward Grigg, the new 
Minister Resident, took up Colonel Stanley's challenge and 
presented a proposal for an international trust-scheme in 
which Arabs and Jews would share power in governing a 
unitary Palestine, while an international body represent- 
ing the major powers and the Arabs and Jews would decide 
immigration policy. The Foreign Office, moreover, would 
take responsibility for Palestine. 
17 
Whatever their merits or faults, neither plan was 
adopted by the government, for in July 1945 Churchill was 
defeated in a general election. The Labour Party formed 
the new government and commenced to examine the Palestine 
policy afresh. 
17 WCP 214, 'Note by Minister Resident in the 
Middle East', 4 April 1945, and WCP 229, 'Memorandum by 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs', 10 April 1945, 
CAB 66/64; Cohen, pp. 179-80. 
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CHAPTER II 
BRITISH PALESTINE POLICY, 1945-1947 
During the Second World War the Labour Party had 
supported consistently the Zionist cause; in May 1945 the 
Party conference endorsed resolutions calling for abro- 
gation of the White Paper policy and favouring unlimited 
Jewish immigration into Palestine. Ninety Members of 
Parliament went on record supporting the Zionist movement. 
Once in power, however, the Labour Party ascertained very 
quickly, as John Marlowe has observed, that 'the future 
of Palestine was no longer a matter in which H. M. G. was a 
free agent'. 
' 
The new government, as Matthew Fitzsimons 
notes, was heir to a complex series of arrangements which 
could not be scrutinized all at once; each commitment 
involved others. 
2 Moreover, since each commitment involved 
vested interests of different branches of the government, 
each had its supporters in the Cabinet. 
The Foreign Office, under the forceful leadership 
of Ernest Bevin, urged the Cabinet to adopt a policy which 
would not alienate the Arabs, in order to protect British 
interests in the whole Middle East region. Bevin regarded 
Middle East oil as an essential element of Britain's 
1 Yehuda Bauer, From Diplomacy to Resistance: A 
History of Jewish Palestine, 1939-1945 (New York, 1973), 
p. 348; George Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950: Survey of 
International Affairs (London, 1954), V, 190; Marlowe, 
Seat of Pilate, p. 181; Hurewitz, p. 227. Of the 90 MPs 
cited above, 26 were Jewish. 
2 Matthew A. Fitzsimons, Empire by Treat : Britain 
and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (London, 
1965), p. 54. 
2. a 
economic well-being, a significant consideration at a time 
when the government was trying to rebuild and restructure 
the British economy. 
3 It appears that Bevin was heavily 
influenced by the advice of British representatives in the 
Middle East and of Harold Beeley, one of his principal 
advisers. One former Colonial office official commented 
later that 'One wondered how much of the thinking was 
Bevin and how much was Harold Beeley. '4 In his view, 
Beeley felt that 
a process took place which can be called the 
"absorption" of a minister by his department. He 
read our material and within the first few weeks he 
came to the conclusion, ... that the traditional Labour Party policy was wrong. It's not true that 
Bevin was "got grip of" by the Foreign Office. But 
it was only by becoming a minister in charge of a 
department that he could become fully informed of 
the issues. 5 
In his approach to the Palestine problem Bevin had 
influential allies in the Chiefs of Staff. Like Bevin, 
they felt that British interests, consisting of oil, bases, 
and the lines of communication to the Empire would be best 
served by maintaining good relations with the Arabs. 
6 Jon 
3 Cabinet Minutes (hereafter cited as CM), 4 Oct. 
1945, CAB 128/1; Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: 
The Struggle Between the British, the Jews and the Arabs, 
1935-1948 (London, 1979), p. 293; Monroe, p. 163, 
Fitzsimons, p. 53. 
4 Chiefs of Staff Committee (hereafter cited as 
COSC) Paper 443, 'Middle East Policy: Comments of His 
Majesty's Representatives in Washington and Mid-East on 
Palestine Policy', 10 July 1945, CAB 80/95; His Majesty's 
Representative Jedda to Foreign Office, 14 Oct. 1945, 
Papers of the British Colonial Office, Public Record 
Office, Kew, Middlesex (hereafter cited as CO) 733/461; 
Sir John Martin, interview with author, 10 May 1978. 
5 Bethell, p. 202. 
6 Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (hereafter cited 
as PHP) Paper 10 (0) (Final), 'Security in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East', 27 Mar. 1945, CAB 79/31. 
2r 
Kimche insists that oil was the most influential factor 
committing Britain to its Middle East strategy, 
7 but this 
view ignores Britain's long-established imperial interest 
in the area. Phillip Darby has observed: 
Although at times the protection of the routes of 
communication, the defence of the Far Eastern-terri- 
tories, or the maintenance of Britain's position in 
the Middle East became the focus of attention it was 
generally understood that the security of India was 
Britain's overriding concern. In this sense the pro- 
tection of India was part of an ingrained pattern of 
thought. It was above politics: it went beyond the 
issue of the moment. It was the touchstone to which 
policy must return: the ultimate justification for 
a defensive system which spanned half the world. 8 
Given the central position of India in the concept 
of imperial defence, it followed logically that the lines 
of communication would have to be preserved and protected; 
the Chiefs of Staff felt that bases in the Middle East 
would best serve that purpose. Such bases would be 
essential in any future war with the Soviet Union, 
regarded by the Chiefs of Staff as the major external 
threat to the region. Since the Egyptian Government was 
demanding that the British remove their Middle East head- 
quarters and base from Egypt--even though the 1936 treaty 
provided for a continued British presence in the canal 
zone--Palestine was the obvious alternative base area for 
Britain's Middle East forces. The Arabs, moreover, were 
threatening to seek Soviet support if British policies did 
not suit them, and George Kirk believes that as the 
Americans did not appear concerned about the Soviet threat 
to the Middle East, the British Government assumed 
responsibility for meeting the challenge and that this 
7 
Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars, pp. 3-23. 
8 Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of 
Suez, 1947-1968 (London, 1973), p. 1. 
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introduced an element of caution into British policy in 
the area. 
9 These perceptions of the situation in the 
Middle East thus convinced the Chiefs of Staff that 
British policy should favour the Arabs over the Jews. 
The Colonial Office view was that a solution 
should be produced as soon as possible in order to prevent 
or contain the violence it regarded as almost inevitable. 
To this end the Colonial Office favoured partition of 
Palestine, although not to the exclusion of any other 
promising suggestion. 
10 Constitutionally responsible for 
the internal administration of British colonies and pro- 
tectorates, the Colonial office nonetheless traditionally 
followed the lead of the senior British officials on the 
spot 
ll--in this case the High Commissioner for Palestine, 
General Sir Alan Cunningham, an ardent proponent of the 
partition solution. Cunningham recalls: 
In June 1946 I wired home something in these terms-- 
"The sands are running out. I am now definitely of 
the opinion that the only hope of getting a peaceful 
solution of the Palestine problem is to introduce a 
plan for partition. If this is not done at once I 
can see no hope for a peaceful solution. "n 
9 PHP Paper 10 (0) (Final), 27 March 1945, CAB 
79/31; Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, The 
Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (London, 1958), p. 
436; Kirk, pp. 3-6. 
10 Cabinet Palestine Committee minutes, 6 Sept. 
1945, CAB 95/14; Hall to Attlee, 19 Sept. 1945, CO 733/ 
461; CP 196, 'Memorandum by Secretary of State for the 
Colonies', 28 Sept. 1945, CAB 129/2. 
11 David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British 
Politics, 1945-1961 (London, 1971), pp. 15,41-2; J. M. 
of Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government: A Study 
the Ideas Expressed by the British Official Classes in 
Planning Decolonization, 1939-1964 (oxford, 1967), pp. 12, 
12 'Note by General Sir Alan Cunningham', Index to 
Papers as High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham Papers 
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The Colonial Office view accorded neatly with the 
government's colonial policy which rejected economic 
imperialism and which dictated that the test of any 
policy should be the advantage the policy accorded to the 
colony--not to Britain. 
13 But a policy which supported 
partition and which was opposed in principal to economic 
imperialism conflicted directly with the views of the 
Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. 
The Prime Minister, on the other hand, had to con- 
sider domestic priorities, primarily the conversion of the 
economy to peacetime standards while carrying out Labour 
policy to nationalize certain sectors of the economy and 
to provide a greater range of social services. This was 
by no means an easy task since the war had cost Britain 
about half of its foreign investments and a third of its 
merchant fleet; in 1945 Britain was spending abroad more 
than twice its earnings. The British economy had become 
dependent upon American assistance and in August 1945 the 
Lend-Lease Agreement ended, a severe blow to the economy. 
The end of the war, moreover, found British forces deployed 
around the world and this major drain on the economy could 
be righted only by demobilization, redeployment from over- 
seas, and substantially reduced defence spending. 
14 
Such 
(hereafter cited as Cunningham Papers), Box IV, File 2, 
Middle East Library, St. Antony's College, Oxford. 
13 Statement by Arthur Creech-Jones, 9 July 1946, 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, Vol. CDXXV, 
columns 342-6, cited in Goldsworthy, p. 140. 
14 Clement Attlee, As It Happened (New York, 1954), 
pp. 228-31; C. J. Bartlett, The Lon Retreat: A Short 
History of British Defence Polic , 1945-70 London, 1972), 
pp. 9,11-3; R. N. Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm: 
British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York, 1968), pp. 
34-5; William P. Snyder, The Politics of British Defence 
Policy, 1945-1962 (Columbus, Ohio, 1964), pp. 206-7,216. 
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action would accord with anti-colonialist sentiment in the 
Labour Party and in the United States, r-` 
15 but would find 
little favour with the Chiefs of Staff. The need to 
rebuild the economy, however, brought domestic policy and 
foreign policy into harmony on at least one issue: the 
need for Middle East oil, hence the need to retain Arab 
good will. 
Although there were periodic reports of disagree- 
ment within the Cabinet over the Palestine question, 
16 it 
appears that this was not a major factor in the policy- 
making process. As indicated earlier, the Foreign Office 
view had considerable support within the Cabinet solely on 
the basis of the Cabinet's perceptions of Britain's long- 
term interests in the area. Bevin's force of character, 
moreover, usually allowed his views to predominate. The 
decisions to give the United Nations responsibility for 
solving the problem and to withdraw from Palestine rather 
than implement the UNSCOP recommendations were consistent 
with perceived British interests. 
17 
The only opposition 
from within came from Arthur Creech-Jones, Colonial Secre- 
tary from October 1946, an ardent supporter of partition. 
15 Monroe, p. 151; Hurewitz, pp. 215,258; Cohen, 
p. 153. 
16-Diary 
of Field Marshall Viscount Alanbrooke 
(hereafter cited as Alanbrooke Diary), Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives, King's College, University of 
London, 5/11,4 Oct. 1945; Bethell, p. 295; The Palestine 
Post, 9 February 1947. 
17 Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers: 
The War and Post-War Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Earl Attlee 
(London, 1961), pp. 179-80; Francis Williams, interview 
with Elizabeth Monroe, Papers of Elizabeth Monroe (here- 
after cited as Monroe Papers), Middle East Library, St. 
Antony's College, Oxford; Arthur Creech-Jones, interview 
with Elizabeth Monroe, 29 Oct. 1958, Monroe Papers; 
Creech-Jones to Callaghan, 30 Nov. 1961, Papers of Arthur 
Creech-Jones, Box 32, File 3, f. 14, Rhodes House Library, 
Oxford. 
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But during his term as under-secretary he had been 
excluded from all discussion of Palestine and by the time 
he took office the-prevailing opinion in Cabinet was 
opposed to partition. He was, in any case, no match for 
Bevin in the 'give and take' of political bargaining. 
Consequently, as Francis Williams recalls, although there 
were murmurs against Bevin outside of Cabinet, decisions 
within were unanimous. 
18 
A second area where there was a general consensus 
in Cabinet-was the decision to involve the United States 
in the attempt to resolve the problem. 
19 The idea of 
involving the Americans was not unique to the Labour Party; 
before he was defeated in the general election in July 1945 
Churchill himself had stated: 
I do not think that we should take the responsibility 
upon ourselves of managing this very difficult place 
while the Americans sit back and criticize. Have you 
ever addressed yourself to the idea that we should 
ask them to take it over? I believe we should be the 
stronger the more they are drawn into the Mediter- 
ranean. ... I am not aware of the slightest advan- 
tage which has ever accrued to Great Britain from this 
painful and thankless task. Somebody else should-have 
their turn now. 20 
President Truman's intervention in the Jewish 
refugee question in August 1945 provided the British 
Government with a pretext for asking the Americans to 
share in the decision-making. Truman had endorsed the 
Zionist cause as a senator and once in office those views 
and his humanitarian concern for Jewish refugees impelled 
him to try to influence British policy in that direction. 
18 Creech-Jones to Callaghan, 30 Nov. 1961; Francis 
Williams interview, Monroe Papers; Bethell, pp. 294-6,301; 
Goldsworthy, pp. 14-6,50-1. 
19 Bethell, p. 211. 
20 Churchill to Stanley, 6 July 1945, CAB 119/147. 
24 
On 16 August 1945 he stated publicly that the United States 
Government felt that as many Jewish refugees as possible 
should be permitted to enter Palestine. He followed up 
this statement with a personal letter to Prime Minister 
Attlee on 31 August urging him to admit 100,000 Jews to 
Palestine immediately. 21 Truman's insistence on the matter 
of refugees annoyed Attlee but on the initiative of Ernest 
Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
the British Government 'turned the tables' on the Americans 
in October by proposing a joint commission to examine the 
refugee problem. After his public pronouncements Truman 
could hardly refuse. On 13 November the two governments 
announced the establishment of the Anglo-American Com- 
mission of inquiry, which would consult all concerned 
parties and make its recommendations to the two governments 
and ultimately to the United Nations. Bevin stated that 
the British Government would abide by the recommendations 
of an unanimous report. Enthusiastically, if unwisely, he 
declared at this time that he was staking his political 
future on the resolution of the Palestine question. 
22 In 
September 1947, however, the British Government was no 
closer to a settlement that would accommodate the interests 
of the British, the Arabs, and the Jews. The evidence 
afforded by the policy-making process during the intervening 
two years suggests why no such accommodation was possible. 
21 
Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The 
Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York, 1977), 
pp. 312-4; The Public Papers o the Presidents: Harry S. 
Truman, 1945 (Washington, D. C., 1961-63), p. 228; Truman to 
Attlee, 31 August 1945, Papers of the British Foreign 
Office, Public Record Office, Kew, Middlesex (hereafter 
cited as FO) 371/45380. 
22 Attlee to Truman, 14,17 Sept. 1945, FO 371/ 
45380; CM, 4 Oct. 1945, CAB 128/1; 'Proposed Anglo-American 
Commission of Inquiry', 9 Oct. 1945, CO 773/463; 
Christopher Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel (London, 1965), 
pp. 337-9. 
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Through the winter of 1945-46 the commission of six 
British and six American politicians held hearings and 
received evidence in Washington, London, Europe, Palestine, 
Cairo and elsewhere in the Middle East. American Zionist 
groups, the Jewish Agency, the Arab League, British 
officials in the area, the Palestine Government and other 
interested parties testified before the commission. The 
British Government extended the Jewish immigration quota 
by 1,500 per month following expiry of the White Paper 
limit, but illegal immigration and terrorism continued. 
23 
The main recommendations of the commission's unanimous 
report, released on 30 April 1946, were: first, that 
100,000 Jewish refugees be allowed to immigrate into 
Palestine as soon as possible; secondly, that the mandate 
be converted into a United Nations trusteeship which would 
prepare Palestine for independence as a unified binational 
state; and finally, that Jewish official institutions 
resume cooperation with the Palestine Government in the 
suppression of terrorism and illegal immigration. 
24 
Reaction to the report was mixed and these responses played 
a significant role in the sequence of events which deter- 
mined the outcome of this phase of policy-making. 
President Truman was delighted that the report 
vindicated his position on the refugee question and stated 
publicly that the transfer of the 100,000 Jewish refugees 
should be carried out 'with the greatest dispatch'. 
25 The 
British Government, however, was not so sanguine. It was 
23 Hurewitz, pp. 236-44. The Jewish Agency was 
the senior official Jewish organization under the mandate. 
24 HC[6808], 'Report of the Anglo-American Com- 
mission of Inquiry Regarding the Problems of European 
Jewry and Palestine', BPP (1946). 
25 Truman, Public Papers 1946, p. 218. 
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not prepared to proceed further without assurance that the 
Americans were prepared to share the military and financial 
burden of implementing the report. Influenced perhaps by 
the murder of seven British soldiers by Jewish insurgents 
in Tel Aviv only days before the report was released, 
Attlee and Bevin responded sharply to what they perceived 
as Truman's selective endorsement of the report. The Prime 
Minister stated that the government could not implement the 
recommendations until the 'illegal armies' were disbanded. 
Field Marshal Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, probably summarized the Cabinet's attitude accur- 
ately when he called the report 'a futile document, which 
puts us in. a more difficult position than ever. If they 
had made any further immigration dependent upon their sur- 
render of arms and abolition of the Jewish Army there might 
have been some sense in their recommendations. '26 
The report did not please the Arabs or the Jews. 
Further large-scale immigration was unacceptable to the 
Arabs and they rejected that suggestion out of hand. 
Jewish reaction ranged from outright denunciation by the 
extreme Zionist factions because the recommendations did 
not include the creation of a Jewish state, to cautious 
acceptance by moderate Zionists who were pleased by the 
immigration recommendation. They took exception, however, 
to the British Government's insistence on disbandment of 
the insurgent organizations; despite assurances from the 
Foreign Office that this did not mean Britain had rejected 
the commission's proposals, the insurgent organizations 
regarded it as proof of British duplicity--Britain was not 
abiding by its promise to implement a unanimous report. 
26 Hansard, 5th ser., CDXXII, 195-7; Kirk, p. 215; 
Alanbrooke Diary, 24 April 1946; see also Chapter VI. 
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Consequently the insurgents refused to surrender their 
arms. 
27 
British actions reinforced this viewpoint. On 5 
May the Foreign office announced that decisions on the 
commission's report would have to await consultation with 
the American Government and Jewish and Arab leaders. The 
delay enraged the Jewish community and drew criticism from 
the Labour Party membership at the annual party conference 
at Bournemouth. In response to this criticism Bevin stated 
that because of the existence of the illegal armies Britain 
would have to send another army division to Palestine if 
the 100,000 refugees were to be admitted, and he was not 
prepared to send the necessary troops. Bevin's speech, the 
delays, and the alleged discovery of government plans to 
destroy the Jewish underground organizations were used by 
the insurgents to justify a major terrorist offensive in 
Palestine in June; the British responded with a large-scale 
internal security operation intended to break up the 
illegal armies. 
28 
In July British and American delegations met in 
London to draft proposals for implementing the commission's 
report. They agreed on a federal state plan which divided 
Palestine into Jewish and Arab provinces and a central 
government district, all under British control. The United 
States would grant $50 million to develop the Arab area. 
If, however, the plan had to be imposed by force Britain 
was unwilling to do so alone; the American Government, 
27 GHQ Middle East Forces, 'Weekly Military Intel- 
ligence Review' (hereafter cited as WMIR), 3,10 May 1946; 
Papers of the British War Office, Public Record Office, 
Kew, Middlesex (hereafter cited as WO) 169/22882; 1 Infan- 
try Division, 'Intelligence Review', 7 May 1946, WO 169/ 
22957; Hurewitz, pp. 249-50. 
28 Kirk, pp. 217-8; Palestine Post, 13 June 1946; 
see also Chapter VI. 
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which had already committed itself financially to trans- 
porting and resettling refugees, refused to agree to commit 
American forces. 29 The Provincial Autonomy plan came under 
attack immediately by American Zionists and the former 
American members of the Anglo-American Commission, who 
regarded the proposal as an outright rejection of the com- 
mission's recommendations. Warned by his advisers that 
support of the plan might cost the Democratic Party Jewish 
votes in the off-year elections, Truman rejected the Pro- 
vincial Autonomy scheme and recalled his delegation. He 
urged the British to consider a new plan forwarded by the 
Jewish Agency. 30 
Implicated in the June insurgent offensive, many of 
its leaders detained by the security forces, the Jewish 
Agency had capitulated to British force majeure. In a 
significant retreat from its Zionist program, the Agency 
put forward a partition proposal for a Jewish state in 'an 
adequate area of Palestine'. 
31 The British Government 
insisted, however, that its own Provincial Autonomy plan 
head the agenda of a proposed London conference, although 
the other participants could advance counter-proposals. 
But the Jews refused to attend unless their detained 
leaders were released and allowed to represent them. The 
government refused to permit this, so the conference opened 
on 9 September without Jewish representation, and the 
29 CP 259, 'Long Term Policy in Palestine: Memor- 
andum by Secretary of State for the Colonies', 8 July 1946, 
CAB 129/11; 'Note of Points Agreed in Conversation with 
Foreign Secretary', 10 July 1946, FO 371/52538; Bethell, 
p. 257; Hurewitz, pp. 250,257. 
30 Donovan, pp. 319-20; Evan M. Wilson, 'The 
Palestine Papers, 1943-1947', Journal of Palestine Studies, 
II (1973), 51. 
31 Washington to Foreign Office, 9 August 1946, FO 
371/52551; see also Chapter VI. 
31 
Agency's plan was never discussed. The Palestinian Arabs 
also boycotted the talks, for similar reasons. The dele- 
gates representing several Arab states and the Arab League 
rejected the Provincial Autonomy plan and presented their 
own proposals for an independent Arab state. The confer- 
ence adjourned after one week, having accomplished 
nothing. 
32 
The end of the conference brought this phase of 
policy-making virtually to a close. It remained only for 
President Truman to"bury the joint Anglo-American initia- 
tive with one more public statement on immigration and the 
Jewish Agency's partition plan. Attlee responded angrily, 
convinced that Truman's statement was little more than a 
cheap ploy to win votes at British expense. 
33 The 
Palestine question was then set aside for several momths 
while the Cabinet dealt with other matters. In Palestine 
itself the situation deteriorated. 
The London conference reconvened at the end of 
January 1947. Bevin had intended to'lay before the par- 
ticipants a scheme which would merge the Provincial Auton- 
omy and Arab plans of 1946, producing an independent Arab 
state with several Jewish cantons. Increased Jewish immi- 
gration would be permitted for a limited period. The 
Cabinet, however, revived partition which was also sub- 
mitted to the conference. Not surprisingly, the Arabs 
rejected partition once again, and the Jews refused to 
agree to the cantonment plan. Bevin then redrafted a vari- 
of the cantonment proposal: local autonomy for ation 
Jewish and Arab areas under British supervision and 
32 'Palestine Policy: London Conference: Summary 
of Proceedings', CO 733/464; Williams, pp. 199-200; see 
also Chapter VI. 
33 Truman, Public Papers 1946, p. 44; Donovan, p. 
320' Bethell, pp. 282-3. 
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independence after five years; 100,000 Jewish immigrants 
during the first two years of trusteeship, after which 
immigration would depend upon Arab consent; and after 
independence, safeguards to protect the Jewish minority. 
Both sides rejected the plan and the conference ended 
shortly thereafter. On 18 February Bevin announced that 
the British Government intended to refer the Palestine 
problem to the United Nations. 
34 
On 15 May 1947 the United Nations General Assembly, 
acting at British request, appointed an eleven-nation 
Special Committee on Palestine. UNSCOP travelled to 
Palestine, Lebanon, and Europe, where it received testimony 
from many of, the same organizations and persons who had 
spoken to the Anglo-American Commission. Trans-Jordan and 
the Arab Higher Committee--which represented the Palestinian 
Arabs--declined to appear. UNSCOP presented its report on 
31 August 1947. The Committee agreed on certain basic 
principles: that Palestine should become an independent 
state as soon as possible; that it should have a democratic 
political structure and should constitute a single economic 
entity. There was, however, considerable disagreement on 
the manner by which these principles should be implemented. 
The result was a majority report recommending partition, 
and a minority report favouring a federal state plan. 
35 
Unwilling to be saddled with the enforcement of a solution 
that might involve further cost in lives and money without 
34 CM, 7,14 Feb. 1947, CAB 128/9; CP 30, 
'Palestine--Memorandum by Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs', 14 Jan. 1947, CP 31, 'Palestine: Future Policy-- 
Memorandum by Secretary of State for the Colonies', 16 Jan. 
1947, CAB 129/16; CP 59, 'Palestine--Memorandum by Secre- 
tary of State for the Colonies and Foreign Affairs', 13 
Feb. 1947, CAB 129/17; Bethell, pp. 293-7. 
35 Bethell, pp. 312-3; Hurewitz, pp. 284-6,289-90, 
295-8. 
33 
gaining any advantage for Britain, the British Government 
had refused to commit itself in advance to accepting or 
enforcing UNSCOP's recommendations. In view of Arab 
opposition to the majority recommendation, it was reluctant 
to. so commit itself now. On 26 September 1947, therefore, 
. the British Government announced its intention to surrender 
the Mandate and withdraw the administration and security 
forces from Palestine. 36 
The British. Government failed to develop a policy 
on the Palestine problem because it was not possible to 
accommodate Arab, British, and Jewish aspirations in a 
single solution. This failure exerted a significant 
influence on the course of the conflict in Palestine. 
First, the British refusal to adopt a policy acceptable to 
the Jews--substantially increased immigration at the very 
least--undermined the moderates in the Zionist movement 
and allowed the extremists to predominate. It contributed 
directly, therefore, to the increase in violence in the 
1945-47 period. 
37 Secondly, the absence of a policy forced 
the civil administration to rely almost solely on coercion 
to retain control of Palestine. It also denied the secur- 
ity forces a clear strategic objective in their counter- 
insurgency campaign and left them to apply repression in a 
political vacuum. 
36 CM, 20 Sept. 1947, CAB 128/10; Bethell, pp. 344, 
346; Hurewitz, p. 299; Sykes, p. 385. 
37 See Chapter VIII. 
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CHAPTER III 
COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE 
When General Cunningham took up the position of 
High Commissioner in November 1945 he was told simply that 
- the broad intention was 'td keep the peace in Palestine'. 
' 
This general directive defined the tactical role of the 
security forces in Palestine. Middle East Training Pamphlet 
no. 9, Part 13, 'Notes for Officers on Internal Security 
Duties' provided the army with a body of tactical doctrine 
for the peacekeeping role. The basic principles were: the 
application of the minimum degree of force necessary to 
achieve the object of any operations; and the need for 
close cooperation between the army and the civil authorities, 
specifically the police. The pamphlet discussed in detail 
. procedures for mobile columns; curfews; search operations; 
riot control; vehicle convoys; and the use of armoured 
vehicles and aircraft. The manual also covered legal 
aspects of internal security operations, training, and 
administrative matters such as accommodation, welfare, 
morale and discipline of troops. 
2 It was a comprehensive 
document, but Army headquarters in Palestine also dis- 
tributed supplementary instructions covering civil-military 
relations and responsibility for internal security. They 
defined the powers of the military forces under the 
1 'Extract from Note on Points Raised with Secretary 
of State by the High Commissioner', 14 Nov. 1945, CO 733/ 
461. 
2G (Training) Branch, GHQ Middle East Forces, war 
diary, WO 169/19521. 
35' 
emergency regulations to make arrests and to detain persons 
without trial, to conduct searches, to use lethal force, 
to impose curfews, and to try suspected insurgents before 
military courts. An important aspect of these arrangements 
was the dual system of control in Palestine: the civil 
authority--the High Commissioner and the government--was 
supreme, but operational control of the security forces, 
and thus the responsibility for maintaining law and order, 
was vested in the General Officer Commanding (GOC) British 
Forces in Palestine. 3 
Other headquarters and formations prepared still 
more detailed instructions on tactical procedures. The 
Armoured Corps staff at GHQ Middle East Forces issued a 
study on the use of armoured forces for tasks such as road 
patrols, convoy protection, clearance and occupation of 
urban areas. The limitations and vulnerability of armoured 
vehicles in urban conflict were emphasized. 
4 
The 6th Air- 
borne Division produced a brief on air support for internal 
security which included command and control procedures and 
the description of a new technique called the 'Air Pin' in 
which aircraft could be used to keep inhabitants inside a 
village while the army was laying a cordon around it. 
5 
In 
view of the political sensitivity of operations in Palestine 
higher authorities produced directives on several potenti- 
ally controversial issues. The use of tear gas was 
3G Branch, HQ Palestine, 'Operational Instruction 
(hereafter cited as 01) no. 21', 27 Oct. 1945, WO 169/19745; 
see also Appendix II. 
4 'Notes on I. S. Duties with Armd Units', in Brig- 
adier RAC GHQ Middle East Forces to CGS, 6 Nov. 1945, WO 
169/19566. 
5 
HQ 6 Airborne Division, 'Notes on Air'Support for 
Internal Security Operations', October 1945, WO 169/19685. 
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discussed extensively and approved at Cabinet level. 
6 
The 
Chiefs of Staff Committee restricted the use of heavy 
weapons in. areas likely to involve risk of innocent 
civilian casualties or damage to holy places. Discretion 
to approve use was vested in the Commanders-in-Chief Middle 
East, but was delegated to the GOC Palestine. 
7 In March 
1945 the War office issued to Middle East Forces a study on 
guerrilla warfare prepared in December 1944 for the forth- 
coming Allied occupation of Germany. The paper discussed 
the strengths, weaknesses, and tactics of guerrilla forces 
and advised that offensive action by security forces-- 
drives against centres of resistance, pursuit of sabotage 
bands, and searches--was the most effective weapon against 
guerrillas. Counter-guerrilla operations were seen as 
purely military operations. 
8 
Assisted by this apparent wealth of literature and 
doctrine, all formations commenced internal security train- 
ing on arrival in Palestine. The training was essential 
because, as Major-General Anthony Deane-Drummond has 
observed, 
the change in role from conventional military operations 
to internal security and para-military duties is 
neither rapid nor easy. Intense--and time-consuming-- 
periods of training are required to prepare troops 
tactically and psychologically for a role which although 
less lethal in terms of overall casualties than 
6 WO 32/10837; War Cabinet Minutes, 13 Nov. 1944, 
CAB 65/44. 
7 COSC, Minutes of Meetings 1945, CAB 79/28-9; 
Joint Planning Committee Paper 30, 'Use of Heavy Weapons 
in the Middle East', 15 Feb. 1945, CAB 84/6; GHQ Middle 
East Forces to HQ Palestine, 4 Jan. 1946, WO 169/22879. 
The term heavy weapons included naval bombardment, close 
air support, artillery and mortar fire. 
8 War Office, 'Guerrilla Warfare', December 1944, 
issued to Middle East Forces, 14 Mar. 1945, WO 169/19521. 
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conventional war is equally demanding and stressful. 9 
First,. the troops had to adjust their thinking from combat 
to peacekeeping. Secondly, the individual soldier had to 
learn the basic principles and tactical procedures laid 
down in the manuals, instructions, and directives, as well 
as acquainting himself with the structure of the police, 
the administration, and the two ethnic communities. This 
indoctrination process was particularly important for the 
6th Airborne Division, which had been sent to Palestine at 
short notice and did not have time to adapt gradually to 
the situation. 
10 Training was conducted at two levels: 
training teams from GHQ Middle East Forces taught street 
and house clearing and command and control of a company- 
sized mobile column. Formations and headquarters, in 
accordance with the basic manual, carried out signals 
exercises and tactical exercises without troops covering 
cordon and search operations and suppression of large scale 
insurrection. Two brigades, however, did not have time to 
run exercises before the first incidents at the end of 
October. 11 
The army tried to compensate for such gaps as there 
were in procedures or training by a continuous process of 
revising techniques on the basis of operational experience. 
Formations constantly refined roadblock techniques, as this 
was felt to be the best weapon against the highly mobile 
insurgents. The new methods included predesignated road- 
block locations which would be occupied rapidly following 
9 Anthony Deane-Drummond, Riot Control (London, 
1975), p. 64. 
10 R. D. Wilson, Cordon and Search: With 6th Air- 
borne Division in Palestine (Aldershot, 1949), pp. 19-20. 
11 12 GHQ Training Team, war diary 1945, WO 169/ 
19621; see also WO 169/19656,19697,19699,19701,19703, 
19743. 
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an incident, and mobile roadblocks which could be mounted 
briefly at random locations on principal roads. 
12 Head- 
quarters Palestine stressed constantly the need for close 
cooperation between the army and the police, for two 
reasons: first, the police were understrength and thus 
needed the army's manpower to help them to carry out their 
tasks; and secondly, the cooperation demanded by internal 
security theory did not always materialize in practice. 
Apart from providing additional manpower, efforts to 
improve collaboration included the designation of specific 
army units to advise and assist in the physical security 
of individual police stations and to monitor constantly 
police radio frequencies in order to provide immediate 
assistance in the event of attack. 
13 While in Egypt the 
2nd Infantry Brigade held a two-day study period on tac- 
tical problems and procedures for internal security. 
14 
The series of search operations conducted in June 
1946 proved valuable in exposing inadequacies in search 
procedures. Reports by the 1st Guards Brigade indicated 
12 HQ Palestine, 'Directive--Searches and Road 
Checks', January 1946, WO 169/23021; HQ 3 Inf. Div., 'Direc- 
tive no. 1--Information from I. S. Ops', 23 Jan. 1946, 
'Directive no. 3--Further Lessons of Recent Ops', 6 Feb. 
1946, 'Directive no. 5--Further Lessons: Roadblocks', 19 
Feb. 1946, WO 169/22967; HQ 3 Inf. Bde, 'Roadblocks', 5 
Apr. 1946, WO 169/22995. 
13 
HQ Palestine, '0I no. 67--Military Cum Police 
Operations', 17 June 1946, WO 169/23022; HQ Palestine, 
Combined Military and Police Action (June 1947), pp. 8-9, 
Private Papers of Mr. John Briance, London: HQ 3 Inf. Div., 
'Directive no. 6' and 'Directive no. 7--Wireless Communi- 
cations--Coordination with Palestine Police Network', 25 
Feb. 1946, WO 169/22967; HQ 9 Inf. Bde,, 'Internal Security 
Instruction no. 5', 2 Mar. 1946, WO 169/23003; see also 
Chapter IV. 
14 HQ 2 Inf. Bde,, 'Brigade I. S. Study Period-- 
General Summary and Notes', 6 Mar. 1946, WO 169/22993. 
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requirements for: unarmed troops to deal with passive 
resistance; special equipment and expert searchers to 
locate hidden arms; improved techrUiques and Hebrew inter- 
preters to hasten identification and interrogation; reserve 
troops to relieve weary search teams; and above all, 
secrecy and surprise in executing operations. 
15 
This body of doctrine and experience notwithstand- 
ing, there was a significant weakness in the army's internal 
security method: the strategic objectives of the Jewish 
insurgents were political, but British internal security 
doctrine took no account of the political context of the 
conflict. 
That this was the case should not be surprising. 
The history of the British Army's involvement in internal 
security, and the traditions and professional assumptions 
of the army itself, mitigated against consideration of the 
political aspects of warfare. From the Restoration until 
the creation of regular police forces in the 19th Century 
the army was primarily responsible. for enforcing law and 
order in Britain. But it was neither a satisfactory nor a 
popular arrangement, disliked by soldiers, politicians, and 
the public alike. The memory of Cromwell's military 
dictatorship stimulated opposition to the use of the army 
for internal policing, and the creation of civilian police 
forces marked a significant change in civil-military 
relations. By the end of the century the army was called 
out with declining frequency as the police became more 
proficient in dealing with civil disorder, and through a 
process of trial and error the basic principles of 'Aid to 
the Civil Power' emerged: the concept of minimum force, 
and the primacy of the civil power and the law, to which 
15 Brigadier E. H. Goulburn to HQ 1 Inf. Div. /North 
Palestine District, 21 June 1946, and 1 Guards Bde., 'Report 
on Op AGATHA 29 June-i July 1946', WO 169/22989. 
to 
the army was subject individually and collectively. 
16 Robin 
Higham has observed that soldiers not only detested aid to 
the civil power, they probably feared it, 
17 
and with good 
reason: acting in this capacity soldiers found themselves 
bound by two sets of laws--civil and military--and the 
overriding principle of minimum force. The arrangement had 
the appearance of a legal trap: 
A soldier is not allowed to excuse himself from taking 
life without dire necessity. The dilemma is painful 
because if he fails to come to the aid of the civil 
power he is liable to be held culpable and be punished 
by the courts. If he fails to use adequate force to 
quell the disorder, he may be court-martialled. If he 
uses too much force he may be tried for manslaughter. 18 
In the 20th Century political opinion began to 
insist that these standards be applied in the colonies. 
Prior to this period the army had suppressed colonial dis- 
order by employing its superior firepower and mobility 
without restraint. 
19 In the context of changing attitudes, 
however, the Amritsar incident of 1919 became a watershed 
in the development of internal security theory. Two lessons 
16 T. A. Critchley, The Conquest of Violence: Order 
and Liberty in Britain (London, 1970), pp. 60-2,67-71,118- 
9,143,147,155-7,167-71,177-8; Adam Roberts, 'The 
British Armed Forces and Politics: A Historical Perspec- 
tive', Armed Forces and Society, III (1977), 535-6; Brig- 
adier C. N. Barclay, 'Britis'h Forces and Internal Security: 
Past Experience and the Future', Brasse 's Annual, (1973), 
p. 84; Captain K. 0. Fox, 'Public Order: The Law and the 
Military', Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (hereafter 
cited as AQDJ), CIV (1974), 297-8,800. 
17 Robin Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain 
1918-1940, A Case Study (London, 1962 , p. 42. 
18 Critchley, p. 75. 
19 
The most comprehensive contemporary study of 
the suppression of colonial rebellions was Colonel C. E. 
Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice 
(London, 1896-1906). The army adopted the book as an 
official manual. 
It + 
emerged from the incident. First, the army realized that 
troops had to be properly trained in internal security pro- 
cedures. After Amritsar regulations and drills emphasized: 
closer cooperation with the police; warning the crowd 
before opening fire; and employing fire by selected marks- 
men under the direction of an officer against specific 
targets. Shooting was justified only to protect life and 
property or in self-defence. Control was to be handed back 
to the police as soon as possible and medical attention 
given to the wounded; a diary and photographs were required 
to record the events. 
20 
These procedures were gradually 
extended for use in riot control throughout the empire 
where, as one writer noted, the British Army gained 
an enviable reputation for restraint and effective- 
ness ... despite the lack of specialised training 
and the often makeshift nature of its equipment. 
Indeed, until comparatively recently it was not 
uncommon for a riot squad to be sent to disperse a 
hostile mob, armed solely with banners, batons and 
a copy of the latest internal security handbook. 21 
The second lesson was that incidents such as 
Amritsar could result in significant political consequences, 
which in turn could rebound to the detriment of the officer 
concerned. Most of the criticism of General Dyer came from 
Britain, from those who had not had to confront the situ- 
ation. It may be fair to suggest, as Robin Higham does, 
that the outcome of the Amritsar incident enhanced the 
army's distrust of politics and its distaste of internal 
security because, 
when the situation gets so bad that statesmen or mayors 
call in the military force, they are frequently more 
20 Deane-Drummond, pp. 13-15. 
21 R. B. Pengelley, 'Internal Security: Some 
Recent British Developments', International Defence Review, 
VI (1973), 620; for an account of-the procedures for employ- 
ing lethal force in internal security in India see Field 
Marshal Sir William Slim, Unofficial History (London, 1959), 
pp. 73,77,79-80. 
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interested in saving their own reputations by restor- 
ing order than in giving the professional soldier a 
clear mandate. Too often the soldier-finds himself 
attempting to back up men whose lack of planning has 
resulted in the soldier on the spot having to make 
unpalatable decisions which, ... he will later find the Cabinet repudiating. ... Politically naive, 
afraid for his career, the military man usually finds 
himself at a disadvantage in upholding his position 
and reputation because he will rarely resort to 
counter-pressure through a lawyer, Parliament, or 
the Press. 22 
With the example of General Dyer before them it is 
hardly surprising that the army wanted it clearly under- 
stood that troops should be employed only as a last resort, 
when the forces of local governments were unable or 
unwilling to act effectively. 
23 
At about the same time as the Amritsar incident 
the army became involved in an urban counter-insurgency 
campaign for the first time, in Ireland. Because it was a 
new experience many problems arose: cooperation with the 
police was never satisfactory; inadequate training led to 
reprisals by the army and police; the security forces were 
unable to build a dependable intelligence service; the 
legal ramifications of martial law were never resolved; 
and there was a noticeable lack of policy direction from 
the government. Most of the military operations involved 
fruitless raids and searches in urban areas, while mobile 
22 Higham, pp. 45,67; Barclay, pp. 87-90; 
Lieutenant-Colonel H. De Watteville, 'The Employment of 
Troops Under the Emergency Regulations', Army Quarterly, 
XII (1926), 283-92. The latter described internal 
security as an 'invidious and hateful' task. 
23 'Principles of Employment of Troops in Aid of 
the Civil Power', 1927, WO 32/3456; GHQ Middle East Forces, 
'Directive no. 245--Internal Security', 13 Apr. 1946, WO 
169/22879. 
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columns pursued the IRA in the countryside. 
24 There were 
lessons to be gained from this experience about the nature 
of insurgency, but to expect soldiers to consider the 
political aspects of conflicts such as the Irish rebellion 
would have required a revolution in thinking in the British 
Army; in the atmosphere prevailing in the inter-war era 
such a revolution was unlikely. With traditional officers 
in command the small professional army remained insulated 
against political questions. The Staff College discouraged 
discussion of such matters, and officers like T. E. Lawrence 
who had been involved in political warfare were out of 
favour. 25 Thinking and practice in internal security had 
thus coalesced along purely military lines. Consequently, 
army scholarship in the inter-war period exhibited only a 
modicum of comprehension of the nature of insurgency. 
In 1937 H. J. Simson, a retired officer, published 
the first considered analysis of urban insurgency and 
counter-insurgency. Drawing on the Irish experience, 
Simson observed that the insurgents used terrorism and prop- 
aganda to achieve two objectives: first, to support a 
carefully orchestrated political/psychological war against 
the government; and secondly, to isolate the police from 
the population, thereby ensuring a secure subversive organ- 
ization, and to disperse the security forces on defensive 
duties, thus denying them the initiative. Simson recog- 
nized that existing army doctrine had not been framed to 
deal with this type of war. To remedy this he favoured the 
24 Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in 
Ireland, 1919-1921: The Development of Political and 
Military Policies (London, 1975), pp. 50-1,53,55,85, 
146-81 153-7,200-5. 
25 Correlli Barnett, Britain and her Army, 1509- 
1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey (London, 
1970), pp. 410-2; A red Vagts, A History o Militarism, 
Civilian and Military (New York, 1959), p. 478. 
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application of martial law but if that was not possible he 
recommended the appointment of a single director of oper- 
ations, assisted by a joint civil/police/military staff to 
direct both the emergency and the normal administration. 
Most important, he felt the security forces had to destroy 
the clandestine subversive organizations and they needed, 
therefore, improved intelligence services. 
26 Simson did 
not have all the answers. He gave little consideration to 
the negative aspects of martial law, despite the limitations 
obvious from the Irish case. He said nothing about how to 
respond to propaganda. Nonetheless, the study was remark- 
able for its sophistication--it clearly defined insurgency 
as a form of political warfare, requiring both a political 
and a military response, and offered solutions to some of 
the problems posed by this form of conflict. 
Yet, officers assigned to internal security duties 
in Palestine in 1945 were urged to read, not Simson, but 
Sir Charles Gwynn's Imperial Policing, published at about 
the same time. 
27 While Gwynn recognized the importance of 
intelligence to both sides and the need for close cooper- 
ation between all elements of the security forces, his 
study revealed no understanding of the political nature of 
insurgency. For reasons he never makes clear he deliber- 
ately avoided drawing upon the Irish experience; instead, 
the case studies focussed on either rural insurrection or 
riot control operations in urban areas. 
28 In this sense it 
26 H. J. Simson, British Rule, and Rebellion 
(London, 1937), pp. 16,33-4,36,40-9,54-5, -77, 
81,83-98,105-6,121-4,126. 
27 Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policin (London, 
1934-39); see also Middle East Training Pamphlet no. 9, 
Part 13. 
28 Gwynn, pp. 8-9,11-12,21-3. The case studies 
also included two international crises, Chanak and Shanghai. 
J 
presaged the basic perceptions of the doctrine prescribed 
for Palestine in 1945. 
Recent experience, moreover, tended to lend 
credence to Gwynn's approach. In Palestine from 1936 to 
1939 the army had to suppress urban terrorism and rural 
guerrilla warfare. Although confined to defensive tasks in 
the early stages of the revolt, once on the offensive the 
army dealt harshly with the rebels. It eliminated urban 
terrorism in Jaffa by demolishing the centre of the old 
town and driving a road through it. In the rural areas the 
army searched villages, imposed collective fines, and 
demolished buildings thought to house guerrillas. Roads 
were driven into the hills where mechanized troops 
encircled and defeated the guerrillas. Military control, 
an abbreviated form of martial law, was imposed on 
Jerusalem, and military courts detained, deported, or exe- 
cuted activists and rebels. 
29 General Montgomery, then 
commanding a division in northern Palestine, typified the 
British approach: in Ronald Lewin's words, he 'clamped 
the countryside in a vice'. 
30 Gwynn's approach to imperial 
policing--with its emphasis on firepower and mobility 
little changed from Callwell's day31--was thus vindicated. 
Military measures had succeeded: there was no reason to 
assume that the Irish experience would determine the 
pattern of future colonial rebellions, or indeed that it 
would be repeated at all. Thus, in 1939 the Staff College 
ran only three brief internal security exercises, focussing 
on the principles of imperial policing, mobile columns, and 
29 Marlowe, Rebellion in Palestine, pp. 157-62, 
191,194-6,205,224- . 
30 Ronald Lewin, Montgomery as Military Commander 
(London, 1971), p. 22. 
31 Gwynn, pp. 20,24,28-32. 
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the lessons of Palestine; Gwynn's book became 'part of 
the stock in trade of any Staff College candidate or 
graduate'. 
32 
Although Samuel Huntington suggests that conserv- 
atism in strategic thinking is characteristic of profes- 
sional armies, 
33 it would be tempting to accuse the British 
Army of being too conservative or traditional in its 
approach to the problem of counter-insurgency. But the 
explanation is surely more complex. First, since insurg- 
ency is a political problem it seems reasonable to propose 
that the British Government, not the army, should have 
taken the responsibility for developing a counter-insurgency 
strategy. The government did not do so, however, because 
it felt the army would be responsible for handling any 
major outbreak of disorder. 
34 Furthermore, the Government 
had no policy upon which to build a strategy. The princi- 
pal lacuna in doctrine, therefore, lay in the civil rather 
than the military sphere. The evidence shows, moreover, 
that the army was unlikely to step in and fill the vacuum 
because it was receding from the internal security role 
and, in any case, it regarded insurgency as a political 
matter not within its purview. Secondly, in 1945 the 
British Army had just emerged from a major conventional war; 
its operational thinking was oriented in that direction. 
32 K. M. White, Librarian, Staff College, Camberley, 
Surrey to author, 8 February 1979; see also Lieutenant- 
General Sir Roger Bower, interview with author, 27 May 1976. 
33 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: 
The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New 
York, 1957), p. 71. 
34 Martin to Gater, 7 May 1946, CO 733/451. J. 
Bowyer Bell, On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation 
(Cambridge, Mass., , p. 177 suggests this was the typical British response once rebels had taken up arms. 
4,7 
The 6th Airborne Division was sent to Palestine not as an 
internal security force but to form the core of the Imperial 
Strategic Reserve, in anticipation of a"future war with the 
Soviet Union. It was based in Palestine because the country 
offered facilities for airborne training. Throughout the 
1945-47 period Headquarters Palestine expressed concern that 
internal security operations were interfering with the 
army's real task--to train for war. 
35 Internal security 
was not necessarily first priority. ' 
Third, conservatism in military thinking is often a 
virtue; it was and perhaps still is a military maxim that 
the best strategy is to force the enemy to fight on one's 
own terms, since this will allow one to exploit whatever 
advantages one has over the enemy. Conventional armies 
usually have greater firepower and mobility than insurgent 
armies, so it would be reasonable for conventional soldiers 
to define their strategy in such a way as to gain from 
these advantages, especially if they have been shown to be 
successful. As Brigadier Barclay notes, senior officers 
tend to take the view that 'If it worked well in the last 
war, why shouldn't it work well in the next one? '36 Thus 
Alun Chalfont is being unhistorical when he criticizes 
Field Marshal Montgomery, CIGS from 1946, for clinging to 
obsolete tactical concepts and for failing to comprehend 
that they would be unacceptable to post-war political 
opinion. 
37 It was not immediately apparent to the army-- 
nor to many others--that Britain's relationship with its 
35 Montgomery, pp. 435-6; Wilson, Cordon and Search, 
pp. 3-4,51-5; GOC Palestine, 'Directive G 2365 I Trg-- 
Training', 31 May 1946, WO 169/23022; Brigadier Maurice 
Tugwell, interview with author, 3 November 1976. 
36 Barclay, p. 81 
37 
Alun Chalfont, Montgomery of Alamein (London, 
1977), p. 344. 
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colonies had been altered in any substantial way by the 
war. Britain, after all, had emerged victorious so there 
was no reason for the army, unconcerned with political mat- 
ters, to question the assumptions upon which imperial rule 
and imperial policing were based. It was a rare officer 
indeed who could draw the analogy between colonial rebel- 
lion and the wartime resistance and suggest that the 
British Army could learn from its former enemies. 
38 So the 
old methods, proven by previous experience in Palestine, 
would suffice. 
Finally, alternatives were by no means obvious. Army 
doctrine emphasized that 'Troops are not trained for police 
duties ... and should not be so employed. 139 Further- 
more, troops were not to undertake on their own 'duties of 
a detective or. secret service nature' . 
40 The conditions 
under which the army provided aid to the civil power, dis- 
cussed very clearly in the manuals and regulations, 
appeared to preclude the use of unconventional tactics 
which by their very nature were disruptive, of dubious 
legality and politically dangerous. 
41 It is hardly sur- 
prising then that senior officers in Palestine expressed 
grave reservations about altering in any way the principles 
and procedures by which the army was used for internal 
security, for fear that the soldiers would not be adequately 
38 Major P. N. M. Moore, 'The Other Side of the 
Kampong', Army Quarterly, LII (1946), 248-52. 
39 HQ 1 Inf. Div., 'I. S. Scheme Palestine 1945', 
September 1945, WO 169/19656. 
40 War Office, 'Guerrilla Warfare', WO 169/19521. 
41 War Office, Directorate of Tactical Investi- 
gation, 'Report of a Working Party on Control of Special 
Units and Organisations', September 1946, WO 232/10B; 
M. R. D. Foot, 'Special Operations, Part I', in The Fourth 
Dimension of Warfare: 'Intelligence, Subversion, Resist- 
ance, ed. Michael Elliott-Bateman (Manchester, 1970), I, 
19,32. 
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protected by the law. 
42 
The absence of a political context in the army's 
internal security doctrine had several important conse- 
quences for the counter-insurgency campaign. First, there 
was a tendency--initially at least--to define the insurgent 
threat in purely military terms. The army, Bernard 
Fergusson observed later, could deal with guerrillas, who 
are merely soldiers fighting by irregular but recognized 
principles and conventions of war--this, in effect, is 
what the War office study on guerrilla warfare said--but 
it could not cope with the Jewish insurgents because they 
did not fight by the rules. 
43 Thus in January 1945 the 
GHQ Middle East Forces Joint Intelligence Committee issued 
an assessment which anticipated two phases of Jewish 
resistance to British policy: first the Jews would use 
passive resistance to paralyze the government and impede 
the operations of the security forces, coupled with the use 
of violence to resist searches for arms and to support 
illegal immigration operations. In the second phase they 
would launch an open insurrection, consolidating themselves 
within specific areas and appealing for foreign assistance 
44 
The influence of British internal security doctrine on this 
threat assessment is readily discernible: the army could 
suppress these actions with imperial policing methods. 
Techniques of aid to the civil power could be applied 
against the first phase, and large-scale repression, similar 
42 Major-General R. N. Gale to HQ Palestine, 23 Mar. 
1946, WO 169/22956. 
43 Bernard Fergusson, The Trumpet in the Hall, 
1930-1958 (London, 1970), p. 210. 
44 
Joint Intelligence Committee, GHQ Middle East 
Forces, 'Probable Jewish Reactions and the Potential Threat 
of Jewish Forces in Palestine in Certain Eventualities', 
11 Jan. 1945, CAB 119/147. 
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to that used in the pre-war Arab revolt, against the 
second. Subsequently intelligence-analysts modified their 
views on the nature of the security problem, even to the 
extent of conceding that the insurgents had 'an enormous 
advantage over the forces of law', 
45 but army operations 
continued to reflect the influence of the earlier view. 
"Large-scale operations were the rule, not the exception. 
46 
This, after all, is what armies are organized and trained 
to do and it had succeeded in Palestine before. 
In any case, this tendency was not necessarily 
inappropriate provided that there was sufficient intelli- 
gence to make the operations effective, and a propaganda 
program to make the effectiveness visible and credible. 
The civil authorities, however, fulfilled neither require- 
ment in Palestine and the army was drawn into intelligence- 
gathering and the propaganda battle. The second principal 
weakness of the internal security doctrine was that it did 
not prescribe a role for the army in either field. Intelli- 
gence was regarded as a police responsibility and propaganda 
a political weapon, both by definition beyond the army's 
purview. 
47 Consequently, the army did not have the per- 
sonnel appropriately trained and experienced to correct the 
deficiencies in these crucial areas. Internal security 
doctrine, therefore, was a direct cause of ineffective 
security force operations. 
45 Bethell, p. 217. 
46 
See Chapter VI and Appendix VII. 
47 Neither topic was covered in 'Notes for Officers 
on Internal Security Duties'. See also Chapters IV and 
VII. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLICE, INTELLIGENCE, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
In his study of the breakdown of law enforcement 
in insurgent situations, Tom Bowden concludes that an 
important lesson from these cases is summarized in Karl 
Popper's observation that 'Institutions are like fort- 
resses. They must be well designed and properly manned. 
" 
The Palestine Administration of 1945 was neither: unable 
to govern by consent or consensus, beset by insurgent 
violence, the administration had to turn Palestine into a 
police state in order to retain control of the country. 
The tools of repression, however, were inadequate: in 
counter-insurgency, as Major-General Frank Kitson has 
observed since, 'the problem of defeating the'enemy con- 
sists very largely of finding him'. 
2 The security forces 
in Palestine were unable to collect, develop and exploit 
successfully intelligence sufficient to defeat the insur- 
gents; nor were they able to prevent insurgent penetration 
of the intelligence services. Consequently, the security 
forces lost the intelligence battle which was, Menachem 
Begin later concluded, 'the decisive battle in the struggle 
3 for liberation'. 
1 Quoted in Tom Bowden, The Breakdown of Public 
Securit : The Case of Ireland 1916-1921 and Palestine 
1936-1939 (London, 1977), p. 309. 
2 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Sub- 
version, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (London, 1971), p. 95. 
3 Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun 
(London, 1951), p. 100. 
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Before dealing with the reasons for this defeat, 
it is essential to examine briefly the organization of 
the police and the military intelligence agencies. The 
Palestine Police Force consisted of some 20,000 regular 
and auxiliary personnel, but the organization and size of 
the force fluctuated constantly during the period under 
study. As in Britain the force was responsible to the 
courts for enforcement of the law but the GOC exercised 
operational control of the police. An Inspector General 
(IG), a Deputy and two Assistant Inspectors General 
carried out the senior administrative operations of the 
force. Palestine was divided into six police districts, 
each run by a Superintendent. The regular police carried 
out most of their work at the district level, operating 
from more than 100 police stations and posts across the 
country. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was 
responsible for police intelligence work and its Political 
Branch, under an Assistant Superintendent, had primary 
responsibility for anti-terrorist operations. Each dis- 
trict had its own CID detachment. 
4 The Police Mobile 
Force (PMF), a para-military gendarmerie formed in 1944, 
consisted of nearly 2,000 men organized like a motorized 
infantry battalion in six companies, equipped with armoured 
cars, lorries, motorcycles, machine guns, and mortars. 
The PMF was created to provide a mobile striking force to 
support the district police in the control of civil dis- 
order and thus to obviate total reliance upon the army for 
4 Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine: 
Memorandum Submitted to the Anqlo-American Commission o 
Inquiry by the Government of Palestine (London, 1946), 
I, 119-20, II1 582; GSI, Short Handbook of Palestine 
(Jerusalem, 1944), p. 72, Briance Papers; see also Appendix 
III. 
. 
ý-. 3 
this task. 5 The auxiliary police carried out certain 
tasks in order to free the regular police for more 
important duties. The largest auxiliary force were the 
Jewish Settlement Police, a government-financed uniformed 
force of 12,800 grouped in ten companies each under a 
British Police Inspector. Their task was to protect 
Jewish settlements and they were equipped with an assort- 
ment of small arms. The Railway Protection Police was 
another British-administered Jewish force which guarded 
stations, blockhouses, and vulnerable points on the Haifa- 
Lydda line. Temporary Additional Police enlisted for six 
months under the same conditions, regulations, and pay as 
the regular police and were assigned to general guard 
duties. In 1945 this force consisted of 1,650 Arabs and 
Jews. 6 
Much less is known about the military intelligence 
agencies in Palestine. Army formations, from battalion to 
division level, had their own intelligence officers and 
small intelligence staffs. A lieutenant-colonel commanded 
GSI, the intelligence branch at Army Headquarters in 
Jerusalem. The Defence Security Office was responsible 
for counter-intelligence: security of installations, 
equipment, information, and personnel through Palestine. 
A lieutenant-colonel directed a staff of eight intelligence 
officers at Headquarters Palestine and five Area Security 
5 'War Establishment: Police Mobile Force, -Middle 
East', 16 July 1944, CO 733/451; Sir Richard Catling, 
interview with author, 14 February 1979. By 1945 only six 
of eight intended companies had been formed. 
6 GS(Ops) British Forces Palestine and Trans- 
Jordan, 'The Development of the Palestine Police Under 
Military Control', June 1939, WO 201/831; Government of 
Palestine, Survey, II, 590-2; Bowden, pp. 158-60. 
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Officers in the main cities.? Field Security Sections, 
which corresponded approximately to Defence Security at 
formation level, were responsible for: controlling access 
to military formations and installations; security of 
materials and information; vetting and dismissal of 
civilian labour; civil-military relations and monitoring 
of rumours and anti-British propaganda; and gathering use- 
ful background information or intelligence for the local 
brigade or divisional headquarters. Field Security per- 
sonnel were also supposed to serve as a liaison between 
army commanders and staffs in formations and GSI, Defence 
Security, civil and military police. A Field Security 
Officer, usually a captain, commanded a section which 
included at least 13 other ranks and was virtually self- 
contained; it could operate independently or attached to 
a larger formation. Field Security were often called upon 
for operational or special intelligence work and several 
sections were operating in Palestine at any one time. 
8 
The Special Investigation Branch of the Royal Military 
Police, though not specifically an intelligence organiz- 
ation, bears mentioning since within the context of 
investigating criminal offences within Army installations 
and units the branch conducted some intelligence work 
related to internal security. 
9 The formal machinery 
7 Defence Security Office Palestine, war diary 
1945-46, WO 169/19758,23031; Jock Haswell, British 
Military Intelligence (London, 1973), p. 169; The Rt. Hon. 
Sir Martin Charteris to author, 9 November 1976; Mr. John 
Briance, interview with author, 3 March 1977. 
8 GHQ Middle East Forces, 'Directive no. 245-- 
Internal Security', 23 June 1945, WO 169/19510; 3 Field 
Security Section Middle East Forces, war diary, 1945, WO 
169/21414; Haswell, pp. 167-8. 
9 A. V. Lovell-Knight, The Story of the Royal 
Military Police (London, 1977), pp. 275-89. 
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intended to facilitate cooperation between these diverse 
organizations were the security committees. The military 
commander of a particular district chaired the local 
security committee which considered all matters relating 
to internal security in the area. The committee also 
included the District Commissioner--representing the civil 
government, the District Superintendent of Police (DSP), 
the Area Security Officer and a military intelligence 
officer. Recommendations on policy or financial matters 
were forwarded for approval to the central security com- 
mittee, which included the Chief Secretary of the govern- 
ment, the IG of Police, the head of GSI, and the Defence 
Security Officer. These committees usually met on a weekly 
basis, more often if necessary, and the High Commissioner 
frequently chaired meetings of the central committee. 
10 
As noted in the previous chapter, internal security 
doctrine dictated that the army's role was to assist the 
police, who would be primarily responsible for gathering 
intelligence. There were practical reasons for this 
separation of responsibilities, quite apart from the army's 
perceptions of the internal security task: the police 
were supposed to be more familiar with the terrain, the 
people, -and the local sources of information; the CID was 
oriented to and experienced in anti-terrorist operations; 
and the police had the power to act against the insurgents 
under the law even before the army was called in. In 
theory this system should have worked well; in practice it 
did not. The ability to develop and exploit operational 
intelligence sufficient to defeat the insurgents depended 
almost entirely on the capabilities of the police and the 
10 HQ 21 Area, '0I no. 21', 21 Nov. 1945, WO 169/ 
19821; GSI, Short Handbook, p. 7; Briance, interview; 
Catling, interview, 28 May 1976; Mr. R. W. D. Pawle, 
interview with author, 18 May 1978. 
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establishment of a close and harmonious working relation- 
ship between the police and the army. In Palestine army- 
police relations were in many respects neither close nor 
harmonious, and a dearth of operational intelligence stood 
as mute testament to serious deficiencies in the police. 
The crux of the problem lay in the near complete 
isolation of the police from the Jewish community. In 
1947 General Dempsey observed: 
In England there are I suspect just as many murders 
as in Palestine. In England the murderer is caught 
because the people ... are on the side of law and 
order and assist the police. in Palestine the people 
do not assist the police and the murderers are not 
caught. ... The people not being on our side the 
police find it difficult if not impossible to get 
evidence. 11 
A sympathetic population, clandestine organization, 
and the anonymity afforded by the large urban centres com- 
bined to protect the insurgents from constant surveillance 
by the police. While this situation was largely the 
product of general Jewish hostility to the British admin- 
istration, the structure of the police force itself was at 
least part of the problem. It was a militarized police 
force organized along traditional colonial lines. In his 
study of the colonial police Sir Charles Jeffries sug- 
gested that while the British concept of the unarmed 
individual policeman had a profound impact on the develop- 
ment of colonial police forces, the inherent differences 
of colonial situations meant that 
there was much attraction in ... a "para-military" 
organisation or gendarmerie, armed and trained to act 
as an agent of the central government in a country 
where the population was predominantly rural, commun- 
ications were poor, social conditions were largely 
11 Dempsey to Montgomery, 4 Mar. 1947, Diary of 
Major-General H. E. Pyman (hereafter cited as Pyman Diary), 
6/1/3, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. 
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primitive, and the recourse to violence by members of 
the public who were "agin' the government" was not 
infrequent. 12 
Simon Hutchinson offers further insight in his 
discussion of the police role in counter-insurgency. He 
suggests that the very nature of a colonial regime tended 
to make the police increasingly partial and more closely 
identified with the government. The primary role of such 
a'force was not the prevention and detection of crime but 
to ensure that the government was not overthrown by 
violence or subversion. A colonial police force thus 
required two capabilities: an efficient political intel- 
ligence branch to prevent subversion, and a para-military 
arm to deal with small-scale guerrilla activity and riot 
control. 
13 
The Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) provided 
the most influential model for the colonial police and had 
a direct impact on the creation of the Palestine Police: 
in 1922 the British Government enlisted a battalion of 
gendarmerie consisting mainly of former members of the RIC 
and its auxiliary division, the 'Black and Tans'. Com- 
manding this force in Palestine was Major-General Hugh 
Tudor, lately Chief of Police in Ireland. From that point 
the Palestine Police developed along the lines later 
identified by Sir Charles Jeffries--conversion into a 
British model civilian police force in 1925-26 while 
retaining certain para-military features for internal 
security. 
14 
12 Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Police 
(London, 1952), pp. 21,23,31. 
13 
Simon Hutchinson, 'The Police Role in Counter- 
insurgency Operations', Royal United Services Institute 
Journal for Defence Studies (hereafter cited as JRUSI), 
CXIV (1969), 56-7. 
14 HC[5479], 186, BPP (1937); Jeffries, pp. 3103; 
Bowden, pp. 153-7,163-73. 
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Quite apart from the fact that the army exercised 
operational control over the force, militarization was most 
visibly manifest in the appointment of military officers to 
senior positions in the command structure. On 10 May 1946 
Colonel William Nicol Gray, Royal Marines, succeeded John 
Rymer Jones as Inspector General. It was a controversial 
appointment. The Palestine Government had requested an 
experienced policeman but the Colonial office, convinced 
that the army would be responsible for handling any major 
disturbances, felt that a non-policeman would be able to 
fill the position so long as he had an experienced police- 
man as his deputy. They pointed out that several recent 
Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police had not been 
policemen themselves, though the comparison was hardly 
relevant. Nonetheless, the Colonial Office criteria 
weighed heavily in favour of a military man and when the 
only acceptable police candidate withdrew Colonel Gray 
came highly recommended. 
15 
Some policemen resented Gray's 
appointment which they felt reflected the British Govern- 
ment's preoccupation with the military aspects of the 
terrorist problem. They felt Gray was too concerned with 
'fire-power and mobility' to give appropriate attention to 
the largely administrative aspects of real police work. 
16 
In his own defence Colonel Gray has pointed out that his 
mandate was to build up the strength of the force, a task 
for which it was expected that his experience in training 
and leading young men would be most valuable. 
17 
15 Palestine Police, 'Annual Administrative Report 
(hereafter cited as AAR) 1946', CO 814/40; 'Police Vacancy-- 
Inspector General', CO 733/451. 
16 Fergusson, p. 202; Briance, interview, 26 May 
1976; Catling, interview, 28 May 1976; Mr. H. B. Shaw, 
interview with author, 2 Feb. 1977. 
17 Colonel W. N. Gray, interview with author, 23 
July 1976. 
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There was at least one more significant military 
appointment to the police. In December 1946 Colonel 
Bernard Fergusson, a Black Watch officer and Chindit 
veteran, went to Palestine from the Combined Operations 
Headquarters to take command of the Police Mobile Force. 
By the time he arrived, however, the Palestine Government 
had decided to absorb the PMF into the district establish- 
ments and Colonel Fergusson merely presided over its dis- 
bandment. He was given a new position--Assistant Inspector 
General Operations and Training--and command of the new 
training depot where he directed his attention to the 
development of fresh techniques to combat terrorism. 
Colonel Fergusson (now Lord Ballantrae) insists that he 
tried to be as unmilitary as possible but, like Colonel 
Gray, he was the object of some resentment among regular 
policemen. 
18 These appointments highlight the significant 
divergence of opinion between, on the one hand, the 
Palestine Government and the security forces--who were in 
general agreement on the importance of an effective police 
force--and on the other. the Government in London, which 
was inclined to minimize the role of the police. 
The militarization of the police was also reflected 
in the composition of the other ranks. From its early 
associations with the RIC the Palestine Police had never 
shaken completely its para-military image. In the 1930's 
the British section of the force was composed of a mixture 
of ex-soldiers, adventurers, and a few professional colonial 
policemen. The government attempted to improve the profes- 
sional quality of the personnel but the demands of the Arab 
revolt forced the police to recruit more of these 'soldiers 
18 Palestine Police, 'AAR 1946' ;. Palestine Post, 
25 Dec. 1946; Fergusson, pp. 201,202,210; Brigadier The 
Lord Ballantrae to author, 20 July 1978. 
1.0 
of-fortune', some of whom were retained against their will 
at the outbreak of the war. They did not make good 
policemen. 
19 As early as 1943 the British Government 
recognized that the British section would require sub- 
stantial reinforcement when the war ended; two-thirds of 
the British section were on contract only for the duration 
of the war. This anticipated shortfall, quite apart from 
any perceived need for a gendarmerie, led to the creation 
of the Police Mobile Force as a reservoir of British 
recruits ready to fill vacated positions at the end of the 
war. But the war cut off sources of manpower and hampered 
recruiting and the replacement of casualties. Conse- 
quently the Police Mobile Force never reached its full 
complement and in November 1945 the British section of the 
police force as a whole was substantially understrength. 
20 
Concerned about a downward trend in recruiting and doubtful 
in any case that ex-soldiers could become good policemen, 
the Chief Secretary was moved to comment: 
we are threatened with the prospects of very serious 
troubles in which the absence of one or two British 
constables in the right place at the right mcnent may 
make a great difference. 21 
Police work makes entirely different demands upon 
a man than soldiering, but despite expressed misgivings 
the police continued to recruit from the armed forces until 
19 'Police: Enlistment of Dismissed Constables', 
CO 733/417; 'The Development of the Palestine Police Under 
Military Control', WO 201/831; Bowden, pp. 166-7,171-3. 
20 WCP 510, 'Palestine Gendarmerie--Memorandum by 
Secretary of State for the Colonies', 16 Nov. 1943, CAB 66/ 
43; WCP 559, 'Security in Palestine', 7 Oct. 1944, Papers 
of the British Prime Minister's Office 4/52/5; General Sir 
Bernard Paget, C in C Middle East Forces, 'Middle East 
Review 1946', WO 169/22881; Catling, interview, 14 Feb. 
1979. 
21 Shaw to Eastwood, 26 Nov. 1945, CO 733/451. 
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August 1947, undoubtedly because there were few sources 
other than serving or demobilized servicemen. Moreover, 
apprehensive that a major recruiting campaign would draw 
too much attention to the deteriorating situation in 
Palestine, the British Government postponed a large-scale 
recruiting program until June 1946 by which time the 
British section of the force was 48 per cent understrength. 
Casualties, resignations and-normal wastage (retirements, 
transfers, terminated contracts) outstripped recruiting in 
1946 to the point that in order to maintain the strength 
of the urban forces at levels sufficient to carry out normal 
police duties, the Police Mobile Force was disbanded piece- 
meal, its manpower transferred to the district forces. 
Recruiting did not exceed wastage until January 1947 and 
thereafter declined constantly. 
22 
The recruiting process and the transfers had an 
adverse effect on training standards. The recruits' course 
was reduced from three months to one and Colonel Fergusson 
concluded that most new policemen had received 'far less 
training than the average private soldier'. 
23 Sir Charles 
Wickham, who visited Palestine in late 1946 to advise on 
modernization of the police, found that neither the 
recruits nor those transferred from the Police Mobile Force 
received proper instruction in police duties. 
24 Trained 
to operate in well-armed organized bodies, the former 
members of the PMF were ill-prepared to patrol a beat as 
22 'Police Force--Recruitment of Other Ranks', 
'Palestine Police--Recruitment Propaganda', CO 733/451; 
'Palestine Police--Recruitment of Other Ranks', CO 537/ 
2268; Palestine Police, 'AAR 1946'; Jeffries, p. 167; see 
also Chapter VI. 
23 
Fergusson, p. 202. 
24 'Report by Sir Charles Wickham' (hereafter cited 
as 'Wickham Report'), 2 Dec. 1946, CO 537/2269. 
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individual policeman. Moreover, less than 4 per cent of 
the British police spoke Hebrew, a factor which further 
isolated them from the Jewish community, their most 
important source of information on the insurgents. 
Increased recruiting could not solve the problem because, 
as Colonel Gray pointed out, 'You can't suddenly recruit a 
lot of police efficiently into a multi-language society. .. 
A British constable who doesn't speak Hebrew isn't going to 
get very far. '25 In spite of the obvious limitations, how- 
ever, even Sir Charles Wickham concluded that the police 
would have to continue to recruit large numbers of inexper- 
ienced men just to bring the force up to established 
strength. He recommended that this be accompanied by an 
intensive training scheme. 
26 
The British police also suffered from low morale. 
In letters to Members of Parliament in late 1945, they 
complained about restrictions on the use of weapons and on 
the conduct of investigations, of intimidation by Jewish 
insurgents, and of inaccurate press reports. 'Small wonder 
then, ' one policeman wrote, 'that members of the Palestine 
Police are resigning in their hundreds. '27 Government 
policy caused confusion by first denying that the police 
would ever be forbidden to use their arms, then justifying 
the withdrawal of police in the face of threats. While 
conceding that restraint was bad for morale, the Chief 
Secretary emphasized that it was 'best calculated to serve 
the interests of H. M. Government in the circumstances 
25 
Palestine Police, 'AAR 1946'; Gray, interview. 
26 'Wickham Report'. 
27 75015/151A, CO 733/456. In interview, 26 May 
1976, John Briance commented that those recruited from the 
armed forces brought with them a 'return home malaise' and 
the attitude that Palestine was 'a bloody mess with no 
future'. 
prevailing'. 
28 
But such concession to intimidation was 
unlikely to further the principal objective of the counter- 
insurgency campaign--'to keep the peace'--when the insur- 
gents were attacking the police with the specific aim of 
depressing morale and blinding the CID. 
29 
If these difficulties were not sufficient to under- 
mine the effectiveness of the police, the CID suffered 
from-structural weaknesses which gravely hampered criminal 
and political investigation. Although the Palestine Police. 
had a higher proportion of CID personnel than any normal 
police force at that time, they were not organized to deal 
effectively with the insurgency. More than half of the 
627 CID personnel were based at police headquarters and 
only 80 were assigned to the political branch. None of the 
remainder in the district CID were assigned specifically to 
political work. Owing to lack of incentive, the risks and 
difficulty of the work and the inability to produce spec- 
tacular results over long periods, they tended to ignore 
political investigation. Consequently, the ordinary CID 
was underemployed while the political branch was chronic- 
ally overworked. By 1945 the activities of the political 
branch had expanded to such an extent that officers did not 
have sufficient time to follow up political intelligence 
reports, thereby leaving a significant lacuna in the intel- 
ligence process. Furthermore, police stations requiring 
plain-clothes officers to exploit important intelligence 
were forced to apply to district headquarters, a process 
which inevitably delayed operations. Financially, criminal 
investigation had a low priority. The government postponed 
and underspent purchase of scientific equipment for CID and 
28 Gort to Hall, 12 Oct. 1945, FO 371/45381; Shaw 
to Hall, 8 Nov. 1945, CO 733/456. 
29 See Chapter VI. 
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in 1946-47 the police spent only £50,000 on criminal 
investigation, out of a budget of more than Z6 million: 
The laboratory and records section required more suitable 
accommodation. 
30 
In view of the difficulties involving the British 
section of the police, one solution might have been to rely 
more uponrthe Palestinian members. The Palestinians, how- 
ever, posed a whole new set of problems. Of the nearly 
2,800 serving in the regular force, only 725 were Jews, all 
but 40 serving in the ranks. Until mid-1946 there had been 
no regular Jewish policemen 'on the beat', a lapse that 
Colonel Gray set about immediately to change. 
31 Insurgent 
intimidation and infiltration rendered the few Jewish mem- 
bers of the CID unreliable from a security standpoint. 
Living unprotected in the Jewish community, they succumbed 
to pressure from the insurgents and, caught in a dilemma of 
conflicting loyalties, some Jewish policemen began to work 
for'both sides. In such situations, William F. Whyte has 
observed: 
the smoothest course for the officer is to conform to 
the social organisation with which he is in direct 
contact and at the same time to try to give the 
impression ... that he 
is enforcing the law. He 
must play an elaborate role of make believe. 32 
The police took no special precautions to deal with 
the problem and as a result, 'security was a nightmare. If 
you wanted to keep anything secret you did not tell anybody 
... nothing passed to a Jewish officer could be kept from 
30 'Wickham Report'; Government of Palestine, 'Draft 
Estimates, 1945-46', CO 733/450; Government of Palestine, 
'Annual Report of the Accounts and Finances, 1945-46,1946- 
47', CO 814/40. 
31 Palestine Police, 'AAR 1946'; Gray, interview. 
32 Quoted in Brian Chapman, Police State (London, 
1970), P. 97. 
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the Jewish Agency or the Haganah. '33 Menachem Begin claims 
that the Irgun knew in advance about security force oper- 
ations and the evidence confirms some extraordinary 
breaches of security: Top Secret documents were stolen 
from the police and the security of at least one major 
search operation was compromised. 
34 This led to such 
anomalous situations as existed in Tel Aviv, where the 
entirely Jewish police force carried out all normal police 
functions but was excluded from anti-terrorist operations, 
which were handled by a British detachment. 
35 Unable to 
trust the Jewish members of the force, the British section 
had to work on their own, attempting to gather intelligence 
in a hostile and deteriorating environment. By the end of 
1946 it was becoming apparent even to outside observers 
that the police were unable to cope with the situation. 
British correspondent O'Dowd Gallagher exclaimed: 
We are losing the fight against the Jewish Terrorists. 
Our main weapon against them, the Palestine Police 
Force, is inadequate ... not only in numbers, but in 
equipment, training, and to a slightly less degree, 
knowledge of the Terrorists' organizations, plans, 
members and generally what the Army calls "intelli- 
gence". ... the name of the British Army would not be besmirched if the Palestine Police had been numer- 
ically strong enough to do their own job themselves. 36 
33 Briance, interview, 3 Mar. 1977. 
34 HQ Palestine, war diary, October 1945, WO 169/ 
19745; 1 Inf. Div., 'Weekly Intelligence Review (hereafter 
cited as WIR) no. 11', 24 June 1946, WO 169/22957; 
Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 7 Aug. 1947, FO 371/61784; 
Minutes of Security Conference, 15 Aug. 1947, Cunningham 
Papers, IV/1; Efraim Dekel, Shai: The Exploits of Haganah 
Intelligence (London and New York, 1959), pp. 127-35,142- 
7,331-9,344-59; Bethell, pp. 248-9; Yisrael Medad, 
National Studies Institute, Jerusalem to author, 31 Oct. 
1978; Begin, p. 99; see also Chapter VI. 
35 1 Parachute Brigade, 'Intelligence Summary 
(hereafter cited as ISUM) no. 2', 25 Oct. 1946, WO 261/209. 
36 Daily Mail, 10 Dec. 1946; Statement by Lord 
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The weaknesses in the police force combined with 
army attitudes towards intelligence-gathering to place 
army-police relations on a poor footing from the start. 
The army had gained considerable experience of intelligence 
work during the war but it was never entirely comfortable 
with the task and, as shown in the previous chapter, was 
inclined to view the insurgents as a military force to be 
destroyed with military means. 
37 The policeman, Simon 
Hutchinson suggests, sees the insurgents as highly 
organized, dangerous criminals and thus favours the meth- 
odical approach--evidence, written statements, photo- 
graphs--which is likely to frustrate his army colleague 
although it is far more likely to produce results in court 
months later. 
38 Thus while most former army officers and 
policemen felt that day-to-day relations were satisfactory, 
army criticism of both the police force and the quantity 
and quality of intelligence suggests that there was sub- 
stantial friction between the two organizations. Major- 
General Anthony Farrar-Hockley, at that time a company 
commander, feels that 
the fundamental problem is that the army is not called 
in until the police are exhausted. Then you have the 
worst of all possible situations--the police are played 
out and feel that their efforts have not been 
Altrincham, 23 April 1947, Hansard (Lords), 5th ser., CXLVII, 
63-4. Palestine did not even have a compulsory system of 
population registration and identity cards: see 'Compulsory 
Registration 1944-45', CO 733/457. 
37 
Haswell, pp. 12,192-4; Donald McLachlan, 
'Intelligence: The Common Denominator, Part II', in 
Elliott-Bateman, I, p. 71. There was substantial internal 
opposition to the creation of even a small permanent intel- 
ligence corps in the post-war army. 
38 Hutchinson, pp. 57-8. In his report Sir Charles 
Wickham described terrorism as 'crime in its most highly 
organised form', which the police would deal with by 'an 
intensification of their normal procedure and operation'. 
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appreciated, and tl 
attitude that they 
the upshot is that 
poor intelligence, 
the other person's 
in Palestine. 39 
ze military come in with a superior 
are going to restore order. ... 
you start off in a muddle, with 
without proper understanding of 
situation--this was very obvious 
Consequently, the army tended to rely on its own 
intelligence services and sources, which were of variable 
quality. The Defence Security Office, staffed by officers 
with lengthy service in Palestine, frequently provided 
accurate reports. GSI, on the other hand, apparently 
had a poorer record of accuracy. Some senior commanders 
developed personal contacts with highly placed and influ- 
ential members of the Jewish community. 
40 
Moreover, wary 
of lax police security, army commanders often kept the 
police uninformed when planning operations, either by 
evolving cover plans to mislead them or by informing and 
involving them only once the operations were underway. 
Some officers, however, like Brigadier E. H. Goulburn, 
felt that effective planning required cooperation of the 
police: 'not being able to inform the police is a great 
39 Major-General Anthony H. Farrar-Hockley, inter- 
view with author, 13 Sept. 1976; see Bibliography for list 
of army officers and policemen interviewed. Joint intel- 
ligence study courses were conducted in an attempt to 
share knowledge and experience: see 1 Inf. Div., 'Intel- 
ligence Course Programme', 17-30 Jan. 1946, WO 169/22956. 
40 
By way of example the Defence Security Office 
accurately predicted a revival of terrorism on a major 
scale in June 1946, while army intelligence discounted 
the possibility on the very eve of the insurgent offensive: 
see Defence Security Office, 'Monthly Summary no. 8', May 
1946, WO 169/23031; G Branch, HQ Palestine, 'Fortnightly 
Intelligence Newsletter (hereafter cited as FIN) no. 16', 
10 June 1946, WO 169/23022. See also General Sir Richard 
Gale, Call to Arms (London, 1968), pp. 163,166-9; Gale, 
interview with author, 6 July 1976; General E. L. Bols, 
interview with author, 28 July 1976; Miss Joanna Dannatt, 
interview with author, 17 Feb. 1978. 
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disadvantage'. 41 
It would be misleading, in any case, to suggest 
that there was no cooperation between the two forces; joint 
operations were conducted as a matter of routine. 
42 There 
was, moreover, collaboration in the field of interrogation. 
The security forces had learned from wartime and police 
experience that, given time, seclusion and adequate prepar- 
ation, interrogation of captured or surrendered enemy 
personnel yielded valuable intelligence. Unable, however, 
to find a location sufficiently secure, they never 
established an interrogation centre in Palestine. Instead, 
a very few captured insurgents were sent to the Combined 
Services Detailed Interrogation Centre at Fayid in the 
canal zone. The centre had been established in 1940 for 
the collection of detailed information from captured spies 
and prisoners-of-war, and in February 1946 Army headquarters 
in Palestine gave permission for GSI and the CID to use the 
centre jointly. GSI would select for interrogation those 
persons most likely to respond and the CID would provide 
Hebrew-speaking interrogators. Nothing is known of the 
centre's operations or its success, if any, in producing 
intelligence, although one former policeman feels that the 
threat of interrogation frightened the insurgents and thus 
41 3 Inf. Div., 'Directive no. 2 Combined Ops 
Police and Mil', 23 Jan. 1946, WO 169/22967; HQ Palestine,, 
'01 no. 67', 17 June 1946, WO 169/23022; Goulburn to HQ 1 
Inf. Div. /North Palestine District, 21 June 1946, WO 169/ 
22989; 1 Inf. Div. /North Palestine District, '0I no. 7', 
28 June 1946, WO 169/22957; Tugwell, interview; Major- 
General H. E. N. Bredin, interview with author, 28 June 
1976; Lieutenant-General Sir Napier Crookenden, interview 
with author, 9 June 1976. 
42 See Chapter VI. Cooperation was frequently dis- 
rupted as army formations exchanged areas of responsibility: 
see Gale, p. 171; Gregory Blaxiand, The Regiments Depart: 
A History of the British Army, 1945-1970 (London,, 1 971)., 
p. 42. 
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detention itself was often sufficient inducement to produce 
information. 43 On the whole, however, the evidence sug- 
gests that either on their own or in combination with those 
of the police, the army's intelligence resources were 
insufficient to compensate for the critical weaknesses in 
the police intelligence capability. 
These deficiencies in the intelligence services 
exerted a significant influence on the counter-insurgency 
campaign. The para-military political image of the police 
force isolated it, from the Jewish community, who associated 
the methods of political intelligence-gathering--surveil- 
lance, informers, interrogation--with the police states 
from which many Palestinian Jews had only just escaped. 
Allegations of brutality, sadism and torture were rein- 
forced by occasional lapses of police discipline resulting 
in reprisals against the Jewish public; insurgent propa- 
ganda frequently charged that the police included fascists 
and anti-semites in their ranks. 
44 The isolation of the 
police blinded the intelligence services, allowing the 
43 'Establishment of Interrogation Centre for 
Examination of Terrorists', CO 537/1838; GSI, GHQ Middle 
East Forces, war diary, February, May 1946, WO 169/22882; 
1 Guards Bde., 'Report on Op AGATHA, 29 June-1 July, 1946', 
WO 169/22989; 'Annexure A to C in C's Conference--"Size, 
Role, Location of GHQ"', 7 Aug. 1947; F. H. Hinsley, 
British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influ- 
ence on Strategy and O erations (London, 1979), pp. 205, 
282-3; Catling, interview, 14 Feb. 1979. 
44 'Wickham Report'] 'Text of Official Communique', 
copy to Creech Jones, 19 Nov. 1946, FO 371/52565; DSP R. S. 
Hainsworth, 'Report on Police Investigations into Serious 
Crimes and Disorders in Tel Aviv and its Environs on 31st 
July 1947', 8 Sept. 1947, copy to Creech Jones, 15 Nov. 
1947, CO 537/477; Chapman, pp. 78-9; J. Borisov, Palestine 
Underground: The Story of the Jewish Resistance (New Yor , 
1947), pp. 65,81-2; Daphne Trevor, Under the White Paper: 
Some As ects of British Administration in Palestine from 
1939-1947 (Jerusalem, 1948), pp. 37-52; see also Chapter 
VII. 
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insurgents to prepare operations in relative security and 
thus to retain both the tactical and strategic initiative. 
Furthermore, the paucity of operational intelligence meant 
that security force operations only rarely produced sig- 
nificant results either in terms of arrests or in the 
reduction of the level of insurgent activity. 
45 Finally, 
the absence of public cooperation and the consequent lack 
of intelligence hindered prosecution of persons accused of 
terrorist offences; this, in turn, encouraged the govern- 
ment to detain without trial persons suspected of complicity 
in terrorism but against whom there was insufficient evi- 
dence for prosecution. Not surprisingly, this practice 
attracted a great deal of criticism both in Palestine and 
in Britain. Moreover, some military commanders, who were 
responsible for issuing detention orders, were not always 
eager to do so. General Sir Roger Bower, at that time a 
brigade commander, felt later that 
it was a disgraceful business. It went badly wrong 
because the civil government pushed responsibility for 
running it onto the services. I could sign committal 
forms taking away people's liberties for two years 
without seeing them or even knowing the charges. I 
complained to the GOC, Barker, who told me that if I 
wouldn't do it he would find someone who will, "so 
get on with it". 46 
Detention without trial did not stop terrorism and, 
as noted earlier, it gave the insurgents a degree of lever- 
age over the government. 
47 In short, weakness in the 
intelligence field meant that the security forces were 
unable to enforce law and order in Palestine. 
45 
See Chapters II and VI and Appendix VII. 
46 HQ 21 Area, '0I no. 21',. 21 Nov. 1945, WO 169/ 
19821; Bower, interview; see also Chapter VII. 
47 See Chapters II and VI. 
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The law enforcement problem was compounded by the 
Palestine court system. Although Palestine had a British- 
style civilian judiciary with supreme, district, and 
magistrate's courts, cases relating to internal security 
were heard before military courts, staffed by military 
officers rather than civilian judges. They could award 
the death penalty for illegal use of firearms or for 
sabotage of communications or power facilities. There was 
no appeal of military court judgements and other courts 
could not challenge or otherwise call into question the 
orders or proceedings of military courts. The GOC alone 
could confirm or commute death sentences. 
48 
Initially, the military courts heard only cases 
involving the possession, carrying or use of firearms and 
explosives, but by 1945 their jurisdiction had expanded to 
include all offences relating to insurgency. Richard Graves 
felt that the government displayed 'an excessive readiness 
to use the military rather than the civilian courts', 
49 
and 
expressed the view that however capable and fair-minded 
were the military courts, the civilian courts would be far 
more efficient, given the administrative resources at their 
disposal. His assessment is unduly optimistic; in 1945 
the Chief Justice conceded that litigation had outrun the 
ability of the courts to deal with it. 
so Nevertheless, by 
their very nature military courts violated the long-standing 
principle of British law that justice must not only be done, 
48 Government of Palestine, Survey, I, pp. 111-2; 
GSI, Short Handbook, p. 7; HQ Palestine, 0I no. 21', 
February 1945, Wo 169/19743. 
49 HQ Palestine, '0I no. 21', 27 Oct. 1945, WO 169/ 
19745; Sir Michael Hogan, interview with author, 10 May 
1976; Sir Ivor Rigby, interview with author, 27 Apr. 1978; 
Richard M. Graves, Experiment in Anarchy (London, 1949), 
p. 70. 
50 FitzGerald to Gort, 6 Feb. 1945, CO 733/455. 
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but must be seen to be done. They gave the Jewish insur- 
gents and their sympathizers, who in any case refused to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of any British courts in 
Palestine, additional propaganda ammunition. 
51 Military 
courts were, as Sir Robert Thompson has observed since, 'a 
tacit admission that responsible government has broken 
down'. 52 
The death penalty posed further problems because 
executions tended to create martyrs to the insurgent cause 
and left the administration open to retaliation. The 
dilemma posed by maintaining the death penalty for carrying 
arms and then being forced to execute a young boy for doing 
so raised obvious questions of proportionality--did the 
sentence fit the crime? As a result of these consider- 
ations the administration demonstrated a marked reluctance 
to adopt procedures which would hasten the awarding, con- 
firmation, and carrying out. of death sentences. Only 12 
convicted Jewish insurgents were executed for terrorist 
offences; many more had their sentences commuted to life 
imprisonment. in some cases, however, the government was 
" forced to commute the sentences under duress, when members 
of the security forces or other British persons were 
seized as hostages. 
53 This helped to undermine further the 
effectiveness and the credibility of the judicial system 
and of law enforcement in general. 
51 Trevor, pp. 84-122; 
' see also Chapter VII. 
52 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insur- 
gency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London, 1966), 
p. 54. 
53 Colonial Secretary to High Commissioner, 25 Mar. 
1938, WO 32/9618; 'Martial Law Policy 1947', CO 537/2299; 
Statement by Viscount Hall, 23 Apr. 1947, Hansard (Lords), 
5th ser., CXLVII, 55; Hogan, interview; Tugwer , interview, 
According to Hall, death sentences of 22 convicted terror- 
ists had been commuted to life imprisonment; see also 
Chapter VI. 
71 
This reluctance to carry out the ultimate sanction, 
particularly under threat of retaliation, points to a 
fundamental weakness underlying the British'counter- 
insurgency campaign. Sir Winston Churchill alluded to it 
in 1947 when he remarked that there was 'no country in the 
world ... less-fit for a conflict with terrorists than 
Great Britain ... not because of her weakness or 
cowardice; it*is because of her restraint and virtues'. 
54 
Under British rule Palestine was, as J. C. Hurewitz 
observed, 'a police state with a conscience'. 
55 
The 
insurgents recognized this and, as will be shown in the 
following chapter, designed their strategies and tactics 
to exploit this all-important factor. 
54 Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, Winston 
S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, ed. Ro ert 
Rhodes James Lon on and New York, , VII77422. 
55 Hurewitz, p. 281. 
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CHAPTER V 
JEWISH INSURGENT ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY 
Between October 1945 and September 1947 Jewish 
insurgents conducted an armed struggle for national liber- 
ation in Palestine. Insistent upon their historic title to 
the land and spurred by Jewish suffering in the European 
holocaust, the insurgents carried out a sustained campaign 
of urban terrorism and propaganda against the Palestine 
administration. Three separate insurgent organizations 
were involved in the campaign: the Haganah (Defence); the 
Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) and the 
Lochmei Heruth Israel (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) 
or Lechi. The organization and strategy of each group will 
be discussed in turn. 
Organization 
The Haganah was the largest of the three, with 
36,871 members at the end of 1944.1 Although the Haganah 
traced its historical roots to the self-defence units formed 
before 1914 to protect Jewish settlements, it was formally 
established in 1921, at the instigation of the Histadruth 
(the General Jewish Federation of Labour). Some units 
engaged in active operations against Arab rebels in 1938. 
During the Second World War the Palmach (Striking Companies) 
were created to assist the British in the event of a German 
invasion of Palestine. Once the threat receded the Palmach 
was retained on active service by the Haganah, being based 
1 Bauer, Diplomacy to Resistance, p. 306. The 
British Joint Intelligence Committee estimated its total 
strength at 65,000: COSC minutes, 8 Aug. 1945, CAB 79/37. 
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on the Kibbutzim (collective agricultural settlements) 
where it could continue military training in conjunction 
with farming. Other members of the Haganah were trained 
by the British for service with special forces in Europe 
and North Africa; some later served in the Jewish Brigade 
which fought in Europe in 1944-45.2 
Although created initially by the Histadruth, the 
Haganah had evolved by the end of the war into the military 
arm of the'Jewish Agency, which had been created under the 
Palestine Mandate to advise and cooperate with the Palestine 
administration in matters related to establishment of the 
Jewish national home. 
3 During the Second World War a new 
command structure was established for the Haganah, in which 
the Histadruth shared command and control with the Polit- 
ical Department of the Agency. The Haganah's security com- 
mittee was responsible for general policies and finances, 
but delegated some of its political and all of its adminis- 
trative authority to the National Command. Moshe Sneh of 
the Agency was commander-in-chief, with seven command mem- 
bers as his assistants. The general staff, responsible for 
technical and educational affairs, reported directly to 
Sneh. By 1945 it'appears that strategic command of the 
Haganah rested solely with the Agency's political department, 
2 
Bauer, Diplomacy to Resistance, pp. 84-8; Edward 
Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London, 1975), 
pp. 3-5,7-14,17-8,20-1,25,27; Yigal Allon, The Making 
of Israel's Army (London, 1971), pp. 4-8,10-1,15-6,199,, 
117-8, and Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed 
Forces (London, 1970), pp. 20-1,29,44-58,63-8,84,98- 
100,106; Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel: 
Nation-Building and Role Expansion (London, 1960 , pp. 3-7, 
11-5,29,32,35-9,41-2,49; Yehuda Bauer, 'Rommel's Threat 
of Invasion, Zionist Policy, and the Jewish Underground in 
Palestine, 1942', Studies in History, VII (1961), 222-48. 
3 'The Jewish Agency--Extract from Report of the 
Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry', WO 169/23022; HC 
(5479], 172-4, BPP (1937); Hurewitz, pp. 18,40-1. 
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which issued orders directly to the commander-in-chief. 
4 
The Haganah was organized as a territorial militia. 
Most served in the Him (Guard Force), a poorly trained 
force intended solely for protection of rural settlements. 
The smallest formation was a post of three to six men. 
Four to eight posts constituted a sector or platoon; two 
or more sectors a region or company; and from two to nine 
regions, a district or battalion. The Him had basic 
intelligence, communications, and medical services, as well 
as arrangements for mutual support of adjoining settle- 
ments. The Hish (Field Force) included 4,600 men in mobile 
formations controlled by district commanders. The Palmach, 
the elite force of the Haganah, totalled some 1,500 men, 
also deployed on a territorial basis: individual platoons 
were based on a kibbutz; adjoining platoons formed com- 
panies, and adjoining companies, battalions. The con- 
ventional military structure notwithstanding, the Palmach 
was a guerrilla army, and this was reflected in its training 
in sabotage, covert operations, and rigorous physical and 
weapons training. Promising members were put through the 
NCO's course which covered small unit leadership, urban 
combat, resistance techniques, international politics, and 
the opposition in Palestine (the security forces and the 
other underground groups). After a minimum of six months 
service as a section or deputy platoon commander an NCO 
attended the officer's training course. This training 
system, combined with a reserve organization, was designed 
to allow the Palmach to expand rapidly in an emergency. 
4 HC[6873], 'Palestine: Statement of Information 
Relating to Acts of Violence', BPP (1946); Bauer, 'Rommel's 
Threat of Invasion', pp. 224-6. The Histadruth dominated 
politically the Jewish Agency Executive. Funds for the 
Haganah raised in Palestine and abroad were held in the 
Keren Hayesod (Palestine Foundation Fund): 'Notes on the 
Structure of Jewry in Palestine', 1 Feb. 1946, WO 169/ 
22956; see also Appendix V. 
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By the end of the war it had four battalions. 
5 
The 
Palmach and the Hish played the most active role during 
the Haganah's period of opposition to the government. 
The Irgun Zvai Leumi had an estimated strength in 
1945 of approximately 1,500.6 It shared the same histor- 
ical origins as the Haganah, but was created in 1931 when 
a group of Haganah members left the parent organization in 
a dispute over the issue of socialist politicization in the 
Haganah. They seized an arms cache and founded Haganah B, 
which became subsequently associated with the right wing 
Zionist-Revisionist Party. It remained a politically 
unstable organization throughout the decade: in 1937 as 
many as half of its members returned to the original 
Haganah and in 1940 the leadership split over the issue of 
cooperation with the British during the war. A minority 
opposed to cooperation left to form a new group, which 
became the Lechi. The Irgun languished until Menachem 
Begin became commander in late 1943.7 He immediately 
5_, 1 Guards Bde., 'ISUM no. 15--Structure and Organ- 
ization of the Haganah', June 1946, WO 169/22989; Allon, 
Making of Israel's Army, pp. 19-21,124-30; Bauer, Diplomacy 
to Resistance, pp. 306,415-6; Luttwak and Horowitz, pp. 
20-1, Perlmutter, pp. 37-8,49. Perlmutter"states that the 
Hish had 700 trained officers by 1946, while Bauer notes 
that by the end of 1944-only 4,372 of the Him had received 
a fair amount of training. He states further that the 
Haganah did not have sufficient weapons for all members, 
though the army's searches of 1946 appeared to indicate 
that the Haganah was becoming better armed, with sufficient 
weapons for the Him. See Chapter VI. 
6 J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: Ir gun, Lehi, 
and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949 (New York, 1977), 
p. 145. 
7 Samuel Katz, Days of Fire (London, 1968), pp. 14- 
5,50; Eitan Haber, Menahem Begin: The Legend and the Man 
(New York, 1978), p. 89; Gerold Frank, The Deed (New York, 
1963), pp. 47-9,57-9,78-82,90-1,103; Bethell, p. 41; 
Perlmutter, p. 27; Daniel Levine, 'David Raziel: The Man 
and His Times', unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Yeshiva Univer- 
sity, New York, 1969, passim. 
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reorganized the Irgun into a secret revolutionary army. 
He severed the group's connexions with the Revisionists to 
ensure both security and the Irgun's ability to determine 
its own political program. Begin was the head of the High 
Command, which controlled both the political and military 
policies and activities of the Irgun. A general staff was 
responsible for administrative functions: planning; 
intelligence; ideology and propaganda; regional commands; 
secretariat; quartermaster; finance; and medical services. 
The operational forces came jointly under the planning 
section and the regional commanders, and consisted of 
squads, platoons, companies, and divisions. According to 
Begin, the organization never had more than 30 or 40 full- 
time members, relying heavily on part-time volunteers, who 
eventually numbered in the thousands. The Irgun financial 
section Keren Habarzel (Fund for Iron) collected funds 
from sympathizers, as well as'authorizing 'expropriations' 
(robberies). By 1946 the Irgun had also created some ten 
front organizations in the United States to generate 
financial assistance from the wealthy American Jewish 
community. In 1946 the Irgun also established a head- 
quarters in Europe to carry out recruiting, fund-raising 
and operations. Although small in size in comparison with 
the Haganah, the Irgun played a major role in the insurgent 
campaign; some historians would ascribe to it the decisive 
role. 
8 
8 Begin, pp. 61,74-81; Katz, Days of Fire, pp. 66-8; 
Haber, pp. 88,95-6,104,198; Samuel Halperin, The Polit- 
ical World of American Zionism (Detroit, 1961), pp. 318-20; 
Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London, 1977), pp. 87,90; 
'Proclamation on e Pa estine Resistance', PM, 2 Dec. 
1946, FO 371/52571; Dan Nimrod, interview wi ii author, 14 
June 1978. Laqueur estimates the Irgun's budget at one to 
two million dollars. Nimrod confirms that the Irgun's debt, 
which is still being paid off, runs into the millions. J. 
Bowyer Bell feels the Irgun played the decisive role. See 
also Appendix V. 
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The Lechi was the smallest organization, numbering 
some 250 to 300 in 1944.9 The group had carried out oper- 
ations almost from the moment of its break with the Irgun 
in 1940. By 1942 most of the members, including their 
leader Abraham Stern, had been arrested or killed by the 
police and those who remained alive, both in and out of 
prison, began to reorganize the group. They adopted the 
structure of a secret terrorist society: members were 
grouped in cells of three with vertical lines of communi- 
cation and command from a three-man central committee. 
Recruitment was very selective to ensure loyalty and secur- 
ity: prospective members sponsored by two established mem- 
bers were subjected to lengthy covert surveillance and 
interrogation in secrecy. Once accepted they returned to 
the large cities where they lived under assumed identities. 
To protect itself from informers, the Lechi established an 
intelligence service which penetrated the Palestine Police 
and built up a file on police anti-terrorist agents. It 
also extended into the British Army and the administration. 
The 'Fighting Division' included personnel, training, 
planning, and logistics branches. There was also a propa- 
ganda department and a separate radio station. The Lechi 
financed itself by means of door-to-door fund-raising cam- 
paigns, protection racket extortion, and bank robberies. 
Initially the Lechi established cells in Jerusalem, Tel 
Aviv, and Haifa, but branches were eventually extended to 
Cairo, Britain, and Europe, with front organizations in the 
United States. At the end of October 1943 21 members of the 
Lechi escaped from Latrun detention camp, putting the group 
on a solid footing. Although never officially appointed, 
Nathan Friedman-Yellin was recognized as the head of the 
central triumvirate, responsible for propaganda and external 
9 Hurewitz, p. 198. 
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contacts and negotiations. Yitzak Yizernitsky took over 
administration, organization, and operations. Dr. Israel 
Sheib was the ideologist, giving lectures to the members 
and running the underground newspaper. 
10 The Lechi was 
very active in the insurgent campaign. It demonstrated a 
capability for inflicting casualties and damage far out of 
proportion to its size. 
Strategy 
Each of the insurgent groups operated according to 
an individual strategy, determined by the political outlook 
or the structure of the group. Of necessity this made 
coordination difficult when the three organizations tried 
to work together. They did not share common political 
goals, so the means of achieving political objectives were 
radically different. 
The political attitudes and objectives of the World 
Zionist Organization (WZO), as expressed through the Jewish 
Agency, determined to a large extent the strategy of the 
Haganah. So long as British policy and the Palestine 
administration supported th efforts to create the Jewish 
national home, the Agency cooperated with the British and 
Palestine governments. The changes in British Palestine 
policy from 1930 to 1939, however, gradually pushed the 
Agency into opposition, and the White Paper was the break- 
ing point; the Jews felt betrayed. David Ben-Gurion, leader 
of the Socialist-Zionists, vowed that while the Jews would 
cooperate in the war against Hitler, they would 'fight the 
10 Ibid.; Y. S. Brenner, 'The Stern Gang, 1940-48', 
Middle East Studies, II (1965), 4-8,12-3; Frank, pp. 20-2, 
105-6,121-5,129-34,147-52; Edward Hyams, Terrorists and 
Terrorism (London, 1975), pp. 152-8; Paul Wi inson, 
Political Terrorism (London, 1974), p. 90; Esco Foundation 
Tor Palestine, Pa estine: A Stud of Jewish, Arab, and 
British Policies (New Haven, 1947), II, 1042-3; see also 
Appendix V. 
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White Paper as if there were no warI. 
11 Yehuda Bauer has 
observed that in reality it was difficult to put that vow 
into effect and political energies were directed mainly 
towards the creation of Jewish military units to serve in 
the war. 
12 
The political struggle against the White Paper 
continued mainly in the United States, producing in 1942 a 
political program which would become the Agency's principal 
political weapon once the war was over. The 'Biltmore 
Program' called for: abrogation of the White Paper; the 
creation of an independent Jewish Army fighting under its 
own flag and command; vesting the Jewish Agency with con- 
trol of immigration and development of Palestine; and the 
establishment of Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth, in 
short, an independent state. 
13 
With the exception of the demand for a Jewish Army, 
the Agency presented this program to the British Government 
in May 1945 coupled with a demand for an international loan 
and other assistance to transfer the first million Jewish 
refugees to Palestine. Churchill replied that the 
Palestine question would have to be dealt with at the peace 
conference, but shortly thereafter the Labour Party came 
to power. When it became apparent that despite its pro- 
Zionist pronouncements the new government was not going 
to implement the Biltmore program the Agency decided to 
authorize the Haganah to use a limited degree of force to 
pressure the British Government into meeting Zionist 
11 Golda Meir, My Life (New York, 1975), p. 161. 
See also Chapter I. 
12 Bauer, Diplomacy to Resistance, p. 72. 
13 Halperin, p. 222. After the Jewish Brigade was 
created in 1944 the demand for a Jewish Army was dropped. 
ýý 
demands, particularly those regarding immigration. 
14 
During 1945-46 the Haganah operated according to a 
strategy it called 'Constructive Warfare'. It was designed 
to persuade the British Government to change its Palestine 
policy, especially immigration policy; it was not intended 
to be a strategy for a war of independence. It was, more- 
over, a compromise. It was supposed to satisfy both the 
militant elements in the Haganah who wanted to take action 
against the British and the moderates who were opposed in 
principle to the use of terrorism. The strategy involved 
three related tactical techniques, with distinct but 
mutually supporting political objectives. First, the 
Jewish Agency and the Haganah would carry out illegal 
immigration operations, to save the remnants of European 
Jewry and to increase the Jewish population of Palestine. 
These operations would serve also as a propaganda weapon in 
the political battle to terminate the White Paper policy. 
Secondly, illegal settlements would be established in 
prohibited areas, to ensure footholds in strategically 
vital areas and, again, to expose the injustices of the 
White Paper. Finally, the Haganah would conduct military 
operations called Maavak Tzamud (Linked Struggle): they 
would be carried out either to protect directly the landing 
and dispersal of illegal immigrants, or would be directed 
at any branch or aspect of the administration involved in 
the prevention of illegal immigration. This allowed a 
wide variety of military targets: roads and bridges; 
patrol boats and naval vessels; police stations, radar 
stations and airfields. Such attacks would undermine the 
security of the British position in Palestine, precluding 
14 HC [6873] , 4, ' BPP (1946) ; Kirk, p. 190; Hurewitz, 
p. 225; see also Chapter II. 
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its effective use as a military base. 
15 
The strategy had obvious weaknesses, largely the 
product of the Agency's. reluctance to use force. Inclined 
to be cautious, the Agency leaders, according to one 
critic, tended to test British reactions after each 
incident to see if they had been pressured sufficiently; 
consequently, there were long periods of inaction between 
many operations. The Haganah took pains to reduce- casu- 
alties, often to the extent of giving warnings of impending 
attack in order to allow British personnel to evacuate 
intended targets. 16 The British, of course, just as often 
refused to evacuate, or chose to defend the target, so 
casualties on both sides were inevitable. Some critics 
found artificial the distinction between the Haganah's 
'constructive' operations and the 'destructive' acts of 
the Irgun and the Lechi, observing that 'One cannot draw 
the line between various kinds of violence'. 
17 
Such dis- 
tinctions were even harder to draw once the Haganah decided 
to cooperate with the Irgun and the Lechi. The British 
Government, in any case, would be unable or unwilling to 
see in the Haganah's actions anything less than a terrorist 
campaign to overthrow the government of Palestine. As 
Elizabeth Monroe has observed: 'Armed resistance 
instinctively produces in an imperial power an unwillingness 
15 'Submission by Head of Command, Jewish Resistance 
Movement', 25 Mar. 1946, CO 733/463; Allon, Making of 
Israel's Arm , pp. 23-7; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 142- 
; Katz, Days of Fire, pp. 87-8; Luttwak and Horowitz, pp. 
22-3; Moshe Brilliant, 'Underground in Palestine: How the 
Jewish Resistance Movement Works', Har er's Magazine, XCCIV 
(1947), 249; Shlomo Katz, 'Understanding the Jewish 
Resistance in Palestine: The Aims and Methods of Hagana', 
Commentary, II (1946), 47-8. 
16 
Katz, Days-of Fire, p. 88; Katz, 'The Jewish 
Resistance', p. 48; Bethell, p. 214. 
17Mary Sirkin quoted in Borisov, p. 69. 
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to capitulate to violence. 118 From the very first Haganah 
action the British Government demonstrated just such 
tenacity. But for nearly a year the strategy of Con- 
structive Warfare allowed the Jewish Agency to apply mil- 
itary pressure to the British Government without having to 
acknowledge responsibility for the action. 
The principle political objective of the Irgun was 
the establishment of an independent Jewish state, incorpor- 
ating both Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The Irgun's ideol- 
ogy rested on three assumptions: first, that every Jew had 
a natural right to enter Palestine freely; secondly, that 
the creation of a Jewish state presupposed the existence 
of an armed Jewish force; and third, that every Jewish 
group and every foreign power supporting the Jewish right 
to independence would be considered an ally. A majority 
Jewish population, created by large-scale immigration, was 
also an essential precondition to independence. 
19 
The Irgun's military strategy was to initiate a 
'Liberation War ... a just war, which is conducted by an 
oppressed people against a foreign power that has enslaved 
it and its country' . 
20 This liberation war was to prepare 
the Irgun for the 'opportune moment' to seize power: when 
the British had been defeated either in the insurgent 
21 
campaign or in a war with another power. Eitan Haber 
18 
Monroe, p. 67; J. Bowyer Bell, 'Revolts Against 
the Crown: The British Response to Imperial Insurgency', 
Parameters, IV (1974), 34-42. 
19 Irgun Zvai Leumi, 'The Aims of the Irgun', 
Jerusalem, 1946, Palestine Statehood Committee Papers, Box 
12, f. 42, Yale University Library (hereafter cited as 'Aims 
of the Irgun', Palestine Papers); Borisov, p. 11. 
20 'Aims of the Irgun', Palestine Papers. 
21 Ibid. 
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states that Begin followed the Clausewitzian maxim that war 
is diplomacy by other means, and the Irgun's strategy bears 
this out: the continuous liberation war would be accom- 
panied by political action, propaganda, economic warfare, 
and would be 'internationalized' in order to win the support 
of foreign governments. 
22 The Irgun regarded this strategy 
as one of total war, requiring the mobilization of the whole 
Jewish people, using political as much as military weapons: 
Total War does not mean only bearing arms. We will not 
honour the rules of His Majesty's Government. We will 
not obey its laws. We will not pay taxes. We will not 
recognize the authority of British officials. We will 
ignore the dictates of their courts. We will set aside 
the injunction prohibiting us from settling on the 
land. ... We will create a provisional 
Jewish Govern- 
ment which will direct this war, integrate all our 
activities, and embody our aspirations. 23 
Begin states that his liberation strategy was based 
on the assumption that the British Government, owing to 
political tradition and Britain's situation in 1945, would 
be unwilling and unable to rule Palestine by excessive force 
in the face of determined opposition. Drawing on the current 
example of the rebellion in Greece, an Irgun pamphlet con- 
cluded: 'The English commander is not free to suppress the 
rebellion in a sea of blood. '24 Convinced that the British 
attached great importance to political and moral factors in 
governing their colonies, the Irgun concluded that it could 
defeat the British by humiliating them: 
the very existence of an underground, which oppression, 
hanging, torture, and deportation fail to crush or 
weaken must, in the end, undermine the prestige of a 
22 Ibid., Haber, p. 111. 
23 Herut (November, 1945) quoted in Borisov, p. 73. 
24 'IZL on Lessons of Greek Rebellion', Defence 
Security Office, 'Fortnightly Intelligence Summary (here- 
after cited as FIS) no. 96', Jan. 1945, WO 169/19758; 
Begin, p. 52. 
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colonial regime that lives by the legend of its omnipo- 
tence. Every attack which it fails to prevent is a 
blow to its standing. Even if the attack does not 
succeed it makes a dent in that prestige, and that dent 
widens into a crack which is extended with every suc- 
ceeding attack. 25 
Begin believed that once the revolt began Palestine 
would come to resemble a 'glass house'; the world's 
attention would be focussed on Palestine and the events 
within. This close and constant scrutiny would allow the 
Irgun to disseminate its political message through its 
actions while protecting the Irgun from an extreme British 
response. Thus the military and political roles of the 
Irgun were inseparable; the Irgun would act as its own 
political spokesman. J. Bowyer Bell has accurately 
described this as a strategy of leverage. 
26 
The Irgun's strategy shared some common aspects with 
that of the Haganah: both employed military and political 
action to put pressure on the British Government; in both 
cases raising the political and military costs of law 
enforcement in Palestine was central to the application of 
leverage. The Irgun commanders felt that 'each operation 
should be planned with an eye to major effects and to this 
end we should make Britain itself our central objective'. 
27 
The strategies diverged on the matter of the means to achieve 
independence. The Haganah's strategy envisaged a negotiated 
solution, in which Constructive Warfare was simply a pressure 
tactic and not the sole means of achieving the desired' 
objective. The Irgun rejected a negotiated settlement; its 
aim was to achieve independence by inflicting a political/ 
military defeat on Britain, forcing her to withdraw from the 
25 Begin, p. 52. 
26 Bell, On Revolt, p. 41; Begin, pp. 52,80,93; 
'Aims of the Irgun , Palestine Papers; see Chapter VII. 
27 Katz, Days of Fire, p. 106. 
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Mandate, and seizing power upon that withdrawal. Inevitably 
then, the Irgun's strategy required a higher level of 
violence and intensity of conflict. 
This crucial difference in the two strategies was 
reflected directly in the participation of the two groups 
in acts of violence. During the period of cooperation, 
1945-46, the Haganah and the Palmach were directly involved 
in conducting eight military operations. The Irgun and the 
Lechi together carried out more than 30 during the same 
period. Once the cooperation ended, the latter groups 
executed some 280 operations between September 1946 and 
July 1947.28 
In his study of the Lechi Gerold Frank has stated 
. 
that the group had no political line or ideological con- 
sistency save for a single political objective--an indepen- 
dent Jewish state. 
29 The evidence suggests that this is an 
over-simplification. Granted that the Lechi's political 
program was abstruse, it does not defy explanation; rather 
it must be examined in relation to the influence of the 
Lechi's founder Abraham Stern, both before and after his 
death. Even before he died Stern had come to view the 
Lechi's struggle for national independence as part of a 
larger war against British imperialism in the Middle East. 
30 
Stern emigrated to Palestine from Poland in the 
early 1920s. A brilliant scholar at the Hebrew University 
at Jerusalem, he later studied in Italy where, according to 
one analyst, he became captivated by Mussolini's fascism and 
returned to Palestine with an ambition to recreate not just 
28 See Appendix VI. 
29 Frank, p. 133. 
30 Geula Cohen, Woman of Violence: Memoirs of a 
Young Terrorist, 1943-1948 (London, 1966), pp. 232-3. 
ýý 
the state of Israel in Palestine, but to build a vast fascist 
Hebrew empire from the Euphrates to the Nile. Stern was not 
a Zionist in the strictest sense of the word: he believed 
that the Jewish state had never ceased to exist; it would be 
recreated by massive Jewish immigration from the diaspora 
and a war of national liberation by the combined forces of 
Zionists outside Palestine and a 'Hebrew Liberation Front' 
fighting inside Palestine. Although Stern's colleagues in 
the Irgun agreed that a Jewish state would have to be created 
by force, they were not as fanatical as Stern and it was 
this that led to the split in 1940: Stern believed that 
with Britain at war the Irgun should push for independence 
31 
J. Bowyer Bell writes: 
When the split came in the summer of 1940, few were sur- 
prised. It had been obvious for years that Stern would 
not wait on events, could not compose his soul, and 
sought a means to act. He attracted about him impatient, 
driven, desperate men who also distrusted politics and 
believed in deeds. 32 
From a political point of view this impulse to action 
was self-defeating. According to Geula Cohen, a former mem- 
ber of the group, 'Lechi never had a chance to formulate its 
beliefs into a systematic program'. 
33 The Lechi launched 
into operations immediately, and Cohen feels that when Stern 
was killed in 1942 much of the group's political direction 
died with him: 'of all the principles he set down on paper 
only the purely tactical ones--those committing us to an 
all-out struggle against British imperialism in the Middle 
East ... remained part of our program. The visionary 
31 
Ibid.; Frank, pp. 102-3; Hyams, pp. 145-6; Henry 
Mitchell, 'A Tale of Terror, Peace, and Our Times', Inter- 
national Herald Tribune, 9 Aug. 1976. Mitchell's art cle 
is based on an interview with Natan Yalin-Mor (Friedman- 
Yellin), former leader of the Lechi. 
32 Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 62. 
33 Cohen, Woman of Violence, p. 232. 
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aspect of Yair's thought faded into the background. '34 When 
Friedman-Yellin took over in 1943 independence remained the 
primary objective, but the struggle was increasingly couched 
in anti-imperialist terms. Lechi doctrine stated that the 
British remained in Palestine to protect their economic 
interests, particularly those related to oil. The Lechi, 
therefore, would render the military bases useless by con- 
stant threat of attack and undermine the economic interests 
by sabotage of the oil refineries and the pipeline. There 
is no question that this frankly Marxist-Leninist inter- 
pretation was intended to appeal to the Soviet Union; 
according to Cohen, Stern himself had believed that the 
Lechi should ally itself with the Soviets in removing 
British influence from the area. 
35 By 1947 the Lechi's 
'foreign policy' favoured neutralization of the Middle East, 
thereby removing both the British imperialist threat to the 
Soviet Union and the cause of communal strife. The Lechi 
emphasized that Britain was the common enemy of both Jews 
and Arabs, and that all who struggled to expel the British 
were natural allies. Peaceful cooperation and economic 
development would follow expulsion of the British. 
36 Eitan 
Haber has suggested, nonetheless, that the Lechi's leaders 
were not as doctrinaire as this policy might suggest, and 
Brenner goes further by highlighting differing views within 
the organization: the left hoped to achieve a radical 
34 Ibid., p. 233; Brenner, pp. 4-5. Yair was Stern's 
cover name in the underground. 
35 Brenner, pp. 11-2; Cohen, Woman of Violence, p. 
233; Haber, p. 94. 
36 Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, 'An Outline 
of Foreign Policy', Jerusalem, 1947, no. 987a, Jabotinsky 
Institute, Tel Aviv, Israel; Friedman-Yellin, interview with 
Gerold Frank, Liberty, 12 Oct. 1946, FO 371/52563; Friedman- 
Yellin, intervie' with Clifton Daniel, New York Times, 25 
Aug. 1947, FO 371/61758; Brenner, p. 18. 
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socialist state, while the right tended to regard the anti- 
imperialist line as an expedient tactic for acquiring 
external support. 
37 
While ideology thus determined the selection of 
major targets, the Lechi's methods were the product of 
Stern's own attitudes and example. Even before he left the 
Irgun he had urged the adoption of tactics of 'indiscrim- 
inate terrorism'. He felt that. if the Irgun was at war it 
should attempt to inflict maximum damage for minimum losses. 
Once the Lechi was acting on its own Stern advocated 
'individual terrorism', a technique borrowed from the 
writings and experience of the European anarchist movements, 
whereby the assassination of key individuals was supposed 
to bring down the whole government structure. 
38 Stern's 
death apparently reinforced this concept: Brenner says that 
the Lechi became obsessed with revenge for his death, which 
they vented against policemen, and convinced they would 
meet the same fate if captured they carried arms at all 
times, so as to avoid capture by killing as many policemen 
as possible, dying in the attempt. 
39 Freidman-Yellin 
defended these tactics in an interview published in 1946, 
pointing out that since the British used every means to 
37 Brenner, p. 18; Haber, p. 150. Ironically, dur- 
ing the period under study the Haganah, not the Lechi, 
benefitted most from Soviet assistance. The Soviet Union 
facilitated Jewish emigration from eastern Europe and from 
May 1947 supported the concept of partition of Palestine. 
See Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten Friendshi : Israel and 
the Soviet Bloc, 194 -1953 (Chicago, 1974-7, passim; see 
also Chapter VII. 
38 Bethell, pp. 125-6; Frank, p. 150; Laqueur, p. 
81; Ze'ev Iviansky, 'Individual Terror: Concept and 
Typology', Journal of Contemporary History, XII (1977), 43- 
63. 
39 Brenner, pp. 5-6. According to Cohen, p. 221, 
the order to carry arms at all times was rescinded in late 
1944 because it was no longer needed. 
ý° 
G 
f: 
if 
combat the Lechi, they had to use every means to fight 
back. 40 The Lechi believed that such actions would serve 
also to dramatize their cause, the battle of the weak 
against the strong: 
Such acts will render the government weak and ineffec- 
tual. Such acts will have powerful echoes everywhere. 
Such acts will prove to the authorities that they 
cannot enforce law and order in Palestine unless they 
keep vast forces here at the cost of thousands of 
pounds. 41 
The Lechi shared with the Irgun only the objective 
of creating an independent Jewish state by force of arms. 
Furthermore, the Lechi's strategy did not lend itself to 
cooperation with the Haganah. Deliberate personal violence 
was antithetical to the doctrines of the Jewish Agency 
leaders. It may be for that very reason that Brenner feels 
the Lechi gained respectability from the period of unified 
struggle since, however the Agency leaders felt, the 
Haganah used methods which appeared indistinguishable from 
those of the Lechi. Moreover, on its own, this very small 
organization could not hope to achieve its objectives; in 
cooperation with the Haganah and especially with the Irgun, 
the Lechi's strategy contributed to the deterioration of 
the security situation in Palestine, to what one author 
called 'the dialectic of repression, resistance, terror and 
reprisal'. 
42 
Given the differing political and military perspec- 
tives of the three groups then, a united front was not a 
likely prospect. In fact from September 1944 to May 1945 
the Haganah made a concerted effort to reduce the effective- 
ness of, if not to eliminate, the other two organizations. 
From February through November 1944 the Irgun and the Lechi 
40 Friedman-Yellin, 12 Oct. 1946, FO 371/52563. 
41 Frank, pp. 130-1. 
42 Borisov, p. 142; Brenner, p. 20. 
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had conducted a joint terrorist campaign which culminated 
in the assassination of Lord Moyne. The campaign alarmed 
the Jewish Agency. Coming at a time when the British 
Government was considering a settlement of the Palestine 
question favourable to the Jews, the offensive was ill- 
timed. Chaim Weizmann, President of the WZO and a moderate 
who believed in close cooperation with the British, felt 
that the terrorist campaign caused a major setback for the 
Zionist movement: 
The harm done to our cause by the assassination of 
Lord Moyne and by the whole terror ... was not in 
changing the intentions of the British Government, 
but rather in providing our enemies with a convenient 
excuse and in helping to justify their course before 
the bar of public opinion. 43 
It was noted in Chapter I that after the murder of 
Lord Moyne the partition plan was shelved and British sup- 
port for the Jewish state idea waned. Furthermore, the 
Jewish Agency felt the Irgun and, to a lesser extent, the 
Lechi constituted threats to the Agency's leadership of the 
Jewish political community. The Irgun encouraged activist 
members of the Haganah to defect and join the Irgun. The 
result of this anxiety was a power struggle, known as 'The 
Season', in which the Jewish Agency and the Haganah cooper- 
ated actively with the British security forces in identi- 
locating, arresting and interrogating members of the fying, 
Irgun. The Lechi succumbed very quickly to pressure and 
agreed to-suspend operations on the understanding that in 
the absence of a favourable settlement the Haganah and the 
Lechi would launch a joint campaign. The Irgun suffered 
significant losses in the Season and conceded defeat in 
April 1945, when it called for an end to 'fratricidal 
43 'Situation: Bomb Outrages, 1944', CO 733/456; 
Hurewitz, p. 199; Marlowe, Seat of Pilate, p. 184; Chaim 
Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim 
Weizmann (New York, 1972), pp. 437-8. 
r 
strife' and the creation of a united front against the 
government. 
44 
The real impetus for a united resistance campaign 
came from the Jewish Agency and the Haganah. Seeing the 
Agency's proposals rebuffed by the British Government in 
the spring of 1945 and a British policy decision postponed 
by the new government in the summer, Haganah militants dis- 
illusioned with the negotiating process urged the Agency 
to allow active opposition to the government. Once again, 
members of the Palmach began to defect to the Irgun. A 
formal truce was arranged between the underground groups 
and the Jewish Agency proposed amalgamation for a campaign 
to extract concessions from the British. The Irgun agreed 
readily to the concept of a united front but rejected amal- 
gamation with Haganah; Begin feared the Irgun would be 
unable to renew the revolt if the Agency or Haganah decided 
to cease operations. The three groups reached a general 
agreement by mid-October, although it was not formally rat- 
ified until 1 November, after the first joint operation. 
Under the agreement the Haganah took command of the Tenuat 
Hameri Ha'ivri (United Resistance Movement), but each group 
retained its independent existence. The Irgun and the Lechi 
could propose operations, which would be approved in general 
terms by a three-man high command representing each of the 
groups. Joint conferences were to be held every fortnight, 
and operations officers would meet before every operation. 
The Irgun and the Lechi were permitted to carry out 
'expropriations' without prior approval. Samuel Katz 
observed later: 'The limitations were blatant, but the 
44 Bauer, Diplomacy to Resistance, pp. 315-33, Begin, 
pp. 138-51; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 127-36; Bethell, 
pp. 188-91. 
4 Y- 
great object had been achieved. The whole people was at 
war. 145 
45 
HC[6873], 4-5, BPP (1946); Elazar Pedazur, The 
History of the Ir un Zvai Leumi (Jerusalem, 1961), III, 30; 
Begin, pp. 181-8; Brenner, p. 16; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, 
pp. 142-5; Katz, Days of Fire, p. 87. 
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CHAPTER VI 
INSURGENT AND SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS 
Between October 1945 and September 1947 the insur- 
gents carried out more than 360 operations in Palestine and 
abroad. These operations consisted mainly/of three types, 
each with distinct political objectives: 'armed propaganda' 
attacks, to exert political pressure on Britain; attacks on 
the security forces, to increase the direct costs of the 
war; and operations against economic targets, to raise the 
indirect costs and reduce the economic benefits of the 
Mandate. The British security forces responded with 
searches, raids, martial law and special operations. The 
British objectives were to defeat terrorism and to restore 
law and order. Major operations by both sides will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
1 
Insurgent Operations 
The first 'armed propaganda' operation of the United 
Resistance Movement took place on the night of 31 October/ 
1 November 1945. The Palmach damaged two police launches 
with limpet mines at Haifa and sunk a third at Jaffa. The 
Haganah attempted to sabotage the railway system at hundreds 
of locations across Palestine. The Irgun attacked Lydda 
railway junction, damaging locomotives and buildings and 
causing 13 casualties among members of the security forces 
and railway staff. A Lechi bombing caused serious damage to 
1 See Appendices VI and VII for complete lists of 
insurgent and security force operations. 
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the oil refineries at Haifa. 
2 
The political objective of this 'single serious 
incident' was to warn the British Government that further 
violence could be expected if it did not deal satisfactorily 
and quickly with Jewish demands. It was also intended to 
raise the morale of Palestinian Jews. According to Bethell, 
the operation had the desired effect on the Jews of 
Palestine, although Agency leaders were concerned that the 
British might respond with an all-but attempt to disarm or 
disband the Haganah. 3 The British were certainly warned by 
the operation but it did not dissuade the government from 
its intended course. Upon receiving reports of the incidents 
Bevin met with Weizmann and Moshe Shertock (from the 
Agency's headquarters in London) and warned them that he 
regarded the violence as a declaration of war. If that was 
what the Agency intended, he advised them, then the British 
Government would cease its efforts to find a solution; it 
would not negotiate under the threat of violence. George 
Hall, the Colonial Secretary, issued apublic statement 
along similar lines, if more moderate in tone: unless the 
violence ceased, he warned the underground, 'progress in 
relation to Palestine will be impossible, and the further 
steps we had in mind in our endeavour to settle this diffi- 
cult problem will be brought to nought'. 
4 So the operation 
succeeded in angering the government but did not affect its 
policy decisions: arrangements went forward to establish 
the Anglo-American Commission. The military response in 
Palestine was low key: a road curfew and some small-scale 
2 Defence Security Office, 'Monthly Summary no. 1', 
October 1945, WO 169/19758; Shaw to Hall, 1 Nov. 1945, CO 
733/456; HC[6873], 3, BPP (1946). 
3 HC[6873], 4, BPP (1946); Bethell, p. 216. 
4 Bethell, p. 215; Sykes, p. 357; Hansard, 5th ser., 
CDXV, 786. 
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searches. Owing to the government's desire for a peaceful 
settlement, the Chiefs of Staff advised against instituting 
a major search for arms or attempting to disarm the Haganah. 
For similar reasons no action was taken against the Jewish 
Agency. 5 
The most significant effect of the operation was 
its impact on the resistance movement itself. The first 
operation had taken place without Agency approval because 
the Executive had refused to allow the Political Department 
to act. They did not cancel the action, however, and 
insisted only that in future the Executive should be advised 
of forthcoming operations in order to be able to exercise a 
veto. The Agency's caution produced confusion. Begin 
states that the Irgun's operation at Lydda had been approved 
on the understanding that the guards were to be overcome 
without using weapons. The Haganah, however, apparently 
failed to coordinate their plans with those of the Irgun; 
the railway sabotage was carried out before the Irgun 
arrived at Lydda, so the guards were alerted and the Irgun 
encountered resistance. Thirteen members of the security 
forces and the railway staff were killed or wounded in the 
attack. The Lechi operation, on the other hand, was not 
approved by the United Resistance Movement because it went 
beyond the strategic objectives of the front. The Lechi 
refused to cancel the operation, however, because it had 
been planned long before the establishment of the resistance 
movement; agents and explosives had been planted at the 
refinery, so the operation had to be carried out before they 
were discovered. In the event the Lechi team bungled the 
operation, inflicting as much damage on themselves as on 
the refinery. The resistance command blamed the Agency 
5 See the 'Security Force Operations' section of 
this chapter; see also Chapter VIII. 
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Executive for the mistakes of the first coordinated oper- 
ation, claiming that if they had approved the resistance 
agreement the casualties at Lydda, and the refinery attack 
itself, could have been prevented. 
6 Nearly a month passed 
before the Haganah carried out another operation. Although 
the machinery of coordination remained in place--the high 
command continued to exercise approval of Irgun and Lechi 
operations--the Haganah never again attempted a coordinated 
strike with the other two groups. So the resistance move- 
ment was united in name only. 
Between 10 and 18 June 1946 the insurgents launched 
a major offensive. On the 10th the Irgun mined three trains. 
The Palmach sabotaged eight road and rail bridges along the 
Palestine border on the night of 16/17 June. The following 
day the Lechi destroyed a locomotive and several buildings 
in a raid on the Haifa railway workshops. On the 18th the 
Irgun kidnapped six army officers in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem? 
Army headquarters attributed the attacks in June 1946 to a 
series of events: the escape of the Mufti of Jerusalem (the 
Palestinian Arab leader) from France to the Middle East; 
Bevin's Bournemouth speech; the death sentences pronounced 
against two Irgun members; and the alleged discovery of 
British plans to liquidate the Haganah. Kol Israel's broad- 
cast of 18 June referred to Bevin's speech and Begin later 
confirmed that the kidnappings were carried out on his orders 
to prevent the execution of his men. His explanation is 
credible; it coincides with the Irgun doctrine. The Lechi 
attack on the railway workshops was in keeping with their 
strategy of striking at British economic targets. The 
explanation of the Haganah's operations, however, requires 
6 HC[68731,4-5, BPP (1946); Cohen, Woman of 
Violence, pp. 102-3; Brenner, p. 16. 
7 HQ Palestine, 'FIN no. 17', 23 June 1946, WO 169/ 
23022. 
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closer scrutiny. The destruction of railway bridges could 
not be related directly to British efforts to. prevent 
illegal immigration. Rather, as Moshe Brilliant suggested 
in a 1947 article, the operations were intended as a warning 
to Britain not to transfer to Palestine troops or instal- 
lations from Egypt or elsewhere in the Middle East. 
8 There 
is considerable evidence to support this interpretation. 
First, rendering Palestine untenable as a military base was 
central to the Haganah's strategy. Secondly, on 12 May Kol 
Israel issued a warning that the resistance movement would 
make every effort 'to hinder-the transfer of British Bases 
to Palestine and to prevent their establishment in the 
country'. 
9 Third, the operation showed every indication of 
detailed planning: sabotage on such a scale was a major 
operation and the damage inflicted suggests that the bridges 
were properly reconnoitred in advance to determine where 
charges should be placed and how well each bridge was pro- 
tected. The attacks involved many men--30 in the attack on 
the Allenby bridge alone. Diversionary attacks were 
carried out in some areas and roads were blocked by mines. 
Intelligence analysts suspected that the assault teams might 
have travelled some distance to reach their targets and 
would have required local guides, medical support, food and 
refuge. They concluded that the operation against the 
bridges bore the hallmarks of 'major planning on a country- 
wide scale'. 
10 Finally, in a rare display of prescience, 
8 
ibid.; HC[6873], 9, BPP (1946); Katz, 'Jewish 
Resistance', p. 49; Brilliant, pp. 249-50; Hurewitz, p. 254; 
Bethell, pp. 244-5. ' Bethell cites an article by Glubb Pasha, 
commander of the Arab Legion, as a further aggravating fac- 
tor. Kol Israel (Voice of Israel) was the Haganah's under- 
ground radio station. 
9 HC[6873], 8, BPP (1946). The British intention to 
move the Middle East base to Palestine was announced on 7 May 
1946: Blaxland, p. 217. 
10 Shaw to Martin, 25 June 1946, CO 733/456; 1 Guards 
I30 
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military intelligence had predicted before the end of May 
that terrorism was likely to resume in June, on a larger 
scale than before. All the information at their disposal 
pointed to a resumption of terrorism, and they correctly 
identified the bridges as likely targets. 
11 
It is clear, 
therefore, that the Haganah had planned the attack on the 
bridges long before the Mufti's escape, Bevin's speech, or 
the discovery of the British plans, all of which appear to 
be unnecessary justification after the fact. Nonetheless, 
GHQ Middle East Forces was probably correct in concluding 
that the revival of terrorism could be attributed also to 
a steady increase in anti-British feeling and a grow- 
ing belief among the terrorists that their recent inac- 
tivity, far from aiding the Zionist cause, was bringing 
disaster upon it. ... the terrorists feel, and prob- 
ably rightly so, that the temper of the Yishuv is more 
propitious to such terrorist activity now ... due to the increasing fear that the Anglo-American Commission's 
report will not be implemented. 12 
The June offensive produced significant consequences: 
on 29/30 June the security forces raided the headquarters of 
the Jewish Agency and arrested several hundred members of 
the Agency and the Haganah. The resistance movement 
responded with the sabotage bombing of the King David Hotel, 
the headquarters of the Administration, on 22 July. Ninety- 
two people were killed and 69 people injured in the explosion 
and large sections of the Administration were damaged or 
destroyed. The British replied with another large search, 
Bde., 'ISUM no. 16', 3 July 1946, WO 169/22989; Bethell, p. 
246. 
11 HQ Palestine, 'FIN no. 15', 26 May 1946, WO 169/ 
23022; Defence Security Office, 'Monthly Summary no. 8', 
May 1946, WO 169/23031; HQ Palestine to 1 Inf. Div., and 1 
Inf. Div. to 3 Inf. Bde., 15 June 1946, WO 169/22957. 
12 GHQ Middle East Forces, 'WMIR no. 65', 21 June 
1946, WO 169/22882. 
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encompassing the entire city of Tel Aviv. 
13 Considerable 
controversy has surrounded the bombing of the King David 
Hotel. The Irgun accepted responsibility for the operation, 
yet it is clear now that the Haganah approved the bombing in 
general, if not specific, terms as an action of the resis- 
tance movement. Begin says the Irgun had first proposed 
the attack in the spring of 1946 but it was not approved by 
the resistance high command until 1 July, after the British 
search operation. He says the attack was both a reprisal 
for the British action and an attempt to destroy documents 
captured by the British during their search of the Jewish 
Agency headquarters. 14 Israel Galili, at that time the 
Haganah operations officer, refutes Begin's interpretation. 
He claims that the Haganah had planned long before the 
British search to destroy the King David as a political 
gesture. He concedes that Operation AGATHA triggered the 
action, but rejects as 'nonsensical' the idea that the 
bombing was intended to destroy documents that might 
embarrass the Jewish Agency. 
15 Both explanations are 
plausible. Galili is probably correct that the documents 
were not the prime concern, since the British had already 
spent three weeks examining t)iem. But whether the attack 
was a direct reprisal for Operation AGATHA or a deliberate 
act of 'propaganda of the deed', the King David Hotel was a 
legitimate target under the terms of the United Resistance 
Movement. 
The bombing, however, produced severe repercussions 
in the Zionist movement. The moderates had been reasserting 
13 
J. P. I. Fforde, 'CID Report on King David Out- 
rage', 16 Aug. 1946, CO 537/2290; The British search oper- 
ations are discussed later in this chapter. 
14 Irgun Zvai Leumi, 'The Truth About the King 
David', 22 July 1947, CO 537/2290; Begin, pp. 212-5. 
15 Bethell, p. 258. 
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their influence since the British operation against the 
Agency. Shortly thereafter Weizmann met with Zionist 
leaders and threatened to resign, making public his reasons 
for doing so, if they did not suspend all armed actions by 
the Haganah and the Palmach. The Haganah succeeded in get- 
ting the Irgun to postpone the King David operation several 
times, but it was not cancelled. In the wake of the dis- 
aster the resistance movement collapsed in confusion and 
recrimination. After the Irgun publicly claimed responsibil- 
ity for the attack, leaders of the Agency and other bodies 
called the operation 'a dastardly crime perpetrated by a 
gang of desperadoes' and urged the Jewish community to 'rise 
up against these abominable outrages'. 
16 
Begin claims that 
despite the incident joint resistance planning continued, 
but from August 1946 the Haganah confined its activities 
solely to illegal immigration and, as Samuel Katz observes, 
'took no further part in the armed struggle against the 
British'. 17 The British had not crippled completely the 
Haganah's military capability, but the Haganah's military 
retreat was accompanied by a political one on the part of the 
Jewish Agency. At meetings in Paris in August they rejected 
the British provincial autonomy plan, but countered with a 
proposal for the creation of a Jewish state in a partitioned 
Palestine. This significant departure from the Biltmore 
program was nothing short of a concession to British force 
18 
Apart from this, however, the British could hardly 
be satisfied with the events of June and July 1946. The 
economic and administrative costs of the terrorist actions 
were severe and despite the universal condemnation of the 
16 CO 537/2290; The Times, 23 July 1946; The 
Palestine Post, 24 July 1946; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 
Bethell, -Pp. 253-4; Meir, pp. 196,198. 
17 Begin, p. 226; Katz, Days of Fire, p. 92. 
18 Hurewitz, p. 260. 
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Irgun for the King David incident the Administration suffered 
the greater political damage. The High Commissioner com- 
muted the Irgun death sentences in the face of threats to 
the officer hostages, thereby contributing directly to the 
undermining of the rule of law. The massive search oper- 
ations at the end of June did not stop terrorism; the King 
David incident only made the show of force appear ineffec- 
tive. 
19 
Any political credit the British Government might 
have gained from the King David incident and from the White 
Paper on terrorism published several days later was under- 
mined by the exposure of an official letter by General 
Barker, the GOC, the tones of which were undeniably anti- 
semitic. Insurgent propagandists quickly exploited the 
letter, forcing the British Government to renounce it pub- 
licly. 20 Finally, far from allowing the British Government 
to apply pressure to the Jewish Agency to meet its terms for 
a negotiated settlement, the detention of Jewish leaders 
gave the leverage instead to the Agency, which held the 
settlement hostage for the release of those leaders. More- 
over, the existence of the detainees and the White Paper on 
terrorism undoubtedly made it difficult for the British 
Government to abandon its own plan for provincial autonomy 
and to adopt partition. Although many in British Government 
favoured partition as the only solution, as did the American 
administration, they could scarcely adopt the plan of those 
they had just condemned. 
The Irgun was damaged politically by the sequence of 
events as well. Quite apart from having to accept the blame 
for the King David bombing, the Irgun was isolated 
19 
The Manchester Guardian, 23 July 1946; Wilson, 
Cordon and Search, p. 56; see also Appendix VIII. 
20 The Palestine Post, 1 Aug. 1946; Hurewitz, pp. 
256-7; Bethe pp. M; see also Chapter VII. 
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politically once again by the collapse of the United Resis- 
tance Movement. J. Bowyer Bell states that Begin recognized 
that Ben-Gurion stood to gain the most from the Irgun's 
activities: 
he could now hold firm as the British produced one 
unsatisfactory solution after another, confident that 
the Irgun would continue to engender chaos within the 
Mandate. The political benefits of the Irgun's mili- 
tary campaign would then fall into the lap of the 
Jewish Agency, fast becoming a state-in-waiting. 21 
In other words, the Irgun had unwittingly become the military 
arm of the Jewish Agency. With the Haganah out of the war, 
the Agency could continue the deal with the British with a 
clear conscience. Yet if the Irgun's strategy of leverage 
succeeded the Agency, not the Irgun, would inherit the 
political victory. 
If Begin did appreciate the Irgun's dilemma, that 
might go some way to explain the next major act of 'armed 
propaganda'. On 31 October 1946 the Irgun sabotaged the 
British Embassy in Rome, causing extensive damage. The 
Irgun claimed that the embassy was bombed because it was 
directly involved in preventing Jewish immigration into 
Palestine. Furthermore, the Irgun warned that the attack 
on the embassy was the beginning of an international campaign 
against the British. Certainly the bombing marked the com- 
mencement of a major propaganda offensive obviously intended 
to gain support for the Irgun around the world and to bring 
the threat of terrorism closer to the British domestic 
audience, heretofore isolated from the direct effects of the 
war in Palestine. 22 However, the immediate consequences 
were disastrous for the Irgun. Following the attack British 
and American security forces assisted the Italian police in 
21 Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 174. 
22 Rome to Foreign Office, 31 Oct., 4 Nov. 1946, FO 
371/60786; Dan Nimrod, letter to author, 12 Dec. 1978; see 
also Chapter VII. 
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the search for the terrorists while the two governments 
exerted diplomatic pressure on the Italian Government to 
exercise greater control over the refugee camps thought to 
be the centre of resistance activity. By the end of Decem- 
ber 1946 the Italian police had arrested 21 members of the 
Irgun, including the chief of international operations, Ely 
Tavin. The actual perpetrators of the crime, however, had 
escaped. The Irgun was forced to regroup and in March 1947 
moved its international headquarters to Paris. The Irgun 
conducted only one other international operation of a 
similar scale, an unsuccessful attempt in April 1947 to 
blow up the Colonial Office in London. 
23 
Instead, the insurgents concentrated on direct 
attacks on the security forces. Between October 1945 and 
September 1947 they inflicted more than 500 casualties in 
some 200 attacks, exclusive of those killed or injured in 
the King David incident. Most of the incidents and the 
casualties occurred between September 1946 and July 1947 and 
road mining was the most common and lethal form of attack. 
It almost invariably ensured casualties among the occupants 
of the vehicle, since precautions and counter-measures were 
never completely successful. The insurgents who planted the 
mines usually escaped undetected. 
24 The increased attacks 
were the result of a conscious shift in strategy by the 
Lechi leadership, who concluded that it would be more cost- 
effective to attack members of the security forces, since 
policy-makers like Lord Moyne could be replaced from other 
parts of the empire. Yalin-Mor claims that the road mining 
broke the morale of the British Army in Palestine: 
23 FO 371/52564,60786,67796; Dan Nimrod, inter- 
view with author, 14 June 1978; Bethell, p. 308. 
24 'Avner', Memoirs of an Assassin (London, 1959), 
p. 87; Wilson, Cordon and Search, pp. -5; see also 
Appendix VI. 
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They were afraid to leave their barracks so they had to 
stay there night after night, month after month. It 
was very bad for morale. And the casualties spread 
unrest among British families in England. They started 
demanding the evacuation of British troops. It had a 
political effect. That was the purpose. 25 
The Irgun and the Lechi supplemented this general war of 
attrition with selective attacks on the intelligence and 
security apparatus. Military and police intelligence 
officers were assassinated and police stations attacked and 
bombed. Quite apart from raising the human and financial 
costs of law enforcement, these attacks helped to neutralize 
the intelligence services. By December 1946 insurgent 
attacks had driven the police from the streets, forcing them 
to patrol in armoured cars, further alienating them from the 
public and their sources of information and cooperation. 
The attacks also produced reprisals which served to under- 
mine the legitimacy of the administration by lending cred- 
ibility to insurgent propaganda claims that Palestine was a 
police state. 
26 The 'Car Park Murders' are a case in point. 
On 25 April 1946 between 25 and 30 members of the 
Lechi attacked the 6th Airborne Division car park in Tel 
Aviv. They killed seven soldiers and stole 12 rifles before 
escaping. 
27 Geula Cohen says the objective of the raid was 
solely to steal the rifles and equipment, but the British 
25 
Quoted in Bethell, p. 288. Not all formations 
reported low morale and confinement to barracks was only one 
factor. Suspension of leave programs and disruption of mail 
from Britain were important problems: General G. H. A. 
MacMillan, 'Palestine: Narrative of Events from February 
1947 until Withdrawal of all British Troops (hereafter cited 
as Palestine Narrative)', p. 35, Papers of General Sir 
Gordon MacMillan of MacMillan, Imperial War Museum, London; 
see also 2 Inf. Bde., Quarterly Historical Reports, 1946, 
WO 261/191-2. 
26 
Bethell, pp. 271,277,308; Fergusson, pp. 224-5; 
see also Chapter IV. 
27 6 AB Div., 'Report on Attack on Airborne Car Park 
Tel Aviv, 25 April 1946', WO 169/22978. 
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felt that murder was the first priority and the capture of 
arms only a secondary consideration. Cohen might well be 
correct: under the terms of the resistance agreement the 
Lechi was permitted to carry out 'freelance' raids for arms. 
But it is hard to ignore the fact that Lechi doctrine con- 
condoned and even encouraged the premeditated killing of mem- 
bers of the security forces, and the Lechi had officially 
declared war on the Palestine Administration in February 
1946. Eyewitness accounts of the attack, moreover, indi- 
cated that there was no attempt to avoid inflicting casu- 
alties even when no resistance was offered. 
28 If the attack 
was intended to generate a harsh British response it had a 
measure of success. Troops searched part of the city and 
placed it under curfew. Major-General Cassels, the 
divisional commander, publicly rebuked the Mayor of Tel Aviv 
for alleged complicity of the Jewish community in the attack. 
Small groups of soldiers engaged in reprisals on two Jewish 
communities. And the attack may have induced Attlee to state. 
several days later that disarmament of the Jewish underground 
would have to precede implementation of the Anglo-American 
Commission's report. 
29 The Lechi attack probably had three 
long-term effects: it hampered peaceful resolution of the 
Palestine problem by reinforcing British intransigence; it 
contributed to the deterioration of the security situation by 
further souring relations between the security forces and the 
Jewish community; and it enhanced the credibility of insurg- 
ent propaganda by producing an unauthorized response which 
brought the security forces into disrepute. 
The Irgun abducted members of the security forces 
28 Ibid.; HQ Palestine, 'FIN no. 8', 17 Feb. 1946, 
WO 169/23021; Bethell, pp. 232-3. 
29 Bevin referred to the incident while discussing 
with the American Secretary of State the report of the Anglo- 
American Commission: Bethell, p. 235; see also Chapter II. 
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and other British personnel on three occasions between 
December 1946 and July 1947. in December a military court 
had sentenced two Irgun members to receive, in addition to 
their prison sentences, 18 strokes of the cane. The Irgun 
warned that they would retaliate in kind if the sentences 
were carried out. After the first flogging the Irgun 
abducted and flogged a British Army major and three 
sergeants. The Irgun warned that the next time they would 
respond with gunfire. On the orders of the High Commis- 
sioner the Chief Secretary remitted the second flogging 
sentence. Then on 24 January 1947 Cunningham confirmed the 
death sentence on Dov Gruver, an Irgun member captured in 
an attack on a police station in April 1946. The Irgun 
warned that it would carry out executions in reply, turning 
Palestine into 'a bloodbath' if Gruner was hanged. To give 
credibility to their threat they kidnapped Tel Aviv District 
Judge Ralph Windham and a British businessman. The cabinet 
in London refused to set aside the sentence but Cunningham 
postponed it, ostensibly pending an appeal to the Privy 
Council. Judge Windham and the businessman were then 
released * 
30 
Finally, in July 1947 the Irgun captured Sergeants 
Martin and Paice of Field Security and held them as hostages 
against the death sentences passed on three insurgents. 
Searches failed to locate the sergeants and their captors 
and on 29 July'the Palestine Government carried out its 
executions. Two days later the two sergeants were found 
hanging from a tree near Nathanya. They were booby-trapped 
and an officer was wounded as the bodies were recovered. An 
Irgun poster explained that Martin and Paice had been 
30 Foreign Office, 'Weekly Intelligence Summary 
(hereafter cited as WIS)'1 7 Jan. 1947, FO 371/61761; CM, 
27-8 Jan. 1947, CAB 128/9; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp- 
188-9; Bethell, p. 291; Kirk, p. 234; Wilson, Cordon and 
Search, pp. 87-8. 
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executed not in reprisal but following a trial'by an under- 
ground court, which found them guilty of illegal entry into 
the Jewish homeland, membership in a criminal organization-- 
the British Army, illegal possession of arms, espionage and 
conspiracy. 
31 
Although it did not involve kidnapping, the Irgun's 
attack on Acre prison on 4 May 1947 bears mentioning here 
since it was carried out in response to the execution of Dov 
Gruner and three other insurgents on 16 April. Forty-one 
Irgun and Lechi members, along with 214 Arabs, escaped in 
the daring rescue operation, but four of the freed insurg- 
ents and four attackers were killed and 13 captured. 
32 
According to Begin the Irgun carried out the floggings 
because it regarded the sentences of the court humiliating 
and degrading to the Jews. The other hostages were seized 
simply to stop the hangings. When this failed in April 
because strict British security measures precluded capturing 
British personnel the Irgun carried out the dramatic prison 
raid. Begin regarded this last operation as a failure 
because of the casualties and arrests of his own men: 'It 
was our duty to pay the hangman in precisely his own coin. 
And we did not succeed. 133 The British did not believe the 
Acre operation had been planned and executed in the brief 
period following Gruner's execution and Eitan Haber suggests 
that the Irgun had more than just retaliation in mind. He 
notes that in the latter half of April the rebellion was at 
a standstill and Begin, convinced that the British would 
cave in under slightly more pressure, insisted on more 
activity. The operation against Acre would serve both the 
31 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on Operation TIGER', WO 261/ 
181; Begin, 288-90; Wilson, Cordon and Search, pp. 132-4. 
32 Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 204-18. 
33 Begin, pp. 231,257,275-83; Bethell, pp. 336, 
338. 
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immediate needs of releasing men from prison and the long- 
term strategy of leverage against Britain. 
34 
Although Begin never states it in his book, the 
intention to undermine the law enforcement process was 
implicit in all of these actions. Twice in the space of one 
month the Irgun could claim that it had forced the govern- 
ment to retreat from enforcement of the decision of its 
courts in Palestine. Moreover, it appears that these 
incidents contributed in a significant way to the asset to 
liability shift which eventually persuaded the British 
Government to leave Palestine. Remission of the second 
caning sentence caused considerable controversy within the 
government and Creech-Jones conceded that the government 
was humiliated by the successful kidnappings and other 
terrorist acts. An editorial in the Daily Telegraph con- 
cluded that the evacuation of non-essential personnel in 
February 1947 which followed the kidnappings was a tacit 
admission that terrorism had succeeded in making Palestine 
ungovernable and raised the status of the Irgun to that of 
an armed revolt, which it could claim as a victory. 
35 
Colonel Gray, Inspector-General of Police, later confided to 
an Israeli journalist that he felt the floggings, the Acre 
prison break, and the hanging of the two sergeants were the 
events which shook the government sufficiently to persuade 
them to think about relinquishing the Mandate: 
In 1947 Britain was still an empire, and an empire ... 
cannot allow itself one thing: to lose prestige and 
become a laughing-stock. ... When the underground killed our men, we could treat it as murder; but when 
they erected gallows and executed our men, it was as if 
34 Haber, pp. 182-3; Wilson, Cordon and Search, p. 
123. There was a substantial reduction in the number of 
incidents after the imposition of martial law in March 1947: 
see this chapter, fn. 75. 
35 Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, New York Herald 
Tribune, 1 Feb. 1947. 
they were saying, "We rule here as much as you do", 
and that no administration can bear. Our choice was 
obvious. Either total suppression or get out, and we 
chose the second. 36 
The insurgents also carried out more than 90 attacks against 
targets of economic importance. Most of the operations con- 
sisted of attempts to mine the railway, resulting in damage 
or derailment of more than 20 trains. Five major railway 
stations were bombed or attacked. There were 12 attacks on 
petroleum industry targets, consisting mainly of sabotage 
of the oil pipeline. The Lechi carried out the most costly 
single operation on 30/31 March 1947 when they destroyed 
16,000 tons of petroleum products in the Shell Oil Company 
installations of Haifa. These attacks were, of course, an 
important element in the Lechi's anti-imperialist strategy 
and they achieved a measure of success. First, they 
increased the already heavy financial burden of the 
Palestine Government by raising both the direct and indirect 
costs of security. Secondly, the attacks forced the secur- 
ity forces to divert troops from offensive operations to 
defensive tasks which posed no threat to the insurgent 
organizationb themselves. 
37 Tactically, then, this form of 
economic warfare was very efficient. 
Security Force Operations 
Security force operations passed through four 
distinct phases during the two year period. From October 
1945 to the end of June 1946 the security forces carried 
out a peacekeeping role, involving searches and security 
operations. The second phase, from 29 June to early 
September, was characterized by a major offensive against 
36 Quoted in Haber, p. 191. 
37 Security force operations intended to protect 
the railway and the oil refineries are discussed later in 
this chapter; see also Chapter VIII, Appendices VI, VIII. 
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the insurgents, including two division-size search oper- 
ations. The security forces returned to peacekeeping in the 
third phase, which continued until the end of February 1947. 
During the final phase, from March through August, the 
security forces went on the offensive again, this time 
employing martial law and special operations. Each of these 
phases will be examined in turn. 
Peacekeeping 
On 21 October 1945 all army formations deployed to 
their operational locations and tasks: protection of land 
lines of communication, airfields and other vulnerable 
points, and prevention of illegal immigration by land and 
sea. The 3rd Parachute Brigade deployed on the outskirts of 
Tel Aviv where it took responsibility for internal security 
in Jaffa District, potentially the most troublesome area. 
In spite of these preparations the security forces were 
caught completely by surprise when the insurgents launched 
their offensive on 31 October. The troops spent most of the 
night "dashing around the countryside' and captured only one 
insurgent. On 1 November the GOC imposed a road curfew and 
formations mounted roadblocks to enforce it. Similar 
scenarios were repeated many times during the next two 
years. 
38 
A fortnight later Jews rioted in Jerusalem and Tel 
Aviv in protest against British policy and provided the 
first major test of the army's internal. security doctrine. 
The security forces quickly brought Jerusalem under control, 
but spent five days restoring order in Tel Aviv. Trouble 
began with a general strike on 14 November: a peaceful 
demonstration in the afternoon deteriorated into attacks on 
government buildings. By the time troops arrived mobs had 
38 HQ Palestine, 'message', 19 Oct. 1945, WO 169/ 
19745; see also WO 169/19685,19697,19699,19701,19703, 
19706; Wilson, Cordon and Search, p. 22; Blaxland, p. 31. 
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nearly overwhelmed the police. At 1840 hours 'C' Company 
8th Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, advanced into Tel 
Aviv in slow moving lorries with horns blaring, bayonets 
fixed, and signs in three languages warning 'Disperse or We 
Fire'. The troops cleared Colony Square and took up 
positions blocking the roads into it. ' The crowd, now 
numbering in the thousands, stoned the soldiers, inflicting 
some serious casualties. After repeated warnings by a 
magistrate using a loudhailer went unheeded, an officer 
directed selected marksmen to fire several rounds to dis- 
perse the crowd. The mob withdrew but continued to wreak 
havoc in other parts of the city. At 2040 the remainder of 
the battalion arrived and after an hour they had restored 
order in the city. The following morning mobs violated a 
curfew and attacked businesses. After consultations with 
the divisional commander Brigadier Lathbury moved two more 
battalions into Tel Aviv and by evening the city was quiet 
once more. Further reinforcements, another battalion and 
two armoured car regiments, arrived on the 16th. Before 
dawn on the 17th troops distributed a government proclam- 
ation which directed all citizens to behave in an orderly 
manner and warned that the government would take all 
measures necessary to maintain order. Gradually the curfew 
was relaxed and on the 20th the soldiers returned to their 
camps. Six Jews died in the rioting and 60 were wounded. 
Twelve soldiers were wounded, and 30 treated for slight 
injuries. Operation BELLICOSE, as the task was named, was 
a tactical success: order was restored and no rioting on 
this scale occurred again during the next two years. Owing 
to the casualties, however, it was undoubtedly a propaganda 
3 
success for the Jews. 
9 
39 3 Para. Bde., 'ISUM no. 3', 28 Nov. 1945, WO 169/ 
19705; see also WO 169/19745,19685,19920,19921; Wilson, 
Cordon and Search, pp. 27-9; Blaxland, pp. 32-3; see 
Chapter VII. 
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Commencing with operations at Givat Hayim and 
Rishpon at the end of November, the security forces con- 
ducted more than 55 searches before the end of June 1946. 
These had two objectives: to capture wanted persons-- 
insurgents or illegal immigrants--and/or to seize illegal 
caches of arms, explosives, military equipment or documents 
40 
A typical search of a rural settlement took place at Yemini 
in northern Palestine early in 1946. Following the derail- 
ment and robbery of a train on-l2 January the 9th Infantry 
Brigade stood to with divisional troops under command and on 
call. The brigade mounted four roadblocks and an aircraft 
surveyed the scene of the incident. The commander of the 
3rd Infantry Division, responsible for security of the 
northern sector, visited the site in the afternoon and, fol- 
lowing consultations with the DSP, ordered the brigade to 
cordon and search Yemini commencing at dawn the following 
morning. Armoured units provided the outer cordon consisting 
of. mobile patrols between the roadblocks. Four battalions 
shared responsibility for the inner cordon. Two companies 
from one battalion provided the search and clearance troops, 
while elements of another erected and guarded the 'cage' 
(holding area for suspects) and provided a reserve. All 
troops were in position just before dawn. At 0600 the 
brigadier, the DSP and their escort drove into the settle- 
ment and ordered the Mukhtar (the village headman) to parade 
all males aged 16-45 years and all females aged 16-30 years. 
The Mukhtar and the inhabitants cooperated fully. The 
search began at 0700 and finished two hours later. At 1025 
the police took 16 suspects to Athlit for further question- 
ing, the cordons withdrew, and residents returned to their 
40 Wilson, Cordon and Search, p. 36. The war 
diaries did not always record and i entify individually each 
search operation; the number cited is the known minimum: 
see Appendix VII. 
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homes. 41 
Rural settlements like Yemini could be isolated and 
searched easily, but the urban areas of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, 
and Haifa did not lend themselves to such large operations. 
Cities offered the insurgents unlimited opportunities to 
escape and hide, to blend in with the population, or to 
observe and ambush the security forces. The old city of 
Jerusalem, with its network of streets and alleys, passages 
and stairways, was almost impossible to police, patrol, or 
isolate effectively. Thus, urban searches tended to be 
small unit operations against specific targets. In January 
1946 police supported by one platoon of soldiers carried out 
a typical operation, a search of eight houses in one sector 
of Jerusalem. 
42 Following the car park murders on 25 April 
1946, the 2nd Parachute Brigade conducted a much larger 
search operation in Tel Aviv. The insurgents attacked at 
2045 and withdrew into the Yeminite section of the Yarkon 
quarter of the city. At 2230 the security forces imposed a 
curfew and the 6th Battalion, the Gordon Highlanders, cor- 
doned that section of Tel Aviv. Elements of the Police 
Mobile Force with the 5th Parachute Battalion and an engineer 
squadron in support initiated the search at 0530 on the 26th. 
When the operation ended at 1205 the police had questioned 
1,491 persons, and had detained 79 although there was no 
proof that they had taken part in the attack. The police 
also recovered a quantity of military equipment and plans 
for an attack on Athlit clearance camp. 
43 
41 3 Inf. Div., 'Report of Train Robbery 12 Jan. 46 
and Subsequent Search 13 Jan. 46', WO 169/22967; 9 Inf. Bde., 
'Report on Cordon and Search Ops, Yemini 13 Jan. 46', WO 169/ 
23003; see also Brigadier R. N. Anderson, 'Search Operations 
in Palestine: The Problems of the Soldier', Army Quarterly, 
LV (1947-48), 204-8. 
42 185 Inf. Bde., 'Schedule of Anti-Terrorist 
Measures 28-31 Jan. 46', WO 169/23006. 
43 6 AB Div., war diary, Oct. -Nov. 1945, WO 169/ 
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Security operations--patrols, roadblocks, raids, and 
guard duties--were a constant aspect of internal security in 
Palestine. Unlike searches, which had a definite beginning 
and conclusion, security operations were endless. There 
were a large number of vulnerable points which had to be 
protected: military installations and government buildings, 
the railway, Haifa port and oil refinery, water reservoirs 
and pumping stations, transportation links, and police 
stations which were undermanned or vulnerable to attack. 
In addition, troops constantly patrolled their sectors on 
foot and in vehicles. Patrols served two functions. First, 
they allowed the soldiers to become familiar with their areas 
of responsibility, thereby increasing the flow of background 
information to the intelligence staffs. Secondly, they 
restricted the insurgents' freedom of movement and increased 
the chances of their being captured. This was particularly 
important in the large cities. Roadblocks were important 
for similar reasons. They were intended to interfere with 
insurgent freedom of action by preventing them from concen- 
trating for operations or by apprehending them as they 
attempted to escape from the scene of an incident. 
44 
The security forces in Jerusalem demonstrated the 
effectiveness of continuous urban security operations. In 
January 1946 the 185th Infantry Brigade was involved in 
improving the fixed wire defences of government offices, ' 
police and brigade headquarters, and other vulnerable points. 
In addition, 'during the times troops were not actively 
engaged in curfew patrols and searches, a large proportion 
were still patrolling the streets in consequence of the "war 
22978; Wilson, Cordon and Search, p. 47. 
44 6 AB Div., war diary, Oct. -Nov. 1945, WO 169/ 
19685; 3 Inf. Bde., war diary, Oct. -Nov. 1945, WO 169/19703; 
see also Chapter III. 
ýý7 
of nerves"'. 
45 
On the instructions of army headquarters, 
the patrols conducted a series of minor security operations, 
including sudden identity and baggage checks of pedestrians 
and passengers on public transportation. The army insti- 
tuted a new system of emergency roadblocks which were 
mounted for short intervals on two occasions. Streets were 
patrolled constantly, and snap searches of houses and flats 
were so frequent that Jews commented that every Jewish house 
in Jerusalem had been searched at least once; the army 
acknowledged that their comments 'corresponded closely to 
the*truth'. 46 The high degree of vigilance produced results. 
On 14 and 15 January the police received intelligence reports 
indicating that the insurgents were about to launch further 
operations; at the same time they noticed a self-imposed 
curfew in specific Jewish areas of the city, around the 
Palestine Broadcasting studios in particular. The security 
forces acted on the warning by completing additional wiring 
and by mounting extra foot patrols and mobile escorts for 
police cars in the appropriate areas of the city. The 
anticipated action occurred on the 19th when a mobile patrol 
encountered insurgents near the broadcasting studios. A 
firefight ensued, and on hearing the shooting and explosions 
troops established the pre-designated emergency roadblocks. 
This prevented the escape and permitted the capture of some 
of the insurgents. Subsequent searches produced further 
suspects, a large arms cache, and valuable intelligence. 
47 
45 185 Inf. Bde., war diary, Jan. 1946, WO 169/23006. 
46 Ibid., and '01 no. 2', 10 Jan. 1946, 'Schedule of 
Anti-Terrors t-Measures 28-31 Jan. 46'; HQ Palestine, 
'Directive--Searches and Road Checks', Jan. 1946, WO 169/ 
23021. There were 10 identity checks and 15 searches in 
Jerusalem in January 1946. Emergency roadblocks provided a 
ring approximately one mile in diameter around the centre of 
the most likely targets. 
47 185 Inf. Bde., war diary, Jan. 1946, and 'Report 
on Operations in Jerusalem 19 January and on Subsequent 
Pf 
This was one of the rare occasions when the security forces 
were able to develop background information into operational 
intelligence and to follow it up with appropriate operations. 
When this occurred the outcome was never in doubt, a factor 
which obviously impressed the insurgents; they conducted no 
further operations in Jerusalem until June. 
The army and the police continued to work together 
in this manner throughout February and March. Their per- 
serverance was rewarded again in March when the discovery of 
an arms cache was followed up by a security force raid which 
netted 30 suspected insurgents and led to 30 more arrests 
the following week. 
48 When the 31st Infantry Brigade took 
over responsibility for Jerusalem at the end of March, it 
maintained the pressure: 46 foot patrols and mobile night 
patrols in April; 34 night patrols in May. In addition, the 
forces carried out raids on Jewish cafes, railroad stations, 
suspect houses, and persons under police supervision. These 
operations induced a long period of relative quiet in 
Jerusalem, but they were so effective as to be almost 
counter-productive: after the middle of May the security 
forces discontinued some patrols and roadblocks and removed 
the guard on the King David Hotel despite warnings of 
impending insurgent activity. 
49 By relaxing their vigilance 
Dates', WO 169/23006. 
48 7 Inf. Bde., war diary, Feb. -Mar. 1946, WO 169/ 
22999. 
49 31 Inf. Bde., 'Anti-Terrorist Operations 
Jerusalem', 31 Mar. 1946, 'Security Operations--Jerusalem', 
'Foot Patrols--Jerusalem', Apr. 1946, WO 169/23005; 1st 
Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, '0I no. 12', 
26 Mar. 1946, 'Guards, Patrols, etc., --adjustments to', 17 
May 1946, war diary, Apr. -May 1946, WO 169/23196. Removal 
of the guard at the hotel may have been the result of long- 
standing complaints by officers about excessive security: 
HQ Palestine, 'Notes on BGS Conference', 5 Jan. 1946, WO 
169/23021. 
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at this time the security forces played right into the plans 
of the insurgents who were preparing the next wave of 
attacks, which included targets in Jerusalem. 
The security forces also maintained a series of 
mobile patrols in Haifa--four per night, each lasting 14 
hours and covering 80-100 miles through the streets of the 
city. In April they were reduced in scale, number, and 
length. At the same time the army switched from using 
static roadblocks, which had proven unproductive and expen- 
sive in terms of manpower, to using highly mobile roadblocks 
which would remain in one place for an hour or two, then 
switch to another location. In this way they intended to 
'keep the possible "evil doer" guessing and give the impre- 
sion of having more roadblocks in use than previously'. 
50 
As in the case of Jerusalem, Haifa was almost free of inci- 
dents and the security operations eventually produced 
results: on 17 June 1946 troops mounted four roadblocks 
around the city minutes after the attack on the railway 
workshops. The fleeing insurgents ran into one of these 
blocks and the entire group was killed or captured. 
51 
Tel Aviv, on the other hand, was largely ignored by 
the security forces. Until autumn 1946 no troops were 
based permanently in the city; instead the battalion based 
at Sarona in the suburbs maintained a company on call to 
support the police at short notice. The security forces did 
not maintain continuous patrols and troops deployed into 
Tel Aviv only for specific search operations. As a result 
the insurgents conducted more operations there and in Jaffa 
(which was subject to the same security arrangements) than 
50 1st King's Dragoon Guards, war diary, Jan. 1946, 
WO 169/23147; 3 Inf. Bde., 'Order for Night Patrols--Haifa', 
2 Apr. 1946, 'Roadblocks', 5 Apr. 1946, WO 169/22995. 
51 1 Inf. Div. /North Palestine District, 'Outline 
Report--Incidents Night 17/18 June', 19 June 1946, WO 169/ 
22957. 
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in the other large cities. There were sound reasons, how- 
ever, for maintaining a low profile presence in Tel Aviv. 
52 
Rural security operations produced mixed results 
owing to the inability of the forces to control vast areas 
of open country. In the northern sector the lst Guards 
Brigade adopted a scheme for establishing quick-reaction 
roadblocks following incidents. Sited close to camps and 
police posts, however, they were obvious and easily avoided, 
though they ensured that the insurgents would have to 
approach targets and retreat by long cross-country routes. 
In April these roadblocks were supplemented by observation 
posts, snap road checks, and 'snooping patrols' by the 1st 
King's Dragoon Guards, valuable in maintaining a visible 
presence and creating 'an uncertain factor to be reckoned 
with in any plans laid down by lawbreakers! 
53 Sometimes 
these operations produced results: on 3 April 1946 aerial 
reconnaissance located a group of insurgents retreating 
across country following attacks on the railway. Troops and 
police quickly blocked all avenues of escape and captured 
30 insurgents with weapons, explosives and equipment. 
54 
More often than not, however, the limitations of rural 
security operations were painfully obvious: in June 1946 
army headquarters issued specific warnings about insurgent 
52 Wilson, Cordon and Search, p. 27; see Appendix VI. 
In order to base troops in Tel Aviv in large numbers the 
army would have been forced to requisition housing, which 
would have further antagonized the population of Palestine's 
only completely Jewish city. Moreover, camps in rural areas 
were easier to defend from attack. 
53 3 Inf. Div., 'Directive no. 3--Further Lessons of 
Recent Ops', 6 Feb. 1946, 'Directive no. 6', 25 Feb. 1946, 
WO 169/22967; 1 Guards Bde., 'Local Alarm Scheme--Plan 
CAPITAL', 8 Mar. 1946, WO 169/22989; 1st King's Dragoon 
Guards, war diary, Feb. 1946, 'Operational Order (hereafter 
cited as 00) no. 6', 21 Apr. 1946, WO 169/23147. 
54 8th Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, 'Report on 
Security Operation 3 April 1946', WO 169/22978. 
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operations anticipated for the 16th against lines of com- 
munication. Formations conducted snap road checks and 
carried out reconnaissance of railway bridges, to no avail; 
the insurgents reached their targets and most evaded 
capture. 
55 
In his review of the situation in the Middle East at 
the beginning of 1946 General Sir Bernard Paget, Commander 
in Chief Middle East Forces, stated that in Palestine, 'The 
Army has not yet initiated any offensive action; any fighting 
that has been done has been carried out in support of police 
operations. '56 This peacekeeping phase ended in June when, 
in response to the insurgent offensive, the security forces 
took action against the Jewish Agency and the Haganah. 
First Offensive 
The security forces' action took the form of a major 
search and arrest operation, code-named AGATHA. The oper- 
ation had two tactical objectives: -first, to occupy and 
search the Jewish Agency headquarters and other buildings 
suspected of being the headquarters of illegal organiz- 
ations; and secondly, to arrest as many members of the 
Palmach as possible, as well as certain members of Jewish 
political bodies believed responsible for the recent upsurge 
of insurgent activity. The success of the operation 
depended upon surprise, so the security forces took strict 
precautions to ensure secrecy: all conferences were held 
away from headquarters and senior officers attending removed 
their distinctive red hatbands; written orders were kept to 
55 1 Inf. Div. /North Palestine District, '01 no. 4', 
15 June 1946, WO 169/22957; 3 Inf. Bde., 'Message', 15 June 
1946, WO 169/22995; see also this chapter, fn. 11.3 Inf. 
Bde. ordered a recce of railway bridges every 48 hours from 
the 15th. The insurgents attacked between the first and 
second checks. 
56 General Sir Bernard Paget, 'Middle East Review 
1945', WO 169/22881. 
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a minimum, circulated in sealed envelopes to officers on a 
restricted list. Only brigade staffs, police superinten- 
dents and a few trusted members of their staffs were 
briefed before the morning of 28 June. Battalion and 
company commanders were briefed during the day at 10' groups 
disguised as informal meetings of officers lower in rank 
than usual. The other ranks were not informed until late in 
the evening. The army made every effort to convey the 
impression that life was carrying on as normal; a large 
number of senior officers appeared on the 28th at the 
Jerusalem horse show. Troops in armoured regiments prepared 
their vehicles for an inspection, unaware that they were in 
fact preparing for a major operation. 
57 
Commencing at 0405 hours 29 June parties of Royal 
Signals troops, escorting civilian personnel who had not 
been told of the operation and who were brought directly 
from their homes, occupied all exchanges and suspended all 
telephone communications across Palestine for more than three 
hours. This was sufficient to prevent telephone trans- 
mission of any warning of the impending operation. The GOC 
imposed road curfews in four districts and complete curfews 
in the main cities. 
58 At the same time some 10,000 troops 
and 7,000 police deployed to their operational targets, the 
three main cities and 30 rural settlements. In the cities 
57 1 Inf. Div. /North Palestine District, '01 no. 6, 
7', 27/28 June 1946, WO 169/22957; 3 Inf. Bde., 'Op AGATHA-- 
Briefing Program', 2 July 1946, WO 169/22995; 3 Para. Bde., 
'OI--Operation AGATHA', 26 June 1946, WO 169/22997; 3rd 
King's Own Hussars, war diary, June 1946, WO 169/23148; 
Wilson, Cordon and Search, pp. 57-8; Blaxland, p. 37. 
58 6 AB Div. Signals, 'Report on I. S. Signal Oper- 
ation Completed 29 June 1946', WO 169/22982; 1 Inf. Div. / 
North Palestine District, '0I no. 6', 'AGATHA Summary no. 1', 
29 June 1946, WO 169/22957; 31 Inf. Bde., '00 no. 9', 28 
June 1946, WO 169/23005; GOC Palestine, 'Curfew Order no. 1', 
29 June 1946, WO 169/23022; GHQ Middle East Forces to War 
Office, 29 June 1946, WO 169/22879, Wilson, Cordon and 
Search, p. 59; Blaxland, p. 37. 
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parties of troops and police equipped with CID 'Black Lists' 
arrested wanted persons, generally at their homes. In 
addition, in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv they searched the 
premises of the Jewish Agency, the Histadruth and other 
organizations, in some cases forcing entry and blowing safes 
with explosives. Rural settlements were cordoned and 
searched in the usual manner. Police carried out inter- 
rogation and identification and sent suspects to Athlit or 
Latrun detention camps. However, Jewish anticipation of 
the operation and the alleged discovery of plans prevented 
the security forces from achieving complete surprise. 
59 
Because the Jewish Agency was a legal organization, 
and because the Haganah made only modest efforts to conceal 
its activities, information on the two organizations was of 
high quality. The security forces knew whom to arrest and 
where to look for evidence, arms, and equipment. By 1 July 
the police had arrested 2,718 persons; many had been 
detained for resisting searches and were released after a 
short time. Seven hundred persons were placed in long-term 
detention, including four members of the Jewish Agency 
Executive, seven Haganah commanders, and about half of the 
membership of the Palmach. Other members of the Agency, 
the Histadruth, and the Va'ad Leumi (National Council) were 
held, but Moshe Sneh, the Haganah commander in chief, 
evaded arrest. In the Agency files the police found evidence 
implicating the organization in the activities of the 
59 HQ Palestine, 'Operational Log (hereafter cited 
as Ops Log) 28/29 June 1946 Op AGATHA', 'Confidential Situ- 
ation Intelligence Report (hereafter cited as COSITINTREP) 
no. 562,564', 29/30 June 1946, WO 169/23022; 1 Inf. Div. / 
North Palestine District, 'AGATHA Summary no. 1,2', 29/30 
June 1946, WO 169/22957; 6 AB Div., 'Ops Log', 29/30 June 
1946, WO 169/22978; 1 Guards Bde., 'Report on Op AGATHA', 
29 June/l July 1946, WO 169/22989; 3 Para. Bde., 'Report on 
Operation AGATHA', 29/30 June 1946, WO 169/22997; Wilson, 
Cordon and Search, p. 59; Bethell, p. 249; Meir, p. 195; 
Trevor, p. 211. 
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resistance movement, as well as quantities of government 
documents revealing the extent of subversive penetration of 
the administration. Troops seized nine tons of documents 
in Tel Aviv alone. 
60 At Mesheq Yagur, a settlement near 
Haifa, troops discovered 33 arms caches containing over 500 
weapons and a large quantity of munitions. The'Haganah did 
not have many such armouries, so the loss was a serious blow 
to the resistance movement. 
61 During the course of oper- 
ation AGATHA the security forces encountered only light 
resistance, mainly of a passive nature, and casualties were 
few. 62 
In mid-July the army returned to routine security 
operations, but following the bombing of the King David Hotel 
troops searched parts of Jerusalem and the police arrested 
60 GHQ Middle East Forces to War Office, 29 June 
1946, WO 169/22879; GSI GHQ Middle East Forces, 'WMIR no. 
67', 5 July 1946, WO 169/22882; HQ Palestine, 'Ops Log', WO 
169/23022; 2 Para. Bde., 'Report: Operation AGATHA', 1 July 
1946, WO 169/22992; 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders, 'Internal Security Operations Carried out by 1st 
Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from 1700 28 
June 1946 to 2400 29 June'1946', WO 169/23196; 1 Inf. Div. / 
North Palestine, District, 'AGATHA Summary no. 2', 30 June 
1946, WO 169/22957; 3 Para. Bde., 'Report on Operation 
AGATHA', WO 169/22997; Begin, p. 204; Hurewitz, p. 255; 
Wilson, Cordon and Search, pp. 60-2. Jewish policemen 
involved in examining captured documents destroyed many of 
those which would incriminate the Haganah or the Jewish 
Agency: Bethell, p. 251. 
61 Statement by George Hall, 10 July 1946, FO 371/ 
52538; Begin, p. 210; arms and munitions found at Mesheq 
Yagur included: 10 machine guns, 78 pistols, 92 two-inch 
mortars, 321 rifles, 475 pounds of explosives, 5,017 gren- 
ades, 5,267 mortar bombs, and 425,000 rounds of ammunition. 
62 G(Ops)l GHQ Middle East Forces, 'COSITINTREP no. 
186', 30 June 1946, WO 169/22879; HQ Palestine. 'COSITINTREP 
no. 562,564', GOC to formation commanders and I. G. Police, 
30 June 1946, WO 169/23022. Total casualties: three Jews 
killed, 60 injured (16 hospitalized) and one British 
soldier killed accidentally. 
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376 persons who had been under supervision. 
63 
The govern- 
ment directed further that the security forces institute an 
intensive search for members of the Irgun and the Lechi, so 
for the second time within one month the army and the police 
carried out a large-scale operation: code-named SHARK, it 
involved cordoning and searching the entire city of Tel Aviv. 
The 6th Airborne Division was the conducting formation, with 
four brigades and supporting arms and services under com- 
mand, amassing a total force of 21, '000 troops. Operation 
SHARK posed unique problems. First, as in the case of 
AGATHA secrecy was essential; the insurgents certainly 
expected some major response. But unlike the previous oper- 
ation the whole force had to be concentrated on one target. 
It would not be possible to camouflage troop deployments by 
dispersing units in all directions. Secondly, the army 
would be responsible not only for searching all buildings 
and screening all persons in the city, but also for main- 
taining essential services to the population for the dur- 
ation of the search. Third, to be effective the search had 
to be launched as soon as possible, despite the fact that 
the army had no plans for an operation of this magnitude. 
Finally, there was very little intelligence upon which to 
act against the Irgun. 
64 
Before dawn on 30 July signals troops disrupted 
telephone service while'the four brigades converged on Tel 
Aviv by different routes. They drew a cordon around the 
city, isolating it from north to south, before the columns 
passed through into Tel Aviv. Police and navy launches 
patrolled the waterfront. Troops had imposed a 36-hour 
63 2 Para. Bde., 'Diary of Events--Operation HARRY 
II, 14-20 July 1946', WO 261/213; Trevor, p. 229. 
64 CM, 25 July 1946, CAB 128/6; GOC Palestine, 
'Military Action to be Taken to Enforce Law and Order in 
Palestine', 22 June 1946, Cunningham Papers, V/4; Wilson, 
Cordon and Search, pp. 67,72-3. 
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curfew before most inhabitants were awake. The brigades 
then laid inner cordons dividing the city into four sectors, 
and then sub-divided their sectors into battalion areas. 
The thorough nature of the operation was its unique feature: 
troops and police searched every building on every street 
from roof to cellar, then escorted all but children and the 
elderly to battalion screening teams, who identified and 
interrogated some 100,000 people. Approximately 10,000, 
mostly males aged 16-60 years, were sent for further screen-' 
ing at brigade level where CID officers checked the identity 
of each person against photographs and descriptions of 
wanted persons. When the operation ended on 2 August the 
police sent 787 persons to detention camp, including Yitshak 
Yizernitsky, a member of the Lechi's leadership triumvirate. 
They failed to identify Friedman-Yellin, however, and missed 
Begin who was hiding behind a false wall in his apartment. 
Troops found five arms caches, the largest hidden in the 
basement of the Great Synagogue. Essential services worked 
smoothly: curfew was lifted briefly in the evenings to 
allow the population to obtain food and other necessary 
services within their restricted sectors. 
65 
The British offensive ended with battalion-size 
searches at Dorot and Ruhama in August and Operation HAZARD, 
the imposition of a curfew in Tel Aviv, in early September. 
66 
With the exception of deployments to protect the railway in 
65 2 Inf. Bde., '00 no. 2--Op. SHARK', 28 July 1946, 
WO 261/191; 2 Para. Bde., 'Report on Operation SHARK', 3 
Aug. 1946, WO 261/213; Charteris to author, 9 Nov. 1976; 
Wilson, Cordon and Search, pp. 67-8,70-1; Begin, pp. 227-30. 
The arms caches yielded: four machine guns, 23 mortars, 176 
rifles, 127,000 rounds of ammunition, a large quantity of 
explosives, and ¬50,000 in forged bearer bonds. 
66 2 Para. Bde., 'Report on Op HAZARD 9/10 September 
1946', 11 Sept. 1946, WO 261/213; Wilson, 'Cordon and Search, 
pp. 79-81. The searches at Dorot and Ruhama produced con- 
siderably quantities of weapons and munitions. 
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November, HAZARD was the last large-scale operation until 
the end of 1946. 
Peacekeeping 
Up to the middle of November most operations were 
small-unit actions. The 2nd Parachute Brigade carried out a 
series of snap searches, road checks, and searches of houses 
and blocks of flats, usually employing no more than one or 
two platoons in conjunction with the police. Battalions 
conducted two cordon and search operations. In a major 
shift in deployment policy the brigade maintained one 
company at police headquarters in Tel Aviv for immediate 
employment on anti-terrorist operations. To counteract the 
effects of road mining, the 1st and 2nd Parachute Brigades 
established a road curfew at night, restricting movement to 
specific routes, and mounted mobile patrols, mobile and 
static roadblocks, and off-road foot patrols. The 9th 
Infantry Brigade, on duty in Jerusalem, carried out secur- 
ity operations in the usual manner. 
67 
In the middle of November the security forces 
launched Operation EARWIG to protect the railway from sabo- 
tage that had brought rail operations to a halt. EARWIG 
consumed large numbers of troops on purely defensive guard 
duties throughout the whole length of the railway in 
Palestine. In southern Palestine the whole airborne 
division, with the exception of several reserve battalions, 
was deployed on this task protecting 70 miles of track. 
The division divided its sector into three zones, each 
assigned a different density of troops according to the 
degree of danger. Small observation posts linked by patrols 
67 2 Para. Bde., '01 no. 8--Operation COMB', 19 
Sept. 1946, '0I no. 11--Enforcement of Curfew', 27 Oct. 
1946, WO 261/213; 1 Para. Bde., '0I no. 12--Brigade Com- 
mander's IS Conference 31 October 1946', '00 no. 16', 3 
Nov. 1946, WO 261/209; 9 Inf. Bde., '01 no. 10', 7 Nov. 
1946, WO 261/207. 
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were established 500-1,000 yards apart in the most hazardous 
areas, which were also patrolled at night. Every morning 
the company responsible for a 
. 
given sector inspected the 
line with the railway gangs before trains were allowed to 
pass. Aircraft also surveyed the line at first light. The 
army was employed in this manner for a month, though the 
numbers were reduced after the first fortnight. EARWIG was 
successful: sabotage ceased and normal rail service was 
gradually restored. 
68 
The tempo of operations increased in response to the 
flogging incidents of 29 December 1946. Between 30 December 
and 3 January 1947 the airborne division carried out seven 
brigade-size searches in Tel Aviv and its suburbs. More 
than 10,000 people were screened and 191 arrested or 
detained. In addition, troops found small quantities of 
arms and explosives. They achieved a higher degree of suc- 
cess when they returned to small-unit operations. Operation 
OCTOPUS, 7-17 January, consisted of a series of raids on 
specific areas of known insurgent activity, guided by accur- 
ate intelligence. Supported by snap searches and mobile 
roadblocks, the raids netted 90 persons, of whom a much 
larger proportion than usual was detained in custody. In 
Rishon Le Zion alone the security forces arrested 12 members 
of the Irgun, including three important members. 
69 
Operations ceased for about one week in the middle 
of January while the army reorganized. The two divisions 
exchanged areas: the airborne division assumed responsi- 
bility for northern Palestine, while the lst Infantry 
Division took over a new central sector consisting of Lydda 
68 1 Para. Bde., '00 no. 18', 14 Nov. 1946, WO 261/ 
209; see also WO 261/213; Wilson, Cordon and Search, pp. 
82-4. 
69 WO 261/209-10; Dimoline to Dempsey, 9 Jan. 1947, 
Pyman Diaries 6/1/2; Wilson, Cordon and Search, pp. 88-9, 
91,235-6. 
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and Samaria districts and a small portion of Haifa district. 
The 8th Infantry Brigade moved from Egypt to take command 
of Gaza district, which was designated the southern sector. 
Shortly after arriving in the north the airborne division 
was reduced in strength as the 2nd Parachute Brigade 
embarked for Britain. 
70 
The army resumed operations as soon as the for- 
mations redeployed. The 1st Guards Brigade, now assigned to 
the turbulent Lydda district, continued the OCTOPUS scheme 
through February while the 9th Infantry Brigade carried out 
a similar programme in Jerusalem. The 3rd Parachute Brigade 
found Haifa quiet, but there were more targets to protect; 
the naval depot, the oil refinery and the pipeline. 
71 
The 
kidnappings at the end of January 1947 disrupted these 
routines almost immediately. The 8th Infantry Brigade cor- 
doned and searched Petah Tiqva and the 9th Infantry Brigade 
carried out two battalion-size searches in the Jewish 
quarters of Jerusalem. The abductions resulted in 
additional duties for the security forces: they assisted 
in the evacuation of non-essential personnel, and later pro- 
vided guards, patrols and mobile reserves to protect the 
security zones. 
72 The concentration and cantonment of 
70 WO 261/187,202,210; Wilson, Cordon and Search, 
pp. 92,97. Some felt the reorganization disrupted security 
arrangements unnecessarily at a time when the security 
forces were getting on top'of the situation: Gale, p. 171. 
71 3 Para. Bde., '0I no. 25--IS in Haifa District', 
23 Jan. 1947, WO 216/218; 9 Inf. Bde., '0I no. 13', 23 Jan. 
1947, WO 261/208; 1 Guards Bde., 'OI no. 2', 25 Jan. 1947, 
WO 261/187. 
72 9 Inf. Bde., '0I no. 17: Cantonment Plan', 2 
Feb. 1947, WO 261/208; see also WO 261/202,210; Foreign 
Office, 'WIS', 4,13 Feb. 1947, FO 371/61761; Washington to 
Foreign Office, 3 Feb. 1947, FO 371/61765; Wilson, Cordon 
and Search, pp. 102-5. According to Hurewitz, p. 282, only 
11 British civilians resided outside the security zones by 
the end of February. 
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British personnel marked the end of the peacekeeping phase. 
Offensive 
On 2 March 1947, following a large number of inci- 
the Palestine Government imposed Statutory Martial dents, 
Law on Tel Aviv and its suburbs and on a Jewish sector of 
Jerusalem, with the intention of putting an end to terror- 
ism in those areas. The process did not involve a military 
takeover of civil administration, but rather the withdrawal 
of public services and the imposition of certain 
restrictions on the activities of the population within the 
martial law areas. Military courts, however, replaced civil 
courts and heard military, civil, and criminal cases during 
the martial law period. 
73 
The controlled area of Jerusalem covered a Jewish 
quarter where many incidents had recently occurred. It 
included both rich and poor neighbourhoods and a business 
and shopping area, which facilitated feeding the population 
and bringing pressure to bear equally on a cross section of 
the community. One battalion with an armoured car troop in 
support controlled and administered the area. Tel Aviv 
posed a problem of greater magnitude: the martial law area 
covered some 50 square miles, enclosing a population of more 
than 300,000 people. The 1st Guards Brigade was the con- 
ducting formation with four additional battalions, an 
armoured regiment, and supporting arms and services under 
command. Most of these were deployed on the long cordon 
around the controlled area. The operation was carried out 
in four phases: imposition of a strict curfew; cordoning 
the area; publication of regulations and issuing of passes; 
73 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on Operation ELEPHANT', pp. 
4,30, Papers of General Sir Rodney Moore, Hampton Court, 
Surrey; 9 Inf. Bde., '01 no. 19,20--Op HIPPO MINIMUS 11 1,7 
Mar. 1947, WO 261/208; CP 107, 'Report by Chiefs of Staff: 
Palestine--Imposition of Martial Law', 26 Mar. 1947, CAB 
129/18. 
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and gradual relaxation of the curfew and restoration of near 
normal living conditions. 
74 
Martial law imposed a dual responsibility on the 
security forces. First, they had to carry out security 
operations within the controlled areas; secondly, they had 
to administer these areas, by far the more demanding task. 
In Jerusalem the martial law headquarters staff included 
advisers in all fields of civil affairs, and the commander 
met daily with seven elders representing the interests of 
the community. Owing to its size and scope the Tel Aviv 
operation, aptly code-named ELEPHANT, required a larger and 
more formal organization. On the third day of martial law 
Brigadier Moore appointed a civil advisory council empowered 
to make immediate decisions necessary to fill the adminis- 
trative gaps created by martial law. The council included 
representatives from all essential services and the security 
forces. It met four times during the operation, dealing 
with problems related to food distribution, health and 
sanitation, welfare, public works and unemployment. 
75 
Martial law ended at noon on 17 March. Daily searches in 
the controlled area of Jerusalem had resulted in the 
detention of 129 persons and the discovery of a mine 
assembly factory, but had not produced new information on 
the insurgents. Troops in Tel Aviv had conducted four major 
as well as many smaller searches. In all the security 
forces made at least 60 arrests, including 24 members of 
the Irgun and the Lechi. Although martial law did not 
eliminate terrorism--incidents occurred even in the 
74 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on Operation ELEPHANT', pp. 
4,44, Moore Papers; 9 Inf. Bde., '01 no. 19', 'Report on 
Op HIPPO MINIMUS', 22 Mar. 1947, WO 261/208. 
75 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on Operation ELEPHANT', pp. 
66-79, Moore Papers; 9 Inf. Bde., '01 no. 20', 'Report on 
Op HIPPO MINIMUS', 22 Mar. 1947, WO 261/208. 
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controlled areas--the arrests were apparently a major blow 
to the insurgents; during the next quarter of 1947 the rate 
of insurgent operations declined by more than 50 per cent. 
76 
On the day martial law was lifted Captain Roy 
Farran, a highly decorated veteran of the Special Air 
Services Regiment (SAS), and Alistair McGregor, a former 
member of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), arrived 
in Palestine to conduct special operations against the 
insurgents. They selected two squads of ten men each from 
the ranks of the police and commenced operations at the 
beginning of April, after only a fortnight's training. The 
nature and results of their operations remain something of 
a mystery. Richard Clutterbuck claims that, acting on a 
pattern of intelligence built up gradually by covert sur- 
veillance, Farran's squad 'eliminated' as many insurgents in 
six weeks as a battalion employing cordon and search oper- 
ations. Farran's claims are more modest: he states that 
his squad worked 'round the clock' for two months, 'watch- 
ing, following, listening and occasionally making an 
arrest'. 
77 Only one operation has been described in any 
detail: Farran's squad 'borrowed' a laundry delivery van 
detained at a bogus roadblock and, acting on intelligence 
from an informer, used the van as camouflage--allowing the 
squad to capture an insurgent courier and some of his con- 
tacts. They later returned the van with an apologetic 
76 CM, 20 Mar. 1947, CAB 128/9; CP 107,26 Mar. 
1947; see also Colonial Office, monthly reports, April-June 
1947, CO 537/2281; Pyman Diaries, 24 Apr. 1947,6/1/4; see 
Appendix VI. The Chiefs of Staff reported 78 arrests, which 
may have included some arrests made subsequent to the oper- 
ation itself. 
77 Bethell, p. 302; Fergusson, pp. 210-1,225-6; Roy 
Farran, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service 
(London, 1948 , pp. 348,351; Lieutenant-Colone R. L. 
Clutterbuck, 'Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay 1960', AQDJ, XXCI 
(1960), p. 167. 
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explanation to the driver. 
78 Obviously it is not possible 
to assess the effectiveness of the squads on the basis of 
such scant evidence. But it is worth noting that during 
this time the insurgents attempted to assassinate more 
plain-clothes policemen than usual, a development which sug- 
gests that the activities of the squads made the insurgents 
suspicious of police surveillance and hence 'trigger happy'. 
The squads were probably on the right track, but Farran's 
cover was blown before they could produce significant 
results. 
79 
The security forces carried out 63 search operations 1, 
from May through July 1947, quite apart from the special 
, operations or the application of martial 
law. 80 The army 
imposed martial law on Nathanya in July in response to the 
abduction of the two sergeants. Operation TIGER was 
intended to permit a thorough search for the missing 
soldiers and to prevent a recurrence of terrorism within 
the controlled areas. From 13 to 27 July the 1st Guards 
Brigade, with two additional battalions and an armoured 
regiment under command, maintained a tight cordon around the 
city. A civil affairs advisory council was established the 
day before the operation commenced, but the administrative 
problems were not as formidable as those of Tel Aviv, since 
the controlled area of Nathanya contained only 15,000 
persons. Daily searches led to the capture of 18 wanted 
persons and economic pressure was brought to bear on the 
community, but TIGER was nonetheless unsuccessful: it did 
78 Farran, pp. 370-1; Fergusson, p. 227. This is 
probably the operation described in Colin Mitchell, Having 
Been a Soldier (London, 1969), p. 61. 
79 Colonial Office,. monthly report, April 1947, CO 
537/2281; see also Chapter. VII, VIII. 
80 MacMillan to Simpson, 3 Aug. 1947, Pyman Diaries, 
6/1/8. 
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not coerce the population into cooperation with the secur- 
ity forces and did not result in the recovery of the missing 
sergeants. General Gale, moreover, was not convinced that 
the operation would prevent a recurrence of terrorism in the 
area. 
81 
The security forces maintained the offensive, how- 
ever. On 5 August they arrested some 70 members of the 
Revisionist Party, including the mayors of Tel Aviv, Ramat 
Gan, and Nathanya, and occupied the headquarters of Betar, 
the Revisionist youth organization. The government detained 
these persons because it was believed they had information 
about the insurgents which they had not disclosed. But 
detention produced no results: the detainees refused to 
divulge any information, and though the police felt they had 
arrested two persons directly involved in the murder of the 
two sergeants, there was insufficient evidence on which to 
bring them to trial. 
82 
With that the offensive phase and the counter- 
insurgency campaign itself came to an end. While the 
British Government and the United Nations deliberated the 
future of Palestine, the Jews and the Arabs initiated the 
next stage in the struggle: between 8 August and 30 Septem- 
ber there were more than 25 incidents of communal violence; 
by contrast there were only_13 attacks on the security 
forces during that period. 
83 After the British Government 
81 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on Operation TIGER', WO 261/ 
181; CP 208, 'Memorandum by Secretary of State for the 
Colonies: Palestine--Security Measures', 19 July 1947, CAB 
128/20; Minutes of Security Conference, 26 July 1947, 
Cunningham Papers. 
82 MacMillan, 'Palestine Narrative', p. 9, MacMillan 
Papers; Minutes of Security Conference, 8 Aug. 1947, 
Cunningham Papers. Betar was known to be a principal source 
of recruiting for the Irgun. 
83 Colonial Office, 'Palestine Situation--Outrages 
1947', CO 537/477. 
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announced in September its intention to withdraw from 
Palestine the security forces increasingly found themselves 
trying to keep thepeace in a bitter communal conflict to 
which they were only an unwelcome third party. The 
insurgent and security force operations were only the mili- 
tary manifestations of a political struggle. Propaganda, 
an important political weapon in the insurgent strategy, 
will be discussed in the following chapter. . 
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CHAPTER VII 
PROPAGANDA 
The leverage strategies of the Jewish insurgent. 
groups assigned a major role to propaganda: to promote the 
political objectives of the insurgents and to undermine the 
legitimacy of the British administration in Palestine. In 
many cases, insurgent military actions were undertaken 
specifically to produce propaganda results in the political 
battle. l This chapter will examine the insurgent propaganda 
campaign and the British counter-measures in order to deter- 
mine which side won the propaganda war. 
Jacques Ellul has defined propaganda as 'a set of 
methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring 
about the active or passive participation in its actions 
of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through 
psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organiz- 
ation'. 
2 Ellul's definitic_, suggests that propaganda's role 
is essentially an internal one: to bind people to 
ä 
move- 
ment and to commit them to action. He recognizes that in a 
revolutionary setting propaganda can be employed to induce 
individuals to endure sacrifices for a cause. 
3 This is 
obviously important in the context of insurgency, but 
implicit in his definition and equally important in the 
Palestine case is his proposition that propaganda is largely 
1 See Chapter VI. 
2 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's 
Attitudes (New York, 1965T, p. 61. 
3 Ibid., pp. 71-4. 
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ineffective when directed to a foreign country or against 
the enemy. 
4 T. E. Lawrence may have been one of the first 
to recognize this limitation, as he assigned an order of 
priority to the task of propaganda, starting with his own 
soldiers: 
We had to arrange their minds in order of battle just 
as carefully and as formally as other officers would 
arrange their bodies. And not only our own men's minds, 
though naturally they came first. We must also arrange 
the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them; 
then those other minds of the nation supporting us 
behind the firing line, since more than half of the 
battle passed there in the back; then the minds of the 
enemy nation waiting the verdict; and of the neutrals 
looking on; circle beyond circle. 5 
In any case, propaganda was not a new weapon in 
1945. Belligerents had employed it during both world wars 
and it had played a significant role in revolutionary sub- 
version and insurgency. 
6 Thus, most of the general prin- 
ciples of effective propaganda were established by the time 
that the Jewish insurgents launched their campaign. These 
principles might be summarized as follows: first, propa- 
ganda is almost exclusively an offensive weapon. Secondly, 
credibility is essential, so propaganda must be consistent 
with verifiable facts, upon which judgements can be made. 
Third, propaganda should be the servant, not the master, of 
policy. Fourth, propaganda cannot prevail against funda- 
mental social trends and attitudes. Instead, it should 
attempt to incorporate and use them to further the objec- 
tives of the organization. Fifth, speed is essential since 
4 Ibid., p. 295. 
5 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London, 
1935), p. 195. 
6 For example, the Russian Revolution, the Irish 
rebellion and the Arab revolt before the war: Ian Greig, 
Subversion: Propaganda, Agitation and the Spread of People's 
War (London, 1973), pp. 28-30; Townshend, pp. 67,117-9; 
Marlowe, Rebellion in Palestine, p. 158. 
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the first story on any incident will command the most 
attention. Finally, propaganda must be continuous to be 
effective.? Ellul adds a cautionary note that propaganda 
remains an imprecise art. The propagandist is unable to 
predict with certainty how each individual will react to his 
propaganda. Furthermore, when propaganda is directed against 
a foreign country, or when it is operating in a police state 
or a revolutionary situation, it may not be possible to 
judge effectiveness. 
8 Conclusions as to the success of 
propaganda, therefore, are inclined to be tentative. Ellul 
concludes that propaganda may be considered successful when 
'attitudes learned by propaganda begin to prevail over the 
"natural" attitudes that are man's second nature'. 
9 Although 
it is by no means clear what he means by 'natural attitudes' 
it might be fair to suggest that he feels propaganda would 
be successful once prevailing social beliefs have been 
transformed from thought to some, kind of action desired by 
the propagandist. In the context of insurgency Lawrence's 
criterion for successful propaganda is more lucid: 'We had 
won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die 
for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the 
enemy was a secondary matter. '10 
7 
Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for 
American Policy, e. Daniel Lerner (New York,, 19 , pp. 260,347,421,474; Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Comes the 
Reckoning (London, 1947), pp. 155,262; Charles Roetter, 
Psychological Warfare (London, 1974), pp. 16-8; R. H. S. 
Crossman, 'Psychological Warfare', JRUSI, XCVII (1952), 
320,321,324. 
8 Ellul, pp. 295,298-9. 
9 Ibid., p. 302. 
10 T. E. Lawrence, 'The Evolution of a Revolt', in 
The Fourth Dimension of Warfare: Revolt to Revolution, ed. 
Michael Elliott-Bateman (Manchester, 1974), II, 15 . 
III 
Insurgent Propaganda 
In Palestine each of the insurgent organizations 
maintained its own propaganda branch, which included an 
illegal radio station and at least one underground news- 
paper. 
11 One correspondent described the extensive propa- 
ganda effort: 
Thousands of copies of secret, illegal Jewish leaflets 
and bulletins issued by clandestine organizations, are 
distributed every day in Palestine. ... Secret literature floods the post, leaflets are pasted sur- 
reptitiously on hoardings and vacant wall spaces, 
"pamphlet bombs" ... explode in busy streets at night 
and shower their printed pamphlets far and wide in 
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. 12 
The insurgents could rely on a measure of moral support from 
the legal Palestine press. The news media deplored violence 
but there was little disagreement on the basic objective of 
Zionism: the creation of an independent Jewish state. Even 
the two English language newspapers, The Palestine Post 
(daily) and The Palestine Tribune (weekly), were Zionist in 
editorial content. The Jewish population was served by 11 
Hebrew daily newspapers, 18 weeklies, and 45 others which 
appeared fortnightly or less frequently. These tended to be 
divided along the same political lines as the insurgents 
themselves, so each group had its sympathizers and detractors 
in the legal press. The insurgents also carefully cultivated- 
close relations with the international news media, particu- 
larly that of the United States, where the large, wealthy 
and influential pro-Zionist Jewish community was served by 
11 HC[6873], 3, BPP (1946); see also Chapter V and 
Appendix V. 
12 Quoted in Borisov, p. 79. 
13 Ministry of Information Overseas Planning Commit- 
tee (hereafter cited as MOIOPC), Paper 577A, 'Plan of Propa- 
ganda for Palestine: Second Revision of Channels', 9 June 
1945, CO 733/465; 1 Inf. Div., 'WIR no. 5', 7 May 1946, WO 
169/22957. 
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a sympathetic news media. Twenty of the 24 national English 
language periodicals were sympathetic to the Zionist cause, 
and the pro-Zionist Yiddish press reached approximately 
one-third of all American Jewish families. The Jewish 
Agency sponsored two English language press services in 
Palestine, and in 1945 all but one of the British daily 
newspapers employed Jewish correspondents in Palestine. 
14 
In addition, the insurgents created front organiz- 
ations or used existing lobbying or fund-raising groups to 
spread their political message in the United States. Here 
the Haganah was at a distinct advantage, linked as it was 
through the Jewish Agency to the WZO. With branches in many 
countries and representatives of the stature of Chaim 
Weizmann, the WZO could plead the Zionist case in influ- 
ential circles while denying any knowledge of, connection 
with, or support for Haganah violence. The Haganah's 
channel to the American Jewish community was the Zionist 
Organization of America (ZOA), which claimed a membership 
of more than 300,000 in 1945/46.15 The Irgun had withdrawn 
from the WZO before the war and, regarded along with the 
Lechi as dissidents, they were isolated from the mainstream 
of American Zionism. Nonetheless, through the efforts of 
Hillel Kook (alias Peter Bergson) the Irgun created ten 
front organizations in the United States by 1946. The 
largest of these, the American League for a Free Palestine 
(ALFP), had a membership of only 35,000. In 1946 the Lechi 
established its own American front, the Political Action 
Committee for Palestine. 16 
14 Halperin, p. 257; Begin, pp. 311, '314; Bell, 
Terror Out of Zion, pp. 179,305-6; Cairo to Foreign Office, 
4 Jan. 1945, FO 371/45376; MOIOPC, Paper 577A, CO 733/465. 
15 Halperin, p. 320. 
16 Washington to Foreign Office, 18 Oct. 1946, FO 
371/52562; 'Proclamation on the Palestine Resistance', PM, 
E1+1 
Some of these organizations operated on a large 
scale: in 1943/44 alone the ZOA distributed more than 
1,000,000 leaflets and pamphlets to libraries, community 
centres, editors, journalists, writers and educators. In 
1945 ZOA news releases were reprinted in 4,000 newspaper 
columns. 
17 
The ALFP ran a continuous newspaper advertise- 
ment campaign: from October 1945 through September 1947 
the ALFP placed 120 advertisements in American newspapers, 
of which 81 were in New York papers. The ALFP also con- 
ducted a mailing campaign to influential individuals, con- 
sisting of at least 21 separate mailings from February 1946 
through August 1947. Furthermore, in the United States and 
Europe the Irgun and the ALFP published The Answer, the 
Irgun's monthly propaganda magazine. 
18 Both inside and 
outside of Palestine, therefore, the insurgents had sub- 
stantial propaganda resources at their disposal which they 
employed to subject Palestine, Britain, Europe and the 
United States to a sustained propaganda barrage. 
In his recent study of revolutionary propaganda 
Maurice Tugwell has identified the common propaganda themes 
2 Dec. 1946, FO 371/52571; Halperin, pp. 318-20; Hurewitz, 
p. 278; Marcia Feinstein, 'The Irgun Campaign in the United 
States for a Jewish Army', unpublished M. A. thesis, City 
University of New York, 1973, pp. 46,101-21,134,136,142, 
149-50,213-4,219. 
17 Halperin, pp. '257-8,402. The Jewish Agency's 
press services issued daily news bulletins throughout the 
period of the insurgency. The Haganah was not necessarily 
mentioned in each issue but all served as vehicles for 
basic Zionist propaganda themes. 
18 'List of Advertisements: ALFP', 'Mail Campaign: 
Reference to Scrapbook Entries', Box XIV, f. 9, Palestine 
Papers; see also Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 305-6. News- 
papers published at least 24 full page advertisements and 
several covering two full pages. The Answer and several 
other Irgun newspapers were published in several European 
languages. 
lam; 
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employed by insurgent groups. 
19 The Jewish insurgents 
presented many of these themes in a manner which reflected 
the different strategies of the three organizations. The 
central theme of the Haganah's and the resistance move- 
ment's propaganda was that the White Paper policy was 
illegal because it violated the terms of the Palestine Man- 
date and was, therefore, the sole cause of violence in 
Palestine. 20 This theme legitimized all acts of resistance, 
particularly those undertaken in support of illegal immi- 
gration. Furthermore, it allowed the resistance movement to 
explain all of its actions in terms of self-defence. In a 
deposition to the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry the 
resistance movement claimed that 
Our path is not the path of terror. ... if there is 
terrorism in this country, it is terrorism from the 
authorities. If ... the British Government sends 
out reconnaissance planes and destroyers, operates 
well-equipped radar stations and builds special police 
posts along the coast, if it uses airborne troops and 
mobile police to hound out the so called-illegal immi- 
grants. ... then it is terrorism against us. And 
when we attack these things we do nothing more than 
defend ourselves against Government terror. 21 
Shlomo Katz, writing for American audiences, 
developed this theme further by stating that the Haganah had 
19 Brigadier M. A. J. Tugwell, 'Revolutionary Propa- 
ganda and Possible Counter-Measures', unpublished Ph. D. 
thesis, Department of War Studies, King's College, Univer- 
sity of London, 1979, pp. 295-307. Brigadier Tugwell's 
thesis, the first full length treatment of the subject, is 
a valuable source on both the theory and the practice of 
revolutionary propaganda. 
20 Ben Gurion quoted in Shaw to Hall, 24 Aug. 1945, 
Palcor News Agency Bulletin, 29 Nov. 1945, Cunningham to 
Hall, 24 Feb. 1946, CO 733/456; Washington to Foreign 
Office, 26 Sept. 1945, CO 733/461; HQ Palestine, 'Ops Log-- 
Report of Kol Israel broadcast', 20 Feb. 1946, WO 169/23023; 
Kol Israel broadcast, 3 Mar. 1946, cited in HC[6873], 7, BPP 
(1946). 
21 Submission by Head of Command, Jewish Resistance 
Movement, 25 Mar. 1946, CO 733/463. 
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been forced into the struggle against its will and that 
British terror was responsible for the close cooperation 
between the Haganah and the Irgun. 
22 
As a corollary the 
resistance movement propagated a second major theme: the 
futility of British operations against a united national 
resistance movement. Emphasizing that the British were 
fighting not just an underground organization but a whole 
people, this line of argument claimed that the British must 
do justice to the Jews or destroy them. Continued refusal 
to meet Zionist demands would only strengthen resistance. 
Richard Crossman, a pro-Zionist parliamentarian who had 
served on the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry, lent 
credibility to this theme when he stated in parliament that 
the military commanders in the Middle East had expressed 
doubts about their ability to defeat the resistance move- 
ment: 'They said: "Frankly, you can't do it if the whole 
community is one hundred per cent behind the resistance 
movement. You can do what you like but you will never get 
far if it has the support of the people. "'23 
Having thus explained and justified its use of 
violence in general terms, the resistance movement dissem- 
inated a third major propaganda theme, which might be called 
'atrocity propaganda'. This theme equated British policies 
and actions with Nazism and anti-semitism. 
24 
British 
activities in Palestine provided the insurgents with many 
22 Katz, 'Jewish Resistance', pp. 47-8. 
23 Ibid., p. 49; 'Submission by Head of Command, 
Jewish Resistance Movement, CO 733/463; Palestine Post, 1 
July 1946; Hansard, 5th ser., CLXXIV, 1881; HQ South 
Palestine Distr ct, 'ISUM no. 21, citing Kol Israel broad- 
cast, 7 Jan. 1947', 15 Jan. 1947, WO 261 ; Ben Gurion to 
Attlee, 18 Mar. 1947, FO 371/61900. 
24 Defence Security Office, 'Monthly Summary no. 3', 
Dec. 1945, WO 169/19758; 3 Para. Bde., 'ISUM no. 10', 18 
Jan. 1946, WO 169/22997. 
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opportunities to use it. After the riots in Tel Aviv in 
November 1945 Meyer Levin, an American correspondent, 
accused the British soldiers of deliberately shooting 20 
young children. He claimed that the soldiers had expressed 
publicly their desire to 'pop off' some children and that 
they sang the Nazi Horst Wessel while doing so. Levin's 
initial news report was revived two months later as an 
article in the American Jewish journal Commentary. 
25 Oper- 
ations AGATHA and SHARK were denounced as Nazi-style pogroms 
complete with screenings, mass arrests and wanton brutality 
and destruction. The capture of illegal immigrant ships 
was described in a like manner. 
26 
On several occasions insurgent attacks caused 
reprisals or other lapses of discipline by members of the 
security forces and insurgent propagandists were quick to 
seize upon these as British atrocities. 
27 Following the 
25 
Overseas News Agency, 'Report on Action of 
British Troops in Tel Aviv', 20 Nov. 1945, FO 371/45386; 
'Lullaby for Dying Children', New York Post, 29 Nov. 1945, 
cited in 'List of Advertisements: ALFP , Palestine Papers; 'The Battle of the Children', Commentary, Jan. 1946, pp. 
25-7, cited in Kirk, p. 201. 
26 Kirk, p. 220; Tugwell, pp. 151-2; New York Herald 
Tribune, 3 July 1946. 
27 Some of the incidents which attracted attention 
were: alleged anti-semitic remarks by senior British 
officers; reprisals by soldiers and policemen; and the 
mysterious bombing of the Jewish Agency press room in March 
1947, which the Agency ascribed to the police: Bethell, p. 
221; Kirk, p. 204; HQ Palestine, 'FIN no. 8', 17 Feb. 1946, 
WO 169/23021; article by George L. Cassidy, New York Post, 
25 Oct. 1946, cited in Washington to Jerusalem, 25 Oct. 
1946, FO 371/52562; Irgun Zvai Leumi, Herut, no. 65, Dec. 
1946, CO 537/2365; Jewish Agency for Palestine, 'Political 
Survey, 1946-1947: Memorandum Submitted to the United 
Nations Special Committee on Palestine', July 1947; Sumner 
Welles, 'Terrorism in Palestine', Washington Post, 12 Aug. 
1947. 
14 
bombing of the King David Hotel General Barker, the GOC, 
issued a harsh non-fraternization order to the troops. The 
insurgents quickly published the document, which concluded 
with an undeniably anti-semitic statement to the effect 
that by obeying the order the soldiers would be punishing 
the Jews 'in the way the race dislikes as much as any, 
namely by striking at their pockets'. 
28 
The 'Farran Case' 
provided the insurgents with some of their most credible and 
dramatic atrocity propaganda. On 6 May 1947 Alexander 
Rubowitz, a youthful member of the Lechi, was abducted by 
an unknown assailant while distributing propaganda liter- 
ature in Jerusalem; he was never seen again. Within a short 
time suspicion focussed on Captain Farran, who was running 
covert operations for the police. Accusations appeared in 
The Palestine Post, and American newspapers reported the 
rumours that were circulating in Palestine: of fascists in 
the ranks of the police, and of a secret police counter- 
terrorist cell operating independently of the police high 
command. Allegations of police abuses became so pronounced 
that the government established a special office to handle 
complaints. Farran then compounded the problem: he fled to 
Syria and demanded political asylum, thereby turning what 
had been an internal problem into an international incident. 
Farran eventually turned himself in for trial, but through 
the summer American newspapers continued to print lurid 
stories about the case, implying conspiracy and torture. 
29 
Throughout the period the Haganah, in keeping with 
its strategy, was careful to describe its operations in 
terms of a 'struggle' and not as acts of war. This was not 
28 'Text of Letter Issued by Lieutenant General Sir 
Evelyn Barker', CO 537/2291. 
29 David A. Charters, 'Special Operations in Counter- 
Insurgency: The Farran Case, Palestine 1947', JRUSI, CXXIV 
(1979), pp. 56,59. 
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the case of the Irgun and the Lechi, both of which declared 
war against Britain early in 1946.30 After the collapse of 
the resistance movement they continued to use many of the 
propaganda themes employed by the Haganah, particularly 
those referring to British atrocities, but there were also 
significant differences. The central theme of the Irgun's 
propaganda, based on its basic political assumptions, was 
that the Jews possessed the historic title to Palestine and 
thus had-the inalienable right to immigrate freely therein. 
Implicit in this theme was the idea that the British 
presence was not just a cause of violence but was inherently 
and manifestly illegal. it was this illegal occupation of 
the Jewish homeland that justified the Irgun's war of 
national liberation. 
31 As a corollary, the Irgun's propa- 
ganda stated that the group did not recognize the authority 
of the British administration in Palestine. Members of the 
Irgun brought to trial for terrorist offences used the pro- 
ceedings to deny the jurisdiction of the British courts. In 
July 1947 the Irgun took this idea to its logical con- 
clusion: in reply to British executions of members of the 
group the Irgun hanged the two sergeants they had kidnapped. 
The announcement issued to justify the action claimed that 
an 'underground court' had found the sergeants guilty of the 
same charges for which the British had executed members of 
32 the Irgun. 
30 HQ Palestine, 'FIN no. 8', 17 Feb. 1946, WO 169/ 
23021; 1 Inf. Div., 'WIR no. 2', 15 Apr. 1946, WO 169/22956. 
31 'Irgun Zvai Leumi Speaks to the United Nations-- 
Will There be War or Peace in Palestine', Sept. 1947, pp. 1- 
5, Box XII, f. 45, Palestine Papers. 
32 Palestine Post, 26 June 1946, giving account of 
trial of 31 members of the Irgun; Wilson, Cordon and Search, 
pp. 133-4. 
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A second major Irgun propaganda theme glorified the 
armed struggle and especially those members of the Irgun 
who paid the supreme sacrifice. The evidence suggests that 
apart from an obvious role in maintaining the internal 
morale of the Irgun this scheme was designed specifically 
to gain sympathizers and financial support in the United 
States. It was probably most highly developed in the ALFP 
production of Ben Hecht's play 'A Flag is Born'. Described 
as a 'skillful portrayal of underground heroism' which 
glamourized the Irgun's leaders, the play had a successful 
run on Broadway before going on tour to many American 
cities. Hundreds of congressmen, government officials and 
foreign diplomats attended the Baltimore performance. The 
play was more than just a propaganda weapon; the ALFP 
solicited financial contributions after each performance. 
33 
Ben Hecht continued to exalt the actions of the Irgun in a 
dramatic fashion. In May-1947 the New York Herald Tribune 
and other major American newspapers published an ALFP 
advertisement entitled 'Letter to the Terrorists of 
Palestine'. Hecht's 'letter' told the Irgun that 
Every time you blow up a British arsenal, or wreck a 
British jail, or send a British railroad train sky 
high, or rob a British bank, or let go with your guns 
and bombs at the British betrayers and invaders of 
your homeland, the Jews in America make a little 
holiday in their hearts. 34 
The letter created a sensation; hundreds of other 
newspapers reprinted it as news, giving the Irgun an 
unexpected propaganda bonus. 
35 This same heroism theme was 
33 Robert John and Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diary 
(New York, 1970), II, 98,152; Robert Silv erkerg, If I For- 
get Thee, 0 Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of' 
Israel (New York, 1970), pp. 323-5; Isaac Zaar, Rescue and 
Liberation: America's Part in the Birth of Israel (New 
York, 1954), pp. 193-4. 
34 New York Herald Tribune, 15 May 1947. 
35 Silverberg, pp. 326-7. 
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employed to equate the Irgun's struggle with that of the 
Irish and of the Americans. One advertisement stated that 
'Your dollars can help a relentless fighting force--built 
of the same hardy stuff and filled with the same inspiration 
as those freedom-loving "rebels" of 1776--march on to liber- 
ation'. 
36 The Irgun and its American front organizations 
undoubtedly expected that such appeals to American heritage, 
patriotism and anti-colonialist sentiment would command 
widespread support. 
Brian Jenkins has observed that international ter- 
rorism can play a major role in enhancing the image of an 
insurgent organization. He feels that 'The publicity gained 
by frightening acts of violence and the atmosphere of fear 
and alarm created cause people to exaggerate the importance 
and strength of the terrorists and. their movement. Since 
most terrorist groups are actually small and weak, the vio- 
lence must be all the more dramatic and deliberately shock- 
ing. '37 This may go some way. to explain the Irgun's attack 
on the British embassy in Rome and the propaganda. theme 
which emerged from it. By October 1946, when the Irgun and 
the Lechi were trying to increase pressure on Britain, the 
Jewish Agency had proposed a partition plan and was pre- 
paring to, denounce terrorism in exchange for the detained 
Jewish leaders. 38 The Irgun commanders may have concluded 
that a dramatic show of force, such as an attack on a 
36 Quoted in FO 371/61860; see also Statement by 
Guy Gillette in U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session (1946), 
XCII, Appendix 4744. 
37 Brian M. Jenkins, 'International Terrorism: A 
New Mode of Conflict', in International Terrorism and World 
Security, ed. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (London, 
1974), p. 16. 
38 
Minutes of Meeting, Sub-Committee--Colonial 
Office and Jewish Agency, 17 Oct. 1946, FO 371/52562; 
Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 29 Oct. 1946, FO 371/52563. 
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British embassy, would demonstrate the strength and deter- 
mination of the Irgun in relation to the apparent weakness 
of the Agency and-the Haganah. Furthermore, it could convey 
the impression that the Irgun was stronger and more wide- 
spread than it was in fact. The propaganda offensive which 
followed the bombing in Rome appears to have been directed 
primarily at Britain. It attempted to convey the image of 
a widespread all-powerful Irgun. The communique accepting 
responsibility for the attack stated that 'the attack against 
the British Embassy in Rome is the opening of the military 
campaign of the Jews in the Diaspora. ... let every Briton 
who occupied our country know that the arm of the eternal 
people will answer with war everywhere and with all avail- 
able means until our sorrowing country is liberated and its 
people redeemed'. 
39 The Irgun gave the communique to 
American correspondents together with an open letter to the 
Italian premier explaining the Irgun's case. On 14 November 
1946 Samuel Merlin, 'political spokesman' for the Irgun, 
stated in an interview that 
if the Irgun say they are going to attack Britons out- 
side Palestine they will do so. ... the bombing of the Rome Embassy was the first step. There will certainly 
be others. They will carry the war into Britain. Pre- 
cautions being taken against the arrival of Irgun ... 
are therefore futile. 40 
At press conferences in Rome and London in the weeks 
that followed Johan J. Smertenko, Vice-President of the 
ALFP, warned that the Irgun might attack British instal- 
lations anywhere in Europe. In January 1947 Peter Bergson 
arrived in Paris where, amidst a blaze of publicity, he 
39 Irgun Zvai Leumi Communique, 2 Nov. 1946, FO 371/ 
60786. 
40 David Briggs, 'British Precautions are Futile', 
Continental Daily Mail, 14 Nov. 1946, FO 371/52565. 
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announced his intention to form a provisional government-in- 
exile. 
41 
The Lechi's central propaganda theme was that they 
were fighting not just for national liberation but also 
against British imperialism in the Middle East. Two sub- 
sidiary themes flowed directly from this one. First, the 
Lechi claimed that the Jews and the Arabs did not have a 
valid quarrel. Their communal differences were a product 
of British imperialism and would disappear after Britain 
was removed from the area. The Lechi insisted that the 
liberation of the Jews would benefit the Arabs, so they 
should join the Jews in a joint struggle against Britain. 
Secondly, the Lechi argued that the British presence was a 
threat to the Soviet Union, which desired only security in 
the region. Neutralization of the Middle East would serve 
both Jewish and Soviet interests; consequently, the Lechi 
would gain Soviet sympathy and support for its anti- 
imperialist struggle. 
42 Like the Irgun the Lechi opposed 
partition, favoured unlimited Jewish immigration into 
Palestine, and refused to recognize the authority of the 
British administration. In relation to the latter the Lechi 
members who were brought to trial went a step further than 
their Irgun counterparts: they not only rejected the legal 
jurisdiction of the courts but demanded to be treated as 
prisoners-of-war, even though they made it equally clear 
that the Lechi did not consider itself bound by the laws 
governing conduct in war. 
43 
41 His Majesty's Representative, Rome to Secretary 
General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italian Government, 27 
Nov. 1946; Rome to Foreign Office, 29 Nov. 1946, Foreign 
Office to Washington, 11 Dec. 1946, FO 371/52571; Paris to 
Foreign Office, 7 Jan. 1947, FO 371/61751. 
42 Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, 'An Outline 
of Foreign Policy', Jerusalem, 1947, pp. 9-13,26-33,37-40. 
43 Political Action Committee for Palestine to 
Attlee, 30 Aug. 1946, FO 371/52556; Washington to Foreign 
irr 
Generally speaking, the insurgents adhered to most 
of the basic principles of effective propaganda. First, 
they used it almost solely as an offensive weapon against 
Britain, forcing the British Government to defend its 
policies and actions. 
44 
The insurgents rarely found it 
necessary to defend their own actions, which they justified 
a priori by attacking the British presence in Palestine. 
Secondly, British policy and operations provided sufficient 
evidence to give factual credibility to insurgent propaganda. 
The insurgents were free to interpret the facts in the way 
which-best served their objectives. The Irgun had appar- 
ently the most credible propaganda: one American corres- 
pondent stated that his newspaper had advised him that he 
could accept the Irgun's statements as fact, but that he 
should always check the accuracy of statements by the 
Haganah. Thus, the Irgun was able to portray disastrous 
operations, such as their attack on Acre prison, as heroic 
and successful actions. 
45 
Third, the insurgents did not 
attempt to prevail against fundamental trends and attitudes; 
rather, they incorporated them into their propaganda and 
used them as weapons. Within the Palestinian Jewish com- 
munity there was general agreement on the desirability of 
creating an independent Jewish state; the insurgents and 
their political constituents disagreed only on the question 
of the social and political shape of the future state. 
Office, 18 Oct. 1946, FO 371/52562; Friedman-Yellin, inter- 
view with Frank, FO 371/52563; Fighters for the Freedom of 
Israel, LHI Bulletin, Palestine, Aug. 1947, pp. 19-20,22, 
P. P. 1149 mcl., British Library, London; Israel Eldad, The 
Jewish Revolution: Jewish Statehood (New York, 1971), p. 
81. 
44 This is discussed in the second part of this 
chapter. 
45 Palestine Post, 5 May 1947; 'The Irgun Speaks at 
Acre', New York Post, 7 May 1947; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, 
p. 218; Katz, Days of Fire, p. 150. 
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Insurgent propaganda in the United States appealed to 
American patriotism and a heritage of anti-British and anti- 
colonialist sentiment. Finally, the insurgents were skill- 
ful propagandists: they usually presented their case 
quickly, clearly and continuously. 
That is not to say that they were flawless propa- 
gandists. According to George Kirk, their tactics were 
inclined to be heavy-handed and patently transparent, 
especially when addressing American audiences: 'At the most 
effective moment some incident, comparatively unimportant in 
itself, would suddenly be taken up, echoed and distorted 
through scores of publicity channels, and would then be 
allowed to drop when it had served its purpose. '46 More- 
over, the need to disseminate propaganda to several 'target 
audiences' produced conflicting messages. Nowhere is this 
more obvious than in the insurgent propaganda concerning the 
'Arab question'. The Lechi called for a joint Jewish-Arab 
struggle to remove British influence from the Middle East. 
The Haganah insisted that Jewish claims to Palestine out- 
weighed those of the Arabs. The Irgun denied that the Arabs 
had any claim to Palestine at all. 
47 Christopher Sykes con- 
cludes that, in general, 
it became a Zionist habit to speak not only in two but 
several voices, to run several lines of persuasion at 
the same time. The. result was to debauch the movement 
with propaganda to an extraordinary extent so that the 
Zionists, preoccupied with higher truth at the expense 
of the yet more essential lower truth, got a not 
undeserved reputation in the world for chronic men- 
dacity. 48 
46 Kirk, p. 204. 
47 Palcor News Agency Bulletin, 29 Nov. 1945, CO 733/ 
456; Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, 'An Outline of 
Foreign Policy', Jerusalem, 1947, p. 44; 'Irgun Zvai Leumi 
Speaks to the United Nations', pp. 12-3, Palestine Papers. 
48 Sykes, p. 26. 
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Tugwell feels, moreover, that there was a tendency 
for propaganda to lead policy, in violation of one of the 
basic principles of effective propaganda. It may be fair 
to suggest that the decision of the WZO congress in December 
1946 not to negotiate with the British Government was a 
product of prevailing extremist propaganda which had 
declared Britain to be an enemy. 
49 Furthermore, insurgent 
propagandists were inclined on occasion to overplay their 
hand, the 'La Spezia Affair' being a case in point. in 
April 1946 Italian police detained on board ship in La 
Spezia harbour some 1,200 would-be illegal immigrants. The 
Jews announced a hunger strike and said they would sink the 
ship in the harbour if not allowed to sail to Palestine. 
The affair produced a flurry of propaganda in Palestine and 
one Kol Israel scriptwriter apparently got 'carried away' 
with enthusiasm: while negotiations were underway to 
resolve the standoff Kol Israel announced that the ship had 
sunk with the loss of all aboard. 
50 Eitan Haber, a sympa- 
thetic biographer, feels that one of Begin's few real mis- 
takes in the propaganda war was the charge sheet which 
accompanied the hanging of the two sergeants. He thinks 
that no one could take the charges seriously or justify the 
'retroactive and fabricated sentence'. 
51 
In order to determine the extent to which propaganda 
furthered the objectives of the insurgents it is necessary 
to analyse its effects on the various 'target' audiences. 
First, it succeeded in maintaining the internal cohesion and 
commitment of the insurgent groups. The behaviour of the 
49 Tugwell, pp. 147-8,171; Foreign Office, 'WIS', 
19 Nov. 1946,1 Jan. 1947, FO 371/52565,61761; The Times, 
11,27 Dec. 1946; Hurewitz, pp. 267-9. 
50 HQ Palestine, 'FIN no. 12', 15 Apr. 1946, WO 169/ 
23022. 
51 Haber, p. 189. 
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insurgents in the courts, in particular their refusal of 
clemency in the face of the death sentence, was ample testa- 
ment to high morale--the product of successful 'integration' 
propaganda. The police experienced great difficulty in 
penetrating the insurgent groups themselves and there were 
few informers. Captured insurgents rarely 'cracked' under 
interrogation. 52 This sense of loyalty and commitment 
extended to the Jewish population as a whole. Although many 
disapproved of terrorism, they refused to cooperate with the 
security forces in apprehending the insurgents. Instead 
they either treated the security forces with undisguised 
hostility or, as one writer graphically recounts, ignored 
them: 
-Soldiers walk about the streets. ... But nobody says 
a word to them. People pass by them as if they did not 
. exist. Military vehicles pass in the streets. ... Like the armed soldiers and the ever-present barbed 
wire, they, too, are ignored. Two different worlds seem 
to coexist here, the military and the civilian, and each 
appears to disregard the other. 53 
Consequently, the insurgents were able to operate virtually 
with impunity. 
Secondly, the evidence seems to suggest that despite 
the profusion of conflicting viewpoints insurgent propaganda 
succeeded in neutralizing the Palestinian Arabs while the 
Jews attempted to remove Britain from Palestine. The Arabs 
did not interfere with the insurgent campaign against the 
British; in fact, the Lechi claims to have had some Arab 
members. 
54 
Through most of the period under study the Arabs 
52 Churchill expressed admiration for the fortitude 
of Dov Gruner, an Irgun member who refused to appeal for 
clemency in Jan. 1947: Churchill, Complete Speeches, pp. 
7422-3; see also Begin, pp. 97-103; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, 
pp. 182; Briance, interview; Catling, interview. 
53 Shlomo Katz, 'Curfew in Jerusalem', Commentary, 
II (1946), 529. 
54 The Arabs even concealed a senior Jewish official 
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confined their activities to organizing their opposition to 
the Jews; they became actively involved in the conflict only 
when, in August 1947, it became apparent that a British 
withdrawal and the partition of Palestine were likely. 
Third, insurgent propaganda achieved a measure of 
success in the United States.. The Truman administration 
never wavered from its basically pro-Zionist stance, 
although it is difficult to know for certain to what extent 
this was a result of Zionist propaganda. The ZOA's 
financial contributions to Palestine's Jewish community 
quadrupled between 1945 and 1947. The ZOA leadership sup- 
ported the militant view at the WZO Congress in December 
1946 and the president of the ZOA publically endorsed a 
Revisionist boycott of British goods in New York in March 
1947. The Irgun increased substantially its American sup- 
port, owing chiefly to Peter Bergson's energetic propaganda 
campaign. By the summer of 1947 the ALFP claimed a member- 
ship of 140,000 and a budget of $7,500,000.55 Nevertheless, 
the insurgents may have overplayed the propaganda in the 
United States; there were indications in 1947 that it *might 
be losing its appeal. In April the Palestine Resistance 
Committee, a coalition of ten Irgun front organizations, was 
dissolved because it had failed to raise sufficient funds. 
The ALFP then took over as the sole fund-raising organiz- 
ation. The British Ambassador suggested that Hecht's 
'Letter to the Terrorists' was in fact an attack on the 
indifference of American Jews to the Irgun's struggle, as 
to prevent his arrest during Operation AGATHA: Gale, inter- 
view; see also Brenner, p. 13. 
55 American Jewish contributions to the two largest 
funds--the Jewish National Fund and the Palestine Foundation 
Fund--increased from almost $15,000,000 in 1945 to more than 
$59,000,000 in 1947: Halperin, pp. 325-6; see also New York 
Times, 24 Mar. 1947; Foreign Office, 'Illegal Jewish Immi- 
gra n, Theory and Practice', 6 Aug. 1947, FO 371/61860. 
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indicated by the failure of the Palestine Resistance Com- 
mittee. And while American Newspapers continued to report 
the deteriorating situation in Palestine, some commentators 
began to question the American role in the dispute. The 
Christian Science Monitor went so far as to suggest that 
President Truman had been unduly influenced by minority 
pressure groups. In any case, British diplomats perceived 
growing sympathy for the difficulties facing the British 
people coupled with concern that Britain might be forced to 
abandon its commitments, leaving a power vacuum in crucial 
areas, the Middle East among them. They noted with satis- 
faction that in 1947 the Congressional Record devoted 
little space to the Palestine issue. 
56 
Finally, it remains more difficult to assess the 
effects of insurgent propaganda on the British. On the one 
hand, 'Black' propaganda aimed at the security forces 
apparently elicited no response, and other forms of harass- 
ment and abuse just made them angry. After all, once they 
were being killed in steadily increasing numbers the 
soldiers could not be expected to accept the insurgent 
propaganda line that the Jews had no quarrel with them but 
only with the British Government. 
57 On the other hand, the 
Irgun had every reason to be satisfied with the psycho- 
logical impact of the bombing in Rome and the ensuing prop- 
aganda campaign. The apparent ease with which the Irgun's 
supporters travelled around Europe created an atmosphere 
of anxiety in Britain. Unaware that the Irgun had few 
56 Washington to Foreign Office, 15 Apr. 1947, FO 
371/61753; Foreign Office, 'Memorandum on Jewish Affairs 
in the United States', June 1947, FO 371/61756. 
57 3 Para. Bde., 'ISUM no. 2', 21 Nov. 1945, WO 169/ 
19705; HQ Palestine, 'Ops Log', 9 Dec. 1945, WO 169/19745; 
Astor to Hall, 7 Mar. 1946, CO 733/456; 3 Field Security 
Section, 'Security Report for Week Ending 11 May 1946', WO 
169/24120; Minutes of Security Conference, 11 July 1947; 
Cunningham Papers; Wilson, Cordon and Search, p. 110. 
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sympathizers and no organization in Britain, the London 
tabloid headlines proclaimed 'Irgun Threatens London'. The 
security services increased the protection of government 
buildings and took special precautions for the opening of 
Parliament. 58 Although some British newspapers had con- 
cluded by March 1947 that Britain was losing the battle for 
the control of Palestine, it is not readily apparent that 
insurgent propaganda had any effect on British policy and 
decision-making. Creech-Jones said later that he recognized 
that Jewish propaganda attempted to 'maximize the trouble 
and difficulty' for the British Government. He states that 
the immigration and security issues became 'irresistable', 
but believes that Bevin felt constrained to maintain his 
course of action, in spite of the personal attacks on him- 
self. 
59 
Tugwell, in fact, feels that the extremism of the 
Irgun and the Lechi soured British opinion and turned a 
'reservoir of goodwill' into hostility, a fact he regards as 
'a singular failure of Zionist strategy' . 
60 In summary then, 
it might be fair to suggest. that insurgent propaganda 
strengthened the hand of those in the British Government who 
wanted to take a tougher line against terrorism. 
58 The News Chronicle, 9 Nov. 1946, Box 1,15/5/24, 
Liddell Hart Papers; The Times, 12,15 Nov. 1946; Irgun Zvai 
Leumi, Herut, no. 65, Dec. 19 6, CO 537/2365; Washington 
Daily News, 13 Nov. 1946, cited in Zaar, p. 212; Katz, Days 
o of Fire, pp. 103-5; Monte Harris to author, 18 Feb. 1978. 
The Lechi later sent letter bombs and assassination squads 
to Britain: Avner, pp. 19-20,110-6,125-50. 
59 'Govern or Get Out', Sunday Express, 2 Mar. 1947, 
cited in Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 190; Eric Grey, 'Even 
Guns Didn't Make Them Talk', Daily Express, 27 Mar. 1947, 
Box 1,15/5/24, Liddell Hart Papers; Creech-Jones to Monroe, 
23 Oct. 1961, Monroe Papers; see also Chapters II, VIII. 
60 Tugwell, p. 148. 
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British Propaganda 
From the earliest years of the Mandate the Palestine 
Government had recognized the influential and, at times, 
inflammatory role of the press in Palestine politics. At 
first the government attempted to restrict the information 
available to the public, and until 1927 the CID controlled 
the press. In 1928, however, the administration decided 
that it could play a role in influencing public opinion and 
so established a press bureau in the Secretariat. In 1938 
it became the Public Information Office (PIO). 
6l By the 
end of the war the Palestine Government was convinced that 
information services had become a normal function of 
Government and the special conditions of Palestine made 
it more than ever necessary that every effort should be 
made to develop and maintain good relations between the 
Government and the public and, in particular, the press. 62 
The PIO performed a dual role: first, public 
relations, by serving as the link between the Government and 
the population; and secondly, propaganda, to help maintain 
internal security and to promote the war effort. It ful- 
filled this dual role by the following means. First, the 
PIO conducted a sustained public information campaign 
through the distribution of publications and government 
information in all three languages, mobile cinema vans, and 
reading rooms in Tel Aviv and Jaffa. Secondly, the office 
arranged press conferences: weekly for the Public Infor- 
mation Officer and monthly for the Chief Secretary of the 
Government. Third, the PIO served as distribution agent for 
the British Ministry of Information (MOI). Fourth, it pro- 
vided press facilities, including the issuing of press cards 
61 MOIOPC, Paper 577A, and Christopher Holme, 'Note 
of a Talk given by the PIO Jerusalem on British Publicity 
in Palestine and its Relation to the Other Functions of 
Government', 13 Mar. 1945, CO 733/465; Government of Pales- 
tine, Survey of Palestine, II, 875-6; see also Appendix I. 
62 Government of Palestine, Survey of Palestine, II, 
877. 
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and a press service relying mainly on Reuters, the MOI and 
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The PIO also 
prepared news broadcasts and provided maps and photographs 
for local newspapers. Finally, it administered press legis- 
lation, newspaper rationing, and (during the war) censor- 
ship. 
63 
For presenting its case overseas the Palestine 
Government could rely upon the MOI in London, and the 
British Information Service (BIS) whose staff served in 
British embassies and consulates. Thus, by all appearances, 
the Palestine Government had all the resources necessary for 
a counter-insurgency propaganda campaign. 
The Palestine Government suffered, however, grave 
limitations in the propaganda field. Resource problems 
plagued the PIO. First, it appears that the director (the 
Public Information officer) did not work well with his own 
staff, with the Middle East Section of the MOI or with some 
of the press, to whom he referred on one occasion as 'that 
lot of bastards'. The MOI, however, did not feel it could 
remove him without a major showdown with the Palestine 
Government. 64 Secondly, while there were different opinions 
as to the amount of propaganda necessary, one official noted 
that the Tel Aviv campaign in particular was mismanaged and 
inappropriate. He also noted that there was a 'total lack 
of experienced publicity men'. 
65 The third problem con- 
cerned post-war reorganization and reductions. The MOI 
carried 85 per cent of the cost of the PIO and at the end of 
63 Ibid., I, 121, II, 874-8,930; MOIOPC, Paper 
577A, CO 733T465; 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on Operation ELE- 
PHANT', p. 101, Moore Papers. On 31 Oct. 1945 censorship 
was transferred to a separate office of the Palestine 
Government Secretariat. 
64 O'Donovan to Davies, 16 Apr. 1944, Ryan to Monroe, 
14 June 1944, Monroe to Woodburn, 7 July 1944, INF 1/419. 
65 Ryan to Monroe, 14 June 1944, INF 1/419. 
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the war the British Government wanted to reduce this burden. 
Between June and December 1945 budgets and establishment 
proposals were constantly revised and reduced. By December 
the MOI had fixed the proposed reductions at about 30 per 
cent. The estimated budget for 1946/47 was reduced by as 
much again. The PIO staff, diminished by vacancies to 109 
persons out of an establishment of 133, was to be run down 
to 65 by March 1946. The PIO cancelled two heavily sub- 
sidized Government newspapers. The reading centre in Tel 
Aviv, though apparently successful as a means of'reaching 
the Jewish population, was to be reduced in scale. Those in 
Haifa and Jaffa received funds for only a further six months 
and the proposal for a centre in Jerusalem was scrapped 
altogether. 
66 
The MOI itself underwent substantial change at this 
time. Eager to bring information expenditure into line with 
overall government spending, the Labour Government announced 
in December 1945 that it would replace the MOI-in 1946 with 
a non-ministerial Central Office of Information (COI). The 
COI was to provide information, material, and publicity 
advice and services for, government departments at home and 
abroad. Unlike the MOI, however, it was not responsible for 
governmental or departmental information policy and was not 
specifically represented by one minister at Cabinet level. 
67 
Moreover, the change in approach to information services may 
66 MOIOPC, Paper 575A, 'Plan of Propaganda for 
Palestine: Second Revision of Appreciation', 2 June 1945, 
and MOIOPC, Paper 577A, CO 733/465; MOI, 'Aide-Memoire of 
Meeting to Discuss Reduction of Palestine Budget', 18/19 
June 1945, INF 1/419; MOI to Eastwood, 21 June 1945, Ryan to 
MOI, 13 Aug. 1945, Finance Officer MOI Middle East to MOI, 
30 Aug. 1945, MOI, 'Palestine Budget, 1945/46', 4 Dec. 1945, 
INF 1/430. Budget: 1945/46 (original). 97,668; (revised) 
X66,507; (minus revenue). f51,807; 1946/47 (estimate) £46,837. 
67 'Post-war Activities of Ministry of Information 
1945-March 1946', INF 1/943. 
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have produced changes in personnel. Sir Robert Bruce 
Lockhart noted that with post-war reorganization the MOI's 
policy found propagandists unsuited by tempermerit and 
training for the more sober post-war publicity. 
68 Sir 
Robert did not indicate, however, whether experienced propa- 
gandists left the MOI at that time. 
At a time when insurgent propaganda was commencing a 
major offensive against the British and Palestine Govern- 
ments these changes and reductions could only make the 
government's propaganda task more difficult. There is, how- 
ever, no evidence to indicate whether the Palestine Govern- 
ment or the PIO objected to these reductions, at least at 
the time. In September 1946, at the urging of the GOC the 
Palestine Government initiated a search for a psychological 
warfare officer to conduct counter-propaganda. Apparently, 
however, the position was never filled. 
69 In Palestine, the 
government and the army concerned themselves mainly with 
technical rather than policy aspects of handling information. 
The High Commissioner, concerned about being unable to pre- 
vent inaccurate news reports outside Palestine, proposed 
that the PIO give to local correspondents informal prelim- 
inary 'handouts' giving the first confirmed news of any 
incident. The PIO could send these to the MOI as well to 
brief the British press. The Colonial Secretary agreed in 
principle, but the MOI decided not to distribute them to 
the press or to the BBC. Instead, the MOI proposed that 
they be sent to the Colonial Office, who would pass them to 
the MOI. The BBC would be encouraged to check with the 
Colonial office to verify the accuracy of its reports. The 
High Commissioner agreed, but was disappointed that the 
British press would not receive the handouts since he had 
68 Lockhart, p. 339. 
69 Minutes of Security Conference, 25,27 Sept. 
1946, Cunningham Papers; Pawle, interview, 18 May 1978. 
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felt they might'have a calming effect. At the same time, 
however, the MOI expressed concern that the PIO had decided, 
for reasons of economy, to discontinue the quarterly report 
and appreciation which the MOI had used to brief British and 
American journalists. The Colonial Office rectified the 
situation by providing the MOI with copies of the monthly 
situation telegram. 
70 
Propaganda was a relatively new weapon in so far as 
the British Army was concerned. As noted earlier, 'Notes 
for Officers on Internal Security Duties' did not cover 
psychological warfare and thus such arrangements as were 
made tended to be ad hoc and defensive. The army did not 
feel responsible for attacking the assumptions, claims, and 
methods of the insurgent propagandists. Generally speaking, 
the army responded to propaganda by attempting to protect 
its own integrity. First, the army attempted to deny the 
insurgents material with which to make propaganda. Form- 
ation commanders explained to their troops the aims and 
effects of propaganda. They told them to set aside precon- 
ceived notions and prejudices and to treat Arabs and Jews 
equally and without malice. Consistent with the principle 
of minimum force, commanders urged their soldiers to avoid 
unnecessary provocation or embarrassment in search oper- 
ations and to handle carefully incidents involving illegal 
immigrants. They were to avoid initiating incidents such 
as reprisals, which were likely to cause press comment, and 
above all, they should not lose their 'sense of proportion' 01 
70 Gort to Hall, 12 Oct. 1945, FO 371/45381; Hall to 
Gort, 18 Oct. 1945, Gort to Hall, 26 Oct. 1945, FO 371/45383; 
Driberg to Eastwood, 16,26 Oct. 1945, Eastwood to Driberg, 
7 Nov. 1945, Gutch to Eastwood, 21 Nov. 1945, CO 733/465. 
71 'Notes for officers on Internal Security Duties'; 
1 Inf. Div., 'Divisional Commander's Directive no. 1', Nov. 
1945, WO 169/19656; 3 Para. Bde., 'Training Instruction no. 
1', (undated), 'Notes on Cordon Check Searches', 16 Oct. 
1945, 'ISUM no. 2,3', 21,28 Nov. 1945, WO 169/19705; 6 
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Secondly, the army encouraged good relations with 
the press. The security forces gave all possible assistance 
to the accredited correspondents consistent with safety and 
operational security. Public relations officers were 
appointed to sector, brigade, and divisional headquarters to 
assist the press. Correspondents were permitted to move 
freely through curfew and restricted areas and to accompany 
the troops on operations. They were allowed on several 
occasions to visit internment camps. 
72 
Third, the army 
attempted to 'manage' news coverage of events in Palestine. 
Army instructions emphasized the need for speed and accuracy 
in passing of information; it was essential to 'beat Reuters' 
in order to prevent or correct inaccurate news reports. 
73 
One staff officer suggested that the army should try to 
influence reporting by providing the press (via the PIO) 
with information before the insurgents did. He felt that 
It is the first "hot news" that captures the head- 
lines. ... They will use the first story they 
get. ... Our object must be, therefore, to provide the material basis of a story within a few minutes of 
the start of an incident. ... It should usually be 
possible for this HQ to produce a story for the PIO of 
what is happening ... sufficient to give the right 
angle to the story. 74 
Airlanding Bde., 'Notes on Confirmation of Brigade Comman- 
der's Conference', 11 Oct. 1945, WO 169/19706: 2 Inf. Bde., 
'IS Appreciation', 24 Oct. 1945, WO 169/19699; HQ Palestine, 
'0I no. 67', 17 June 1946, WO 169/23022; Wilson, Cordon and 
Search, pp. 19-20. 
72 HQ Palestine, '0I no. 56--Press', 31 Dec. 1945, 
WO 169/19745; 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on Operation ELEPHANT', 
pp. 102-5; 1 Armoured Division, 'IS Instruction no. 4', 6 
June 1947, WO 261/178; 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on Operation 
TIGER', WO 261/181; Farrar-Hockley, interview, 13 Sept. 1976. 
73 6 AB Div., '0I no. 4--Passing of Information', 17 
Oct. 1945, WO 169/19685; HQ Palestine, 'Lessons From Ops 25/ 
26 Nov. 1945', 7 Dec. 1945, WO 169/19745. 
74 1 Inf. Div., 'Publicity', 8 May 1946, WO 169/ 
22957. 
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Until 1947 officers were forbidden to give interviews to 
the press. It was decided then that the senior military 
commander on the scene of an operation could give an inter- 
view or answer questions from the press. Officers concerned 
were encouraged to give the fullest possible account of the 
operations, but were to confine their remarks to statements 
of fact that the correspondents could check; they were not 
to comment on policy or express opinions. It was not until 
August 1947, however, that the Central security committee 
decided that the PIO should colour its reporting by empha- 
sizing successful security force operations. 
75 Finally, the 
security forces tried to jam or locate and capture the 
insurgents' illegal radio stations. In January and February 
1946 army radio direction-finding units fixed the location of 
Kol Israel on several occasions, but troops and police who 
converged on the sites never captured the transmitter or its 
crew. They did, however, locate and seize the Lechi radio 
station and its staff in Tel Aviv. Begin claims the Irgun's 
station was never silenced. 
76 
Propaganda policy was decided at several levels 
which were not cooperating with each other fully. In June 
1945 the MOI Overseas Planning Committee established the 
aims and objectives of its propaganda plan for Palestine. 
The aims were to maintain internal security in Palestine and 
to create an atmosphere conducive to a settlement of the 
problem by promoting good relations between the British, the 
75 HQ Palestine, '01 no. 56--Press', WO 169/19745; 
3 Para. Bde., '0I no. 38--Appendix: Relations with Press', 
30 Apr. 1947, WO 261/219; Minutes of Security Conference, 
22 Aug. 1947, Cunningham Papers. 
76 HQ Palestine, war diary, Feb. 1946, WO 169/23021; 
8 Battalion, Para. Regt., war diary, Jan. -Feb. 1946, WO 169/ 
23228; Minutes of Security Conference, 20 Dec. 1946,21 Mar. 
1947, Cunningham Papers; Begin, pp. 82-3. Available evi- 
dence gives no conclusive indication of the success or 
failure of jamming. 
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Arabs, and the Jews. The objectives were to continue to 
emphasize the war effort while publicizing British achieve- 
ments and difficulties. An annex to the appreciation noted 
that while it was undesirable to push separate propaganda 
lines to the Jews and the Arabs, different approaches were 
necessary. Propaganda to the Jews would have to convince 
them that the British Government cared about their fate; 
, 
both communities, however, would have to be reminded con- 
stantly of Britain's obligations under the Mandate. 
77 it 
was not sufficient, of course, to deal with the problem 
solely within Palestine; the British Government tried to 
counteract insurgent propaganda overseas, particularly in 
the United States. The campaign, which was largely defen- 
sive and low-key, began at the end of November 1945 when the 
High Commissioner complained to London about the flood of 
propaganda concerning the search at Givat Hayim. He felt 
that both British policy and the internal situation in 
Palestine would suffer unless vigorous steps were taken to 
deal with the propaganda. Cunningham's views were passed to 
Washington but the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, did not 
appear to take the problem seriously. He felt that mis- 
representations were not widespread. and that the few news- 
papers which had violently distorted facts were, in any 
case, incorrigible. On the occasion of any future incidents 
he stated that the embassy would issue an appropriate com- 
munique through the BIS. Moreover, the embassy and the BIS 
would continue to give information privately to press and 
radio commentators in order to put across the British view 
of operations in Palestine. In the case of Givat Hayim, 
however, British reports from the scene varied considerably 
77 
MOIOPC, 
Second Revision of 
1945, CO 733/465; 
Second Revision of 
INF 1/943. 
'Plan of Propaganda for Palestine: 
Aims and Objectives', Paper 576A, 1 June 
'IOIOPC, 'Plan of Propaganda for Palestine: 
Appreciation', Paper 575B, 2 June 1945, 
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on crucial details. Insurgent propaganda thus scored a 
significant victory when the British Government accepted 
the Zionist version of events despite some obvious incon- 
sistencies. 
78 
There was a brief change in policy in May 1946: 
following the car park murders in Tel Aviv the Foreign 
Office urged the Washington embassy to 'move from the 
defence to the attack' by using reports of such incidents 
as the basis for a propaganda offensive. 
79 in principle 
this probably made sense, but in practice official British 
statements would carry little weight amongst Britain's 
American critics. Moreover, in this specific case it was 
already too late by at least a fortnight. Insurgent propa- 
gandists had turned a potential disaster for the resistance 
movement into an embarrassment for the British by skillfully 
exploiting British excesses in response to the murders: the 
divisional commander's public rebuke to the Mayor of Tel Aviv 
and the brief reprisal by British troops against a Jewish 
settlement. Any propaganda advantage the British might have 
gained from the Lechi attack vanished as the Jewish press 
castigated General Cassels, linking his attitude to the 
reprisals. General Cassels himself later conceded that he 
had achieved nothing by his public statement 'except more 
British press adverse comments and a spate of letters from 
American Jews'. 
80 So the Foreign Office directive was not 
78 3 Inf. Bde., 'Report of Incidents', 26 Nov. 1945, 
'Confidential Message', 27 Nov. 1945, WO 169/19703; 3 Para. 
Bde., 'ISUM no. 3', 28 Nov. 1945, WO 169/19705; Cunningham 
to Hall, 28 Nov. 1945, Colonial Office to Washington, 
Washington to Foreign Office, 30 Nov. 1945, Hall to Levy, 
10 Jan. 1946, CO 733/456. 
79 Foreign office to Washington, 9 May 1946, CO 733/ 
456. 
80 Hurewitz, pp. 243,353-4 note 15; Field Marshal 
Sir James Cassels to author, 27 Nov. 1976; see also Chapter 
VI. 
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only too late; it was completely out of touch with the 
realities of the propaganda war. 
Following Operation AGATHA in June 1946 the British 
Ambassador, now Lord Inverchapel, felt that the principle 
British propaganda aim in America should be 'to remove the 
Palestine issue from the headlines' by allowing the current 
agitation to subside and by refraining from further public 
statements. He did, however, favour continued efforts by 
BIS to influence the American press. 
81 
Through 1946/47 
British diplomats also protested, without success, to the 
State Department about advertisements soliciting funds for 
the insurgents. The Foreign Office, however, criticized 
the embassy for not pressing the issue with sufficient 
vigour. Commenting on memorandum sent to the State Depart- 
ment in December 1946, one official said, 
This is a lamentably weak document. One would have 
thought that as three previous protests have gone 
unanswered, we could, without really upsetting Anglo- 
American relations, point out that the financing of 
rebellion on the territory of a friendly power was 
just the least bit steep? 82 
The British did not ask for suppression of the advertising; 
they tried instead to persuade the American Government to 
remove the tax exempt status of contributions to the organ- 
izations concerned. By September 1947 the issue was still 
unresolved and all that British persistence had achieved was 
a statement from the Truman administration asking Americans 
not to engage in activities likely to cause violence in 
Palestine. 83 At the embassy's request the Foreign Office 
81 Washington to Foreign Office, 12 July 1946, FO 
371/52538. 
82 'Aide-Memoire to State Department', 5 Dec. 1946, 
and comments by Harold Beeley, F. B. A. Rundall, FO 371/61765. 
83 Washington to Foreign Office, 28 Jan. 1947, CO 
537/2312; Foreign office to Washington, 21 May 1947, FO 371/ 
61759; see also FO 371/61757; Joseph Schechtman, The United 
States and the Jewish State Movement (New York, 1966 , p. 195. 
ýý 
attempted to keep them informed of British plans for 
Palestine, to enable the officials in Washington to antici- 
pate and respond effectively to criticism. Even so, certain 
limitations may have hampered the efforts of British dip- 
lomats in America to present their case effectively. In 
February 1947 the embassy felt that British officials had 
been misquoted on several occasions and thus decided that 
they should not speak in public on the Palestine issue; con- 
sequently, numerous invitations to do so were refused. The 
Foreign office disagreed with this policy, pointing out that 
it seems to be an unfortunate development at a time when 
the other interested parties must be intensifying their 
propaganda. ... it seems to be more than ever necessary that misrepresentations of British policy should be 
answered as effectively as possible. 84 
The embassy insisted, however, that its staff and the BIS 
were more effective in putting the British case personally, 
in letters to and conversations with influential persons. 
The ambassador lifted the ban on public speaking in April 
but by August even the embassy staff had come to doubt the 
value of their propaganda techniques. They concluded that 
insurgent propaganda was effective and wondered if they were 
doing enough to counter it. They could not afford to place 
full page newspaper advertisements like those of the ALFP; 
conversations and replies to letters were valuable, but they 
only reached a few people; briefing correspondents was 
effective, but by this time many American newspapers were 
reluctant to print anything that sounded pro-British. The 
embassy requested more information on Palestine, including 
statistics on terrorist incidents, casualties, and illegal 
84 Washington to Foreign Office, 3 Feb. 1947, 
Washington to Foreign Office, 8 Feb. 1947, FO 371/61765; 
Washington to Foreign office, 16 Apr. 1947, FO 371/61773; 
see also FO 371/61860. 
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immigration but did not receive a reply until September 
1947.85 
Propaganda counter-measures directed at the British 
audience showed even less drive or imagination than efforts 
in America. It may be fair to suggest that once British 
soldiers were being killed such measures were unnecessary 
because the British population tended to sympathize with the 
army in such difficult circumstances. Nonetheless, the 
Palestine Government and the army attempted to correct or 
forestall what they considered misleading or sensationalist 
accounts in British newspapers. The High Commissioner's 
view, however, that an eyewitness account of events by a 
senior British officer would provide 'an adequate rejoinder 
to wilful distortions' suggests a certain naivete: on his 
part, since critics would not find such an account unbiased. 
The British Government made statements in the House of 
Commons, either in reply to questions or on the occasion of 
major developments, such as Operation AGATHA in June 1946. 
In July 1946 the government published a White Paper on 
terrorism which provided evidence implicating the Jewish 
Agency in the resistance movement. 
86 
The Foreign Office, 
with the assistance of Passport Control, the security ser- 
vice and the Palestine Government, made a concerted effort 
to harrass. and keep under surveillance the ALFP's European 
representatives. After his speeches in London and Rome 
Smertenko was denied re-entry into Britain. . Peter Bergson's 
Palestinian citizenship was revoked and the British 
85 Washington to Foreign Office, 16 Apr. 1947, FO 
371/61773; Washington to Foreign Office, 6 Aug. 1947, FO 
371/61784. 
86 Cunningham to Hall, 30 Nov. 1945, FO 371/45387; 
GHQ Middle East Forces to War Office, 4 Jan. 1946, WO 169/ 
22881; Hansard, 5th ser., CLXXIV, 1805-10; HC[6873], BPP 
(1946); Mi'nutes of Security Conference, 6 June 1947, 
Cunningham Papers; Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 7 Aug. 1947, 
FO 371/61784. 
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Government persuaded the Italian Government to suppress La 
Riposta, the ALFP's propaganda magazine 
87 
During the period 1945/47 the British and Palestine 
governments conducted only one well-organized and effective 
propaganda campaign: a recruiting campaign for the 
Palestine Police. At the end of November-. 1945 the Chief 
Secretary suggested that the existing recruiting campaign-- 
then confined to the armed forces, and not producing the 
desired results--be expanded to include the general public, 
using all the methods of modern publicity. The Colonial 
Office approved the idea in principle in January 1946, but 
there was considerable reluctance to begin the campaign at 
that time. The government did not want to attract too much 
attention to the Palestine problem, nor did it wish to 
introduce too many men into the force rapidly without pro- 
viding adequate training. Furthermore, as noted earlier, 
the government felt that the army would be responsible for 
controlling major disorder in Palestine, so police manpower 
was not regarded in London as an urgent problem. 
88 
In June 
1946, however, the deteriorating situation in Palestine and 
a shortage of 3,000 policemen forced the government to act. 
A two-month publicity campaign prepared by the Palestine 
Government began in June. The Colonial Office, the War 
Office, and the COI assisted the Palestine Government in 
securing advertising space, even at the expense of recruiting 
for the armed forces. The campaign commenced in early June 
with advertisements in 40 provincial newspapers. Later this 
expanded to 80, supplemented by letters to 1,350 headmasters 
87 See correspondence relating to Bergson and 
Smertenko in FO 371/52571,61751; see also Rome to Foreign 
Office, 26 June 1947, FO 371/67813B; Rome to Foreign office, 
22 Aug. 1947, CO 537/2289. 
88 Shaw to Eastwood, 26 Nov. 1945, Trafford-Smith, 
'Note Following Meeting on Recruiting', 11 Jan. 1946, Martin 
to Gater, 7 May 1946, CO 733/451. 
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of public and secondary schools and a recruiting slide 
presented at 400 cinemas and 50 theatres. The campaign was 
renewed in September and November 1946-and again in January 
1947; by that time it included national Sunday newspapers 
and some national magazines. 
89 The recruitment propaganda, 
which was produced originally in 1945, was criticized for 
not telling the whole truth about service in the police: it 
stressed the reputation of the force as a 'body of picked 
men' chosen for their high standards of character, education 
and physical fitness; it said nothing about the dangers, the 
fact that effective training had all but ceased, and prob- 
lems such as equipment shortages. 
90 Nonetheless, the 
recruiting campaign was a major success. The first week of 
advertising produced 2,000 inquiries and by the end of 
September the Colonial Office had received some 6,000 appli- 
cations. The large majority were rejected for a variety of 
reasons, but the monthly intake of recruits increased 
steadily: from 62 in June 1946 to a peak of 395 in December, 
by which time more than 1,200 recruits. had been selected 
and intake to the force had outstripped wastage. Enquiries 
and applications continued to increase until July 1947.91 
The success of this campaign contrasts sharply with 
the overall British approach to propaganda and highlights 
. 
89 Home Information Services (Official) Committee, 
Minutes of meeting, 19 June 1946, Gater to Cunningham, 26 
June 1946, Mather and Crowther Limited, 'Interim Report on 
Palestine Police Recruiting Campaign', 9 July 1946, and 
Colonial Office, 'Memorandum on Recruitment Campaign for 
Palestine Police', Nov. 1946, CO 733/451. 
90 Colonial Office, 'The Palestine Police Force', 
18,25 June 1945; Daily Mail, 10 Dec. 1946. 
91 Gater to Cunningham, 26 June 1946, Mather and 
Crowther, 'Interim Report', Colonial Office, 'Memorandum on 
Recruitment', CO 733/451; Mather and Crowther to Trafford 
Smith, 17 Mar. 1947, and correspondence relating to monthly 
recruiting figures, Apr. to Aug. 1947, CO 537/2268; Minutes 
of Security Conference, 6 Nov. 1946, Cunningham Papers. 
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obvious weaknesses in British propaganda policy. First, 
unlike the insurgents, the British Government (and thus by 
implication the Palestine Government) did not have a pol- 
itical programme upon which to build a propaganda campaign. 
As early as June 1945 the Overseas Planning Committee 
observed that 'Until H. M. G. makes a new declaration of 
policy with regard to Palestine, it is undesirable that our 
publicity should attempt to cover future developments'. 
92 
In the autumn of 1946 Harold Beeley observed further that 
the only effective forms of counter-propaganda would be a 
conclusive policy decision on Palestine and an Arab effort 
to publicize their own case. 
93 In short, the British had 
nothing with which to challenge the basic assumptions of 
insurgent propaganda. Moreover, the British Government 
itself accepted some of the Zionist claims; differences were 
over interpretation and degree. Propaganda scarcely can be 
effective if it is reduced to 'splitting hairs' on fine 
points of interpretation. The government's failure to 
renounce totally the White Paper policy, in any case, left 
the British position open to attack in propaganda terms. 
Consequently, the British tended to use propaganda defen- 
sively, leaving the initiative with the insurgents. 
Secondly, without a policy there were no clear 
propaganda objectives; -those established in 1945 were 
inadequate and were never revised. The British could not 
win simultaneously the support of Arabs and Jews, who were 
not in the least interested in Britain's achievements and 
difficulties. British propaganda, therefore, could not 
promote good relations between the various parties, nor 
could it contribute to producing internal security. More- 
over, those objectives, prepared with a continuation of the 
92 MOIOPC, Paper 576A, CO 733/465. 
93 Harold Beeley, note of file, 15 Oct. 1946, FO 371/ 
52561. 
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world war in mind and before the insurgents launched their 
offensive, appear in retrospect inappropriate. Effective 
propaganda seems to require a wartime adversary relationship 
and a concept of ultimate victory, but internal security 
was not a combat role and did not include a concept of 
victory. The objective of the security forces was to main- 
tain 'law and order'; this precluded the development of the 
kind of propaganda themes which could prevail against 
propaganda that labelled Britain as the enemy. Any attempt 
to use such an approach would have left the British open to 
charges of anti-semitism, which were frequent enough as it 
was. 
The third problem was that the British Government 
suffered from a 'credibility gap'. The Jewish population 
of Palestine and Britain's critics in America regarded as 
suspect anything the British Government said. John Kimche 
blamed the British press for official and public ignorance 
in Britain of the realities of Palestine and for encouraging 
the army and administration to pursue a futile course. He 
claimed that as early as 1946 British reporting consisted of 
'political warfare of the crudest kind, involving misrepre- 
sentation, distortion, suppression, and invention'. 
94 The 
insurgents went further, accusing the British press of being 
partisan 'patsys of the CID'. 
95 Some of the criticism was 
justified: as noted earlier, some British newspapers tended 
to sensationalize reporting of events in Palestine. The 
Palestine Government tried to deal with that problem by 
means of censorship, but that only aggravated the situation. 
The government insisted that it censored only those items 
likely to have a detrimental effect on the local security 
situation, and vehemently denied that censorship was used 
94 Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars, pp. 188-9. 
95 Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, LHI Bulletin, 
pp. 12-3. 
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to stifle legitimate criticism. Critics, however, felt that 
censorship, 'so far from serving its intended purpose of 
pacification, is by concealments and distortions positively 
manufacturing the ignorance on which suspicions and dis- 
order breed in Palestine'. 
96 The governments in London and 
Jerusalem were scarcely shielded from criticism, but there 
is no question that the Palestine Government used the power 
to censor widely and any form of censorship, however 
expedient, was undesirable. There is no evidence to show 
that it contributed to a decline in violence, and it lent 
credibility to insurgent claims that the government was 
trying to suppress the 'truth' about Palestine. In short, 
it simply provided the insurgents with another British 
weapon that could be turned against the British themselves 
and, therefore, undermined British legitimacy while 
enhancing that of the insurgents. 
The fourth weakness was in resources. The changes 
and reductions at the MOI and the PIO left British propa- 
ganda without central direction; the governments in both 
London and Jerusalem had to fend for themselves. While 
Westminster could count on at least The Daily Telegraph to 
support a tough policy against terrorism, the press in 
Palestine was without exception hostile to the government. 
Richard Graves, Mayor of Jerusalem in 1947/48, felt that the 
Palestine Government was severely hampered in not having a 
press of its own. Its only means of answering criticism was 
by austere communiquSs, in papers already slanted against 
the government, which could hardly be expected to win many 
converts. He concluded that the government should have 
96 Cunningham to Hall, 29 June 1946, FO 371/52534; 
Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 13 Dec. 1946, 'Bad Tempered 
Censorship', Evening Standard, 25 Nov. 1946, 'Press Censor- 
ship', The Times Jan. 1947, 'Palestine Bans "Iron Hand" 
News', Daily Graphic, 6 Jan. 1947, Cunningham to Creech- 
Jones, 10 Jan. 1947, CO 537/2289; 1 Inf. Div., 'Report on 
Operation ELEPHANT', pp. 101-3, Moore Papers. 
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subsidized long before an English language newspaper and 
given it a free hand to criticize as well as a general man- 
date to support the government. Such a paper would have 
been able to launch counter-attacks against criticism in 
the local papers. 
97 Although it may be correct in theory, 
Graves' view seems unduly optimistic. Under the circum- 
stances prevailing it is hard to see how such a paper could 
have overcome the credibility gap perceived by the Jews. 
Finally, the army's inexperience in handling public 
relations caused some difficulties. It is apparent that 
despite all good intentions army/press relations were less 
than satisfactory. British correspondents complained of 
being 'held up, searched, and refused admittance to places 
where, with their passes, they have every right to go'. 
98 
if this was the case it is hardly surprising that the 
security forces had few defenders in the news media. The 
problem probably became self-sustaining, since hostile, 
reporting generated a hostile attitude towards the press on 
the part of the army. General Cassels observed that 
It did make one hopping mad to read some of the com- 
ments in the Press ... denigrating all or most of our 
actions. They sat in comfort and safety in England 
while we lived in fairly uncomfortable conditions and 
under the continued ... threat of being sniped or blown up! 99 
In fairness it must be stressed that the army was not 
accustomed to conducting operations under the glare of pub- 
licity. Nonetheless, the army's inexperience and the govern- 
ment's low profile approach to propaganda generally made it 
difficult for the Palestine authorities to present themselves 
97 Graves, p. 91. 
98 'Bad Tempered Censorship', Evening Standard, 25 
Nov. 1946, CO 537/2289. 
99 Cassels to author, 27 Nov. 1976. 
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as a winning side, let alone to recover from embarrassments 
like the Farran case.. By contrast, the police recruiting 
campaign had a clear, if limited, objective. The various 
agencies concerned cooperated in the task and pursued the 
objective in a manner uncharacteristic of British propaganda 
efforts at that time. The initial message, which was rein- 
forced and sustained, appealed to a receptive audience of 
young men and ex-servicemen who found peacetime life in 
Britain too dull or economically difficult and for whom the 
prospect of exciting work in Palestine provided a desirable 
alternative. In this sense perhaps the recruiting campaign 
was blessed by extraordinary timing: delayed much longer 
than was justified by police requirements, it opened against 
a background of rising violence which actually may have 
helped recruiting. In summary, it possessed and exploited 
what British propaganda lacked generally: all the elements 
of an effective propaganda campaign. 
Conclusion 
In June 1943 R. G. Casey, then Minister of State 
Resident in the Middle East, warned the British Government 
not to rely solely on military force to maintain order in 
Palestine. With, in retrospect, startling accuracy he 
alerted the government to the threat of a propaganda war in 
which the security forces would be the principal victims. 
In a complex situation like that of Palestine, military 
force is an admirable preventative against disturbance 
of internal security, but it is little use as a cure.. 
it will have failed in its first purpose if it ever has 
to be used. The extreme Zionist leaders would not be 
deterred by a display of military force alone, lacking 
any indication of the policy which it was stationed in 
Palestine to implement. They would rely on the obvious 
political embarrassment in London and Washington which 
would be entailed in ordering British ... troops to "put down a Jewish rebellion" or even to fire on Zionist 
demonstrations. However inconsistent with the actual 
facts of the situation today in Palestine, there is a 
body of opinion amongst members of the British and 
American public which regard the Jews in Palestine as an 
177 
"oppressed" and "defenceless" people. The entire force 
of the world-wide Zionist propaganda machine would be 
mobilized, in these circumstances, to present events in 
Palestine in this convenient emotional light and so to 
paralyse any effective action by security. forces whose 
only directive was to "maintain order" . 
100 
But in 1945 Britain had no policy and directed its 
security forces simply 'to keep the peace'. As Casey fore- 
told, the Zionists were not intimidated by the military 
presence and mobilized a world-wide propaganda campaign to 
discredit and paralyse it. In this context insurgent 
propaganda was most effective in Palestine itself. By com- 
bining basic Zionist assumptions with atrocity propaganda 
and themes of moral righteousness, martyrdom and justi- 
fication of violence, the insurgents isolated the security 
forces from the Palestinian Jewish community and insulated 
themselves from police penetration. This was exactly what 
Begin intended when he appealed to the Jews to build 'a 
protecting wall' around the insurgents. 
101 This propaganda 
victory had an immediate and significant impact on the 
counter-insurgency campaign: information on the insurgents 
all but dried up and in the absence of accurate intelligence 
the security forces were unable to stop terrorism; in short, 
they lost control of Palestine. The insurgents exploited 
this failure, and the numerous blunders which accompanied it, 
when they extended their propaganda campaign to the United 
States. By showing that the facts proved their case the 
insurgents kept the American administration firmly on the 
side of a Zionist solution to the Palestine problem and 
encouraged American sympathizers to continue their moral and 
financial assistance to the insurgents. Condemned and, 
through its own short-sightedness, lacking the means to 
100 WCP 246, 'Palestine: Memorandum by the Minister 
of State', 17 June 1943, CAB 66/37. 
101 Begin, p. 43. 
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respond, the British Government was unable to secure 
American support for the various British initiatives to 
settle the conflict. 
In conclusion, insurgent propaganda did not influ- 
ence directly the decisions of British policy-makers. 
Instead, as will be shown in the next chapter, it succeeded 
through a strategy of 'indirect approach': the inability 
to defeat the insurgents and the failure of political 
initiatives--themselves the products of effective insurgent 
propaganda--were the principal factors which convinced the 
British Government to relinquish the Palestine Mandate. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Clausewitz called the decisive phase of conflict the 
'culminating point'. 
' This point may be easily discernible 
in a conventional conflict: a significant defeat on the 
battlefield which shifts the strategic balance conclusively 
against one belligerent. However, in insurgency the turning 
point is often less than clear for the results on the 
battlefield are significant only to the extent that they 
affect political and strategic decisions on further conduct 
of the campaign. The culminating point is reached when the 
leaders on one side have been convinced that they can no 
longer impose constraints on the decisions and actions of 
the other. The result is a stalemate, which often favours 
the insurgents who win by demonstrating that the security 
forces cannot contain the insurgency. By September 1947 
just such a situation prevailed in Palestir-. Because the 
insurgents had convinced the British Government that it 
could not restore or maintain order, the operations of the 
security forces no longer affected the political outcome of 
the struggle. This chapter examines how the interplay of 
insurgent action and government response transformed 
Palestine from a strategic asset for the British to a 
political and military liability. 
Operation AGATHA was the first significant event in 
this process. Since May 1945 senior officials in Palestine 
had been urging the British Government to do away with the 
1 
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from 
Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 
1941; repr. New York, 1967), p. 111. 
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Jewish Agency, which they regarded as a rival political 
power. The British Government, however, was reluctant to 
act against the Agency because it was a legitimate integral 
part of the Mandate. 
2 Once the fighting started in the 
autumn the issue came up again. The Palestine adminis- 
tration was convinced, on the basis of intelligence and the 
Agency's refusal to cooperate against the insurgents, that 
the Agency was implicated in the violence. In November 1945 
the Chief Secretary advised the Colonial Secretary that 
I will leave to you to judge whether the demeanour and 
activity of the Agency and its leaders during the past 
three years have been consistent with those obligations 
and responsibilities [imposed on the Agency under 
Article 4 of the Mandate]. ... it is becoming diffi- 
cult to the verge of impossibility for us unfortunates 
out here to deal with these people. 3 
The government did not act on his information, however, 
perhaps because it was at that time involved in the deli- 
cate negotiations with the American Government concerning 
creation of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry. 
The High Commissioner concluded, after insurgent 
attacks in December 1945, that action should be taken 
against the Agency. In Cunningham's view, it had rejected 
the legitimacy of the Palestine administration, had refused 
to cooperate with the government in suppressing, and was in 
fact financing, terrorism. He suggested that the security 
forces occupy the Agency's headquarters and place certain 
4 
members under police supervision. The cabinet, however, 
2 Secretary of State for the Colonies, 'Report of 
Discussion of Palestine Policy', 25 May 1945, CO 733/461. 
3 Shaw to Martin, 3 Nov. 1945, CO 733/456; Shaw to 
Hall, 9 Nov. 1945, CO 733/457; HC[6873], 4-5, BPP (1946); 
3 Para. Bde., 'ISUM no. 3', 28 Nov. 1945, WO 16-9/119705. 
4 Cunningham to Hall, 29-30 Dec. 1945, CO 733/457; 
Palestine Executive Council minutes, 1 Jan. 1946, CO 814/41. 
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opposed any such action because they felt it would 
strengthen the hand of the extremists in the Zionist move- 
ment and undermine that of the moderates, producing at the 
very least widespread disorder. Further, they believed it. 
would produce an unfavourable reaction in the United States 
and render impossible effective work by the Anglo-American 
Commission. The Colonial Secretary suggested that 
Cunningham merely reduce contact with the Agency as a 
demonstration of the government's displeasure. 
5 On the 
advice of the Chiefs-of Staff Committee the cabinet rejected 
for the same reasons a wholesale search for arms. The 
Chiefs of Staff had advised the cabinet that a search at 
that time would be militarily counter-productive: a sub- 
stantial search would probably result in armed conflict; 
anything less would not produce worthwhile results. They 
concluded that the most promising plan would be to conduct 
a search for arms as a secondary operation when action was 
taken to arrest the leadership of the Haganah and the 
Palmach. In any case there should be no search until 
insurgent activity made such a course of action 'obviously 
justifiable and necessary'. 
6 
There were, therefore, sound political and military 
reasons for postponing any significant operation against 
the Jewish Agency and the insurgents. By June 1946, how- 
ever, the government had to weigh these reasons against 
significant developments in the political and military 
situation. First, the report of the commission of inquiry 
had recommended that the Jewish Agency resume at once 
5 CM, 1 Jan. 1946, CAB 128/5; 'Extract from Brief 
Supplied to Creech-Jones for Cabinet, 1 Jan. 1946, and Hall 
to Cunningham, 2 Jan. 1946, CO 733/457. 
6 COSC minutes, 9,16, Nov. 1945, CAB 79/41; C in 
C's Middle East to COSC, 19 Nov. 1945, and Cabinet Defence 
Committee (hereafter cited as CDC) Paper 31, 'Situation in 
Palestine: Report by Chiefs of Staff', 19 Nov. 1945, 
Cunningham Papers, V/4. 
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cooperation with the Palestine administration in the sup- 
pression of terrorism. Such cooperation was not forthcom- 
ing. The insurgent attacks in June represented a major 
escalation in the level of violence, which the High Commis- 
sioner feared would continue unless drastic action were 
taken. Cunningham, moreover, felt that the recent violence 
showed that extremist elements had taken control of the 
Agency which, in turn, controlled the Haganah. The cabinet 
concurred in his assessment, concluding that it could 
tolerate no longer a situation 'in which the authority of 
the government was set at nought'. 
Secondly, both the High Commissioner and the CIGS 
expressed fears that troops in Palestine might get out of 
hand unless the government took firm action against the 
insurgents. 8 Their fears were hardly groundless. Following 
the attack on the airborne car park in April Generals 
D'Arcy and Cassels warned Cunningham that failure to take 
firm action might result in reprisals by the troops them- 
selves. Cassels recalls: 
When I went to see the High Commissioner was I allowed 
to do anything positive? ... The answer is "No"--a 
few roadblocks here and there and the odd curfew but no 
more. All very frustrating and ... it was not all 
that easy to keep the ... Airborne soldiers under 
control when they saw their comrades being murdered. 
9 
The High Commissioner approved only a curfew and road 
restrictions and, as the generals had predicted, some of the 
paratroopers engaged in a brief reprisal against a Jewish 
7 CP 238, 'Memorandum by Secretary of State for the 
Colonies', 19 June 1946, CAB 129/10; CM, 20 June 1946, CAB 
128/5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Cassels to author, 27 Nov. 1976. Cassels' recol- 
lection is confirmed in 'Record of a Meeting in the Chief 
Secretary's Office', 26 Apr. 1946, Cunningham Papers, V/4; 
and GHQ Middle East Forces to Cabinet Office, 1 May 1946, 
WO 169/22882. 
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settlement. After the kidnappings in June a British officer 
shot and killed a Jew who had jostled him on the street. 
10 
Against the background of these incidents Cunningham warned 
the cabinet that 'any hesitancy in action as result of kid- 
napping and shooting at officers will have serious effect 
on morale of troops who have already been tried very 
highly'. 11 
It may be fair to criticize the army commanders for 
either admitting incompetence to command or attempting to 
blackmail the government into using draconian measures. In 
any case, confronted by these compelling arguments the 
cabinet authorized the High Commissioner to take such steps 
as he considered necessary to break up the illegal military 
organizations, including a search of the Jewish Agency's 
headquarters and the arrest of its members. 
12 The decision 
produced significant consequences for the counter-insurgency 
campaign. First, the principal political objective of the 
operation clearly was to split the Zionist movement in such 
a way as to isolate and neutralize the more extreme elements, 
thus allowing the moderates to regain control. Cunningham 
had long felt that it might be possible to produce such a 
division and General Barker was convinced the security 
forces could do so, so long as they struck principally at 
the Palmach, the Haganah leadership and the extreme elements 
in the Jewish Agency and did not try to neutralize and dis- 
arm the Haganah as a whole. 
13 
General Gale dissented; he 
10 Wilson, Cordon and Search, p. 48; HQ Palestine, 
'Message', 18 June 1946, WO 169/23072; Cunningham to Hall, 
21 June 1946, CO 733/456. 
11 CP 238,19 June 1946, CAB 129/10. 
12 CM, 20 June 1946, CAB 128/5. 
13 Cunningham to Hall, 27 Dec. 1945, CO 733/463; 
Lieutenant General Evelyn Barker, 'Military Action to be 
Taken to Enforce Law and Order in Palestine', 22 June 1946, 
Cunningham Papers, V/4. 
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felt mass arrests might produce the exact opposite of the 
desired and anticipated effect, a leadership vacuum which 
would be filled by the extremists. 
14 
In the short term, Barker and Cunningham were cor- 
rect. Chaim Weizmann reasserted his authority over the 
Zionist movement, forced Moshe Sneh to resign as Haganah 
commander and the Haganah and Palmach to suspend offensive 
operations. After rejecting further armed resistance the 
Jewish Agency accepted in principle the idea of establishing 
a Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine. Nonetheless, the 
British Government was unable to exploit politically these 
developments. In his public statement on Operation AGATHA 
Cunningham had emphasized that the Jewish Agency was not 
being closed or proscribed and that 'The door of negotiation 
and discussion is not shut'. 
15 
Jewish politicians, however, 
appreciated that their cooperation was essential to a 
-negotiated peaceful settlement of the Palestine question and 
they withheld such cooperation by refusing to participate in 
the London conference on Palestine unless their detained 
leaders were released. Of necessity this made progress at 
the conference almost impossible and in October 1946 the 
government felt induced to suspend the policy of general 
searches as a gesture of good faith in negotiations with 
the Agency over the resumption of political cooperation 0 
16 
Thus, while Operation AGATHA allowed the British Government 
to apply a degree of pressure on the Jews, it gave more sig- 
nificant leverage to the Jewish political community to use 
as a weapon against Britain. 
14 Gale, p. 168. 
15 HQ Palestine, 'Statement by High Commissioner', 
29 June 1946, WO 169/23022. 
16 'Minutes of Meeting, Colonial Office and Jewish 
Agency Sub-Committee', 17 Oct. 1946, FO 371/52562. 
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Secondly, even if the cabinet had valid political 
reasons for taking action there was no sense in doing so 
unless it would restore law and order. The principal mili- 
tary objective of Operation AGATHA was to break up the 
insurgent organizations. This would be possible only if 
the security forces possessed sufficient intelligence on 
the underground groups, for experience had demonstrated 
that large searches based on little or no information were 
not cost-effective. Farrar-Hockley notes that under such 
circumstances 'sometimes you got a terrorist; sometimes you 
got something you weren't looking for. More often you got 
nothing. '17 But General Barker advised the cabinet that 
the dearth of intelligence on the Irgun and the Lechi would 
confine the security forces to arresting members of the 
Haganah and the Palmach. Such action, he warned, would not 
stop terrorism; in fact it might increase after the oper- 
ation. 
18 In the event, he was correct: by September 1946 
the rate of terrorist incidents had increased substantially 
above that of the previous ten-month period. It is possible 
to suggest several reasons why this occurred: the dis- 
ruption of the resistance movement freed the Irgun and the 
Lechi from all constraints previously applied by the 
Haganah. Detention of the Zionist leaders precluded obtain- 
ing the cooperation of the Jewish public in gathering intel- 
ligence on the extremists. Furthermore, the High Commis- 
sioner commuted the death sentences which had resulted in 
the kidnappings, 
19 thereby demonstrating that the insur- 
gents, not the government, determined which laws would be 
enforced. 
17 Farrar-Hockley, interview with author. See also 
Appendix VII. 
18 Barker, 'Military Action', Cunningham Papers. 
19 Wilson, Cordon and Search, pp. 55-6. 
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In his brief to the cabinet General Barker had 
warned them that it would be impossible to subjugate the 
Jews by force indefinitely; a political solution was 
required. 
20 When it ordered Operation AGATHA, however, the 
cabinet appeared to appreciate only the urgency of the 
immediate security crisis and not the long-term political 
implications of the proposed action. Consequently, Oper- 
ation AGATHA contributed not to the pacification of 
Palestine but to a substantial deterioration in the security 
situation. By the end of the year the opportunity for a 
negotiated settlement had passed. The British Government 
was forced to choose between governing Palestine by coercion 
or abandoning the mandate altogether. 
Field Marshal Montgomery was one of those who 
thought that coercion was long overdue. Prior to taking up 
his post as CIGS, he had visited Palestine during the 
insurgents' June offensive and told General Barker that 
'this was no way to carry on. The Army must press for a 
decision to re-establish authority. '21 Cunningham later 
told Creech-Jones that the field marshal had expressed this 
opinion before he had seen the situation and that he had 
pressed his views with such vigour that General Paget wrote 
personally to Alanbrooke, the retiring CIGS, to inform him 
that there was no truth in Montgomery's allegations. 
22 
There may be several reasons why Montgomery took this view. 
By his own account he felt Britain should fight to retain 
its position in the Middle East, which he regarded as a 
vital base for strategic reserves. 
23 He was undoubtedly 
20 Barker, 'Military Action', Cunningham Papers. 
21 Montgomery, p. 423. 
22 Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 23 Nov. 1946, CO 537/ 
1731. 
23 Montgomery, pp. 433,436. 
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irritated to see the 6th Airborne' Division, the elite for- 
mation of the proposed Imperial Strategic Reserve, tied 
down on internal security duties. Moreover, it is clear 
that the essence of counter-insurgency escaped him possibly, 
as Cunningham suggests, because of his experience in the 
pre-war Arab revolt: 
There is, of course, no comparison between that situ- 
ation and the present. Moreover, I have seen a tele- 
gram to CINCMELF to the effect that as a soldier he 
should not be concerned with politics and must visu-. 
alise matters from a purely military angle. I need 
hardly comment on this in so far as Palestine is 
concerned. 24 
This would appear to confirm Alun Chalfont's assessment that 
'The political situation in the Middle East was altogether 
too complex for Montgomery. '25 Such attitudes were scarcely 
confined to Montgomery; they were common to the army as a 
whole. His views are important, however, because as CIGS 
Montgomery was in a position to influence security policy in 
Palestine. He began to play an active role in this regard 
in November 1946, with important consequences. 
The field marshal had dissented on the decision to 
release the detained Jewish leaders and regarded the current 
peacekeeping role as appeasement. In the wake of the 
increasing attacks on the security forces and the railways 
and the police reprisals, the IG of the Palestine Police 
told Montgomery, 'We must beat terrorism or it will beat 
us. '26 Colonel Gray's comment undoubtedly reinforced 
Montgomery's own misgivings about the wisdom of the current 
security policy. On 20 November Montgomery told the COSC 
24 Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 23 Nov. 1946, CO 
537/1731. 
25 Chalfont, p. 334. 
26 'Notes on Relationship Between High Commissioner 
and General Officer Commanding Palestine', Nov. 1946, CO 
537/1731. 
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that in his opinion the policy of appeasement had failed. 
The suspension of searches and release of detained leaders 
had not produced any improvement in the security situation; 
instead, the situation had deteriorated: casualties were 
increasing and the police were still understrength. He 
felt that the government should issue a new directive to the 
High Commissioner to use the forces at his disposal to main- 
tain strict law and order. 
27 He repeated these points in 
the Cabinet Defence Committee meeting that afternoon, add- 
ing that he felt the army had lost the initiative it had 
gained in June and that the defensive attitude had seriously 
increased the strain on morale. The field marshal felt 
that strain had caused the police reprisals and that the 
problem could spread to the army. Pressed by the Prime 
Minister as to what further measures were required, 
Montgomery replied that the army had been prevented from 
searching for arms or from acting on intelligence received 
prior to incidents. The committee asked the Colonial Office 
and the War office to examine the conditions regarding the 
use of the armed forces in Palestine. 
28 
Cunningham rejected Montgomery's allegations and 
asked that the inference be withdrawn. There were, he said, 
no limitations on the use of the armed forces. He explained 
that the operations in June had not gained the initiative 
against the terrorists, nor had that been the intention; 
they had only driven a wedge between the terrorists and the 
Haganah, who were now quiescent. The High Commissioner 
explained that discussion generally resolved most questions 
of civil-military relations where opinions were at variance. 
Neither he nor General Barker could suggest any changes 
in the decision-making process and both agreed that the 
27 COSC minutes, 20 Nov. 1946, FO 371/52565. 
28 CDC minutes, 20 Nov. 1946, FO 371/52565. 
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government should encourage the Jews to deal with the 
insurgent problem themselves while it tried to improve 
police methods. 
29 
At the end of November the CIGS visited the Middle 
East to see the situation for himself. He found an ally in 
General Miles Dempsey, Commander-in-Chief Middle East Land 
Forces, who favoured immediate searches and the imposition 
of fines on communities, where incidents had occurred. 
30 
Cunningham opposed such action which, he felt, amounted to 
reprisals: 
I should say with the examples of Ireland and even the 
Arab rebellion before me, I am dead against reprisals 
as such. The question of the morale of the troops is 
constantly in my mind and is a factor which I am con- 
stantly emphasising to HM Government, but I am sure 
that you will agree that it would not be right to take 
action which would imperil imminent political solution 
to this thorny problem, which alone can bring peace to 
this country, for the sake of the morale factor alone. 31 
As General Barker did not attend the conference, Cunningham 
faced Montgomery and Dempsey alone on these issues. They 
agreed that the most effective counter-insurgency plan would 
be to employ the minimum number of troops on defensive tasks 
and the largest number in a mobile offensive role to seize 
and maintain the initiative. They concluded, however, that 
the restrictions imposed on the army by the existence of an 
armed population, the immense task of guarding the railway 
and the inability to take action except on the receipt of 
intelligence were so great that it was not possible to carry 
29 Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 23 Nov. 1946, CO 537/ 
1731; Barker to author, 30 Aug. 1976. In his letter General 
Barker confirmed that he felt the system of consultation 
worked well. He could not recall any issues that were not 
resolved in this manner. 
30 Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 23 Nov. 1946, CO 537/ 
1731. 
31 Ibid. 
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out the proposed plan. 
32 Privately, however, Cunningham 
dissented from the consensus. He told Creech-Jones that he 
thought the army would not be effective even if it was 
allowed to develop its full power in maintaining law and 
order and would, in any case, antagonize the large pro- 
portion of the population who were otherwise opposed to 
terrorism. At the same time, he believed that 'unleashing' 
the army was still a credible threat. Cunningham warned 
Jewish leaders that only he stood between them and the army 
and that if the violence continued he would stand aside and 
free the army. They replied that the insurgents had agreed 
to a truce during the Zionist congress and the High Commis- 
sioner responded by suspending a proposed series of searches 
which would have been instituted following further inci- 
dents. 33 
Cunningham was correct in his assessment of the 
limitations on the effectiveness of the army. Given the 
poor state of intelligence, there was little more the army 
could do without becoming a political menace; the mobile 
role envisaged by Montgomery would be sufficient to antagon- 
ize the Jewish population but was likely to fall short of 
coercing them into cooperation with the security forces. 
Such a role was, in any case, inappropriate to this largely 
urban conflict. Montgomery did not grasp the essential 
point that numbers, mobility and firepower were not the 
decisive elements in this conflict. The insurgents did not 
operate in large formations; cells of two or three men 
planned and carried out the operations and dealing with 
these was a matter for the police, not the army. The field 
marshal appears, in any case, to have been misinformed with 
32 Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 3 Dec. 1945, CO 537/ 
1731. 
33 Ibid., and Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 6,12 Dec. 
1946, CO 537/1.731. 
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regard to certain factors which influenced his judgement of 
the situation. The police reprisals were the product of a 
combination of factors of which strain was only one element. 
The factors did not pertain to the army and reports from the 
period indicate that, despite poor living conditions and the 
demands of continuous operations, army morale was high. 
34 
He was correct that the army had been prevented from search- 
ing for arms specifically, but Cunningham was not solely 
responsible for this policy: the cabinet had rejected such 
action on the advice of'senior military commanders. 
Cunningham, for his part, may be criticized for' 
undue optimism. A political solution to the Palestine 
problem was by no means imminent in November 1946. And 
while police reform was required, cooperation of the Jewish 
population and official bodies was equally essential and was 
not likely to be forthcoming. Hurewitz states that the 
British offensive in the summer of 1946 had seriously under- 
mined the authority of the Jewish Agency, whose moderate 
leaders could have constrained the insurgents. 
35 
The 
detention of those leaders undoubtedly weakened the Agency's 
ability to control the violence but the Agency probably 
discredited itself by agreeing to renounce terrorism in 
exchange for the detainees without extracting any changes in 
British immigration policy or Palestine policy in general. 
In either case, without a solution or a policy change favour- 
able, to the Jews the police would not receive the cooperation 
from the Jewish public that was vital to defeat terrorism. 
As the Colonial Office and the War Office prepared 
their cases for the prime minister, Cunningham, Barker and 
34 See Chapter IV; see also 2 Inf. Bde., Quarterly 
Historical Report, Dec. 1946, WO 261/192; 2 Para. Bde., 
Quarterly Historical Report, Nov. 1946, WO 261/213. Bethell, 
p. 288 cites evidence to the contrary. 
35 Hurewitz, p. 255. 
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Colonial Office found themselves supporting a minority view- 
point. They stressed that if the government desired a 
political settlement then it must do all in its power to 
strengthen those opposed to terrorism, with whom a settle- 
ment would be negotiated. Hence, military action would 
have to remain restricted to direct attacks on insurgents 
when encountered, immediate searches in the vicinity of 
incidents or preventive action based on sound intelligence 
concerning proposed insurgent operations. 
36 The War Office 
view hardened along Montgomery's lines: 
viewed from a military standpoint the policy of appease- 
ment has failed. The restoration of law and order can 
depend only on the adoption of a consistent and vigorous 
policy in dealing with disturbers of the peace. Such a 
policy is not in force. If we are to prevent the 
present situation in Palestine from getting out of hand, 
strong military preventive action must be taken in 
Palestine at once. 37 
Montgomery believes that the flogging incidents at the end 
of December persuaded the prime minister to concur with him 
when the Cabinet Defence Committee discussed security policy 
on 1 January 1947.38 The results of the meeting appear to 
support Montgomery's claim. Ernest Bevin and Albert 
Alexander, the Minister of Defence, supported a tough policy 
and Montgomery himself challenged Creech-Jones' assertion 
that restraint had produced results. The CIGS said that all 
the information at the army's disposal indicated otherwise. 
The field marshal wanted to flood the country with mobile 
troops to restore confidence in authority and to make things 
difficult for the insurgents. Montgomery won his case; the 
36 CDC Paper 145, 'Use of Armed Forces, Part II: 
Colonial Office View', 19 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1731. 
37 'Use of Armed Forces, Part I: War Office View', 
19 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1731. 
38 Montgomery, p. 469. 
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committee directed Creech-Jones, Alexander, and Cunningham 
to draw up a new directive to the High Commissioner. Since 
it involved a change of policy it would be submitted to the 
cabinet for approval. 
39 Two days later Montgomery, Creech- 
Jones, Cunningham and two Colonial Office officials met to 
draft the directive. The CIGS pressed his case in even 
stronger terms: he advocated 'turning the place upside 
down' to disrupt the population and to persuade them to 
cooperate with the authorities against the insurgents. 
Montgomery welcomed the opportunity to draw the Haganah out 
for a battle, claiming he had succeeded with such measures 
against the Arabs before the war. Enthusiastically he 
offered the whole strength of the British Army, bringing in 
reinforcements from Egypt or Germany. Cunningham feared 
that this would destroy any hope of a political settlement 
and . Creech-Jones observed that war with the Haganah meant war 
with the whole Jewish nation. Montgomery replied that he 
thought the British Government. would have to enforce 
partition against the wishes of the Jews and the Arabs. He 
then asked Cunningham if he was prepared to give the GOC a 
free hand to carry out the new directive. Cunningham 
replied that he was not so prepared, since he had to take 
the political aspect into account. 
40 
In spite of the obvious disagreement the draft 
directive was sent to cabinet, where Creech-Jones did not 
oppose it further. He explained that the army wished to 
have the power to conduct searches anywhere at any time and 
to be free to increase patrols in dangerous areas. 
Montgomery added that recent searches without specific 
39 CDC minutes, 1 Jan. 1947, CO 537/1731; Montgomery 
to Pyman, 2 Jan. 1947, Pyman Diaries, 6/1/2. 
40 'Note of a Conference at the Colonial Office', 
3 Jan. 1947, CO 537/1731. 
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evidence had been very effective. The cabinet approved the 
directive, which instruc. ted the High Commissioner to take 
all possible steps using the security forces at his disposal 
to establish law and order. They were not to conduct 
reprisals, but were to take the offensive and seize the 
initiative. The directive advised the High Commissioner 
that 'Such action as you may take to implement the policy 
outlined ... above will receive the full support of His 
Majesty's Government. ' 41 
This was surely nothing less than a 'blank cheque', 
significant both in its results and in revealing how the 
complex interaction of events, decisions, and personalities 
changed the way in which the British Government directed the 
war. Though not mentioned in the discussions, insurgent 
operations undoubtedly influenced the cabinet's decision: 
three days earlier the Lechi had bombed the Haifa District 
police headquarters, causing considerable loss of life. 
Furthermore, the High Commissioner's decision to remit the 
second caning sentence aroused considerable controversy, 
just as the policy debate reached a climax. In a telegram 
to Dempsey which was later withdrawn because it caused so 
much 'concern in high places', Montgomery said leniency was 
a weak and thoroughly bad policy which could only make things 
worse for the government and the security forces. He told 
Dempsey to take this up with the High Commissioner. 
42 Sir 
Winston Churchill echoed these sentiments in the House of 
Commons debate on Palestine at the end of January: 
of 
41 CM, 6,15 Jan. 1947, CAB 128/9; CP 3, 'Memorandum 
by Secretary of States for the Colonies: Use of Armed 
Forces', 7 Jan. 1947, CAB 129/16. Montgomery claims that 
Creech-Jones asked him to draft the new directive. The docu- 
ments make no mention of this but the directive bears the 
unmistakable stamp of Montgomery's thinking. See Montgomery, 
p. 469. 
42 Montgomery to Dempsey, 16 Jan. 1947, Pyman 
Diaries, 6/1/2; Montgomery, p. 470. 
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You may remit a sentence of caning because you do not 
like that form of punishment, you may remit it because 
you have a tender heart, you may remit it because some 
new circumstance has arisen since the magistrate or 
tribunal gave the decisions, but you do not remit it 
because a British major ... and three sergeants are 
caught and subjected to that punishment, and because 
you are afraid it may happen to some more. ... This is the road of abject defeat. 43 
The policy debate also reflected personalities. Montgomery 
and Cunningham were at odds. Cunningham appeared to be 
indecisive, while the field marshal's views conveyed the 
impression of strength. Major-General Pyman, Dempsey's 
Chief of Staff, felt that there would not be a more robust 
and enlightened policy until Cunningham was replaced. He 
reminded a colleague that the High Commissioner's wartime 
record suggested a lack of resolve: 'You will remember that 
he gave in at Sidi Rezehg in December 1941 forty eight hours 
too soon'. 
44 Montgomery was justified in criticizing 
Cunningham for rescinding the caning sentence under duress, 
but at least the High Commissioner appreciated the political 
dimension of the conflict; the field marshal did not. In a 
message to Pyman the CIGS stated that once started the new 
policy would have to be carried through 'firmly and relent- 
lessly and despite world opinion or Jewish reaction in 
America'. 45 This appears to confirm Cunningham's recol- 
lection years later: 
Lord Montgomery ... deals only with the military side 
of the problem. I had to deal with it from all angles. 
From this wider point of view it seemed and seems to me 
that the main effect of Lord Montgomery's intervention 
was to bedevil it still further. ... What he forgets is that there was a civil government in being, and that 
43 
Churchill, Complete Speeches, VII, 7422. 
44 Pyman to Hobart, Jan. undated, Pyman Diaries, 
6/1/2. 
45 Montgomery to Pyman, 2 Jan. 1947, Pyman Diaries, 
6/l/2. 
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the military means had to be dovetailed into political 
requirements. 46 
Montgomery was a professional soldier and it is hard to 
fault the field marshal for trying to cope with the problem 
in the only way his profession had shown him. Yet even his 
military judgements were misguided or, at the very least, 
ill-advised. There was nothing to be gained by. doing battle 
with the inactive Haganah when the Irgun and the Lechi were 
carrying out the attacks. Contrary to his understanding, 
the successful searches in January 1947 had been based on 
accurate intelligence. 
47 
The cabinet's approval of the new directive to the 
High Commissioner indicates that one result of the 
insurgency process was that Cunningham and Barker found 
themselves overruled in or excluded from operational policy- 
making, which occurred now at a higher level. The distance, 
both physical and intellectual, that separated the cabinet 
from the situation on the ground in Palestine enhanced 
existing misconceptions about the object of security force 
operations. Montgomery correctly grasped that the 'militar- 
ized' political situation would be resolved*by force, not 
negotiation. What he, and perhaps some of his cabinet col- 
leagues, did not comprehend fully were the limits that 
policy imposed on the use of force. By the end of February 
1947 the government had decided to turn over to the United 
Nations the responsibility for resolving the Palestine 
problem. In circumstances where Britain had all but abdi- 
cated political responsibility for the final outcome, the 
security forces had but two options: first, they could take 
punitive action against the Jewish community as a whole to 
coerce them into cooperation with the police; or secondly, 
46 General Sir Alan Cunningham, 'Policy in Palestine: 
An Answer to Montgomery's Criticisms', Daily Telegraph, 9 
Dec. 1958. 
47 See Chapter VI. 
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the security forces could attempt to combat the insurgents 
without the assistance of the public. Both options 
involved political risks: if these measures failed to 
restore order the insurgents would have demonstrated con- 
clusively Britain's inability to govern Palestine; in the 
absence of a political settlement all that would remain was 
the prospect of a progressively deteriorating security 
situation. 
Security force commanders went into the 1947 offen- 
sive with some misgivings. Martial law could not be imposed 
on Haifa because of the need to keep the port, refineries 
and British businesses functioning. The plan for Jerusalem 
was regarded as an unsatisfactory last resort. 
48 General 
Dempsey insisted that martial law be imposed for as long as 
was necessary to produce satisfactory results in terms of 
arrests, with or without the assistance of the public. He 
regarded a fortnight as the absolute minimum because 
The employment of the Army on such a scale as this is a 
serious and weighty matter and has been put into effect 
only after the most careful thought and preparation. 
To call off the present operations too soon would make 
it appear that we regarded the recent outrages and our 
consequent action as comparatively trivial matters and 
it would in my view be a very grave mistake. 49 
Even Montgomery, whose insistence on tough measures had 
induced the new offensive, expressed doubts about the ability 
of the security forces to restore the situation. In a 
message to Dempsey he reflected: 'It is useless for us to 
go into back History and to say that if only we had tackled 
the problem initially with proper will power and determin- 
ation we would never have got to the present situation. All 
this is of course very true. The point now is whether we 
48 Minutes of Security Conference, 23 Feb. 1947, 
Cunningham Papers. 
49 Dempsey to MacMillan, 3 Mar. 1947, Pyman Diaries, 
6/1/4. 
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can handle the business. '50 He concluded that the security 
forces could deal with the situation provided that the 
politicians permitted them to do so and there were suf- 
ficient troops for the task. 
In the event, he was correct. Coercion produced a 
degree of cooperation from the population and, as noted 
earlier, the arrests that ensued reduced sharply the level 
of violence during the next quarter of 1947.51 But it 
would be three months before this was obvious and the 
cabinet, concerned with immediate results, was not impressed. 
General Gale had stated at the outset that martial law would 
continue until terrorism was 'eradicated'. 
52 Not only had 
terrorism continued within and outside the controlled areas, 
martial law had proven as damaging economically to the 
administration as to the'Jewish community. Moreover, the 
cabinet believed that lifting martial law after such a short 
period conveyed an impression of weakness which would 
encourage only further resistance. The apparently incon- 
clusive results led the cabinet to conclude that extending 
martial law over the whole country would not be effective. 
The High Commissioner opposed it because the army had 
advised him that imposing martial law throughout the country 
would have no extra effect against the insurgents and, in 
any case, there were insufficient troops to do so. 
Cunningham added pointedly that the army could not be 
expected to secure the whole country when it could not 
defend even itself from attack. Moreover, both he and the 
Colonial Secretary believed that the experience of martial 
law had demonstrated that the Palestine Government could not 
afford the economic hardship ensuing from a country-wide 
50 Montgomery to Dempsey, 4 Mar. 1947; Pyman Diaries, 
6/1/4. 
51 See Chapter VI. 
52 Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, 3 Mar. 1947. 
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withdrawal of services. 
53 The Chiefs of Staff concurred. 
They felt that the security forces could not govern the 
country and continue internal security operations as well. 
Their report recommended, first, that civil government con- 
tinue, making wide use of the High Commissioner's powers 
under the emergency regulations. Secondly, the security 
forces should intensify pressure against the insurgents by 
the usual methods. Third, the government could re-impose 
martial law for limited periods when and where necessary 
and, finally, summary military courts should be established 
with the power to impose the death penalty for specific 
offences. The cabinet approved the report subject to further 
consideration of the recommendation concerning military 
courts. 
54 
While the cabinet debated the merits of martial law 
the security forces attempted to combat the insurgents with 
their own methods. M. R. D. Foot defines special operations 
as 'unorthodox coups, ... unexpected strokes of violence, 
usually mounted and executed outside the military establish- 
ment of the day, which exercise a startling effect on the 
enemy; preferably at the highest level'. 
55 The operations 
of the special squads went some way towards achieving that 
53 Gale. to MacMillan, 13 Mar. 1947, cited in 1 Inf. 
Div., 'Report on Operation ELEPHANT', pp. 9-10, Moore Papers; 
Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 14,16 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2299; 
Minutes of Security Conference, 17 Mar. 1947, Cunningham 
Papers; CP 95, 'Memorandum by Secretary of State for the 
Colonies: Palestine--Use of Armed Forces', 19 Mar. 1947, 
CAB 129/17; CM, 20,27 Mar. 1947, CAB 128/9. 
54 CP 107, 'Report by Chiefs of Staff: Palestine-- 
Imposition of Martial Law', 26 Mar. 1947, CAB 129/18; CM, 
27 Mar. 1947, CAB 128/9. The government gazetted a new 
emergency regulation which precluded appeal or calling into 
question of any judgement, decision, order, sentence or 
direction of a military court. 
55 Foot, 'Special Operations, Part I', p. 19. 
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objective, but the scheme was flawed in many respects and 
it is doubtful whether the squads could have achieved more 
under the circumstances. First, the squads became a 
'private army'. While they worked ostensibly under the 
direction of the DSP they were answerable only to Colonel 
Fergusson, who in turn reported directly to the IG, Colonel 
Gray. They thus bypassed completely the normal police chain 
of command. Secondly, placed outside the normal command 
structure the squads never became fully integrated with the 
CID Political Branch, for whom covert anti-terrorist oper- 
ations were routine. While close cooperation existed at 
lower levels some senior police officers did not approve of 
or support the scheme. Furthermore, rather than exploit 
the talent available in the CID, Colonel Fergusson turned 
to the army for leaders with wartime experience of special 
operations. The squads, although recruited from the ranks 
of the police force, consisted largely of ex-servicemen 
rather than experienced police intelligence officers. 
56 
Third, from the beginning the squads laboured under 
grave limitations. They had trained together for only a 
fortnight in a rural setting despite the fact that the 
cities were to be their theatre of operations. Special 
operations rely on secrecy for effect but by Farran's own 
account the activities of the squads were anything but 
secret. 
57 Finally and most important, the tactical 
56 Bernard Fergusson, 'Memorandum to Palestine 
Secretary, Colonial Office: Secondment of Army officers to 
Palestine Police', 12 Feb. 1947, CO 537/2270; Fergusson, 
pp. 210-1,225-6; Farran, p. 248; Lord Ballantrae (Bernard 
Fergusson) to author, 20 July 1978; The Hon. Roy Farran to 
author, 17 Aug. 1978. Farran's squad included five SAS 
veterans who had served with him during the war, an 
ex-cavalry sergeant, two commandos, and an Irish-American 
fighter pilot. The AIG/CID and the DIG Police were opposed 
to the scheme. 
57 Farran, pp. 348-9,351,375,377,380-1; 
Fergusson, pp. 225-6. 
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objectives of the squads were never clear. In theory, such 
units can be used to gather intelligence covertly for the 
CID. Alternatively, the squads could exploit CID intelli- 
gence to capture or kill the insurgents themselves. Colonel 
Fergusson clearly favoured the latter role since the squads 
did not consist of trained detectives and none of the men 
had more than a cursory comprehension of Hebrew. Thus, 
their value as intelligence gathering units was limited. 
58 
However, if the squads were to operate in the anti-terrorist 
role they required good intelligence and their operational 
guidelines would have to be specific and in accordance with 
the law; as soldiers and policemen they were bound by regu- 
lations which were very clear on their powers of arrest and 
the circumstances under which they could open fire. But, 
accurate intelligence was scarce and there was no clear 
directive to specify how the squads were to be employed. in 
his memoirs Fergusson noted that they were 'not to terrorize 
or repay in kind, but to anticipate and to give would-be 
raiders a bloody nose as they came in to raid'. 
59 Farran, 
on the other hand, maintains that they were given full dis- 
cretion to operate as they pleased within their area: to 
advise on defence against terrorism and to take an active 
part in hunting the insurgents. Farran considered this 'a 
carte blanche ... a free hand for us against terror when 
all others were so closely hobbled'. 
60 When the case became 
public, however, the Chief Secretary insisted that "No 
authority has ever been given for the use by any member of 
the police force of other than ordinary police methods in 
58 Fergusson, 'Memorandum to Palestine Secretary', 
CO 537/2270; Fergusson, pp. 225-6. 
59 
Fergusson, p. 210. 
60 Farran, p. 348. 
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dealing with apprehended persons'. 
61 
The obvious discrepancies suggest that the guide- 
lines were less than clear in some crucial aspects. In any 
case, the use of special operations was out of step with 
the strategic objectives of the internal security campaign. 
Even in the offensive phase a mandate to restore law and 
order precluded the employment of disruptive tactics of 
dubious legality. There was, furthermore, a lack of 
political judgement: the security forces were operating in 
a political vacuum while the United Nations considered the 
Palestine problem. It was hardly the most auspicious moment 
to commence special operations. It would be easy to fault 
the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office for approving 
the special operations scheme under conditions which appear, 
in retrospect, most inappropriate. But the cabinet's 'blank 
cheque' and the constant pressure from Montgomery to intens- 
ify operations against the insurgents place the approval of 
the plan in perspective. They might be-criticized, however, 
for failing to extract from Colonel Fergusson a clear idea 
of how he intended to use the squads. 
The blame, in any case, does not lie entirely with 
the government. The scheme and the results which ensued 
were direct products of the militarization of the police. 
The men who made the decisions and set the events in train 
were soldiers and their lack of experience in police matters 
led them to turn a police role into a military one. They 
excluded the CID from a task for which it was trained and 
experienced; it became the servant of the squads rather than 
the master. Furthermore, Fergusson's and Farran's wartime 
experience caused them to think of Palestine and thereby to 
devise their operations as if they were in occupied Europe. 
But the analogy was incorrect because the security forces 
61 
Gurney to Creech-Jones, 25 June 1947, Cunningham 
Papers, II/1. 
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were the occupation force and the insurgents were the resis- 
tance movement. 
Conducted in a poor intelligence environment without 
strategic purpose or clear tactical objectives, the oper- 
ations could be expected to achieve only minor success at 
best. There was no reason to expect that the squads would 
be effective by covert means when the overt system of 
internal security had already broken down. The insurgents 
were quick to exploit for propaganda purposes any British 
excess, while the British Government was demonstrably unable 
to counter insurgent propaganda. It was a high risk situ- 
ation for a democracy striving to achieve impartiality and 
international recognition of its efforts. The decision- 
makers obviously failed to assess the potential liabilities 
of the operations if they were exposed. in failing to do so 
they left themselves open to a situation in which the nature 
of the operations provided the insurgents with specific 
ammunition with which to discredit the mandatory power. 
When this occurred the special operations exercised a 
startling effect--at the highest levels of the British 
Government * 
62 
In the aftermath of Operation TIGER and the hanging 
of the two sergeants, debate resumed on the efficacy of 
martial law. However, a whole new set of considerations 
confronted the cabinet. First, Arab-Jewish communal violence 
had erupted recently on a large scale. Early in August 1947 
Cunningham advised Creech-Jones that 'I cannot guarantee 
that the situation will not deteriorate to such a degree 
that the Civil Government will not break down and as you 
know it is by no means clear how much longer I can keep the 
Civil Service working under conditions such as exist at 
62 
Creech-Jones to Cunningham, 18-19 June 1947, 
Cunningham Papers, II/1; see also Chapter VII. 
204- 
present. '63 Secondly, Britain was in the midst of an 
economic crisis and on 30 July the government ordered an 
increase in the rate of demobilization. 
64 
Third, when India 
and Pakistan became independent on 15 August much of the 
justification for Britain's Middle East strategy simply 
evaporated. At the same time the United Nations Security 
Council upheld continuation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. 
British troops would be able to remain in the canal zone, 
and in September the British Government announced that the 
major supply base for the region would be transferred to 
Kenya. 65 Against this background the politicians and mili- 
tary commanders considered the options remaining for 
Palestine. On 3 August General Sir John Crocker, C in C 
Middle East Land Forces, advised the War Office that the 
troops in Palestine were sufficient to impose martial law on 
only one area at a time and that even if the situation 
demanded more, the application of martial law over the whole 
country would delay planned deployments; it was therefore to 
be avoided. Nonetheless, he argued forcefully against any 
further reductions in troop strength, otherwise it would 
become difficult to fulfil even limited obligations in 
Palestine, quite apart from any other commitments in the 
Middle East. With the support of the Cabinet Defence Com- 
mittee Montgomery hastened to assure Crocker that his forces 
would not be reduced further. 
66 At the same time Cunningham 
sent an equally gloomy assessment to Creech-Jones. He 
explained that while martial law was the only remaining 
63 Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 7 Aug. 1947, CO 537/ 
2299. 
64 Rosecrance, p. 63. 
65 Ibid., Darby, pp. 10,37; Kirk, p. 8. 
66 Crocker to Simpson, 3 Aug. 1947, Simpson to 
Crocker, 4 Aug. 1947, Pyman Diaries, 6/1/8. 
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option, it would not stop terrorism and would place a strain 
on the army without improving its ability to deal with the 
situation. Nonetheless, he would hold it in readiness; 
Creech-Jones endorsed his views. 
67 
The government in London, 
however, was also disillusioned with the results of martial 
law. One senior Colonial Office official pointed out that 
Cunningham's views on martial law were contradictory and 
that in any case it would damage the administration and 
British prestige. 
68 
Following a conference with the GOC Palestine, 
General MacMillan, on 7 August Crocker informed Cunningham 
that in view of potential difficulties in Egypt (related to 
the decision to remain in the canal zone) there would be no 
reinforcements available for Palestine. 
69 On 30 August the 
British Government announced further reductions in the size 
of the armed forces, accompanied by reduced defence spending. 
By early September the War Office and the Colonial Office 
had agreed that it would not be possible to impose martial 
law on Palestine as a whole. 
70 
The implications of these 
arguments could scarcely be lost upon the government: even 
without attempting to enforce a solution the security forces 
were insufficient and were incapable of maintaining order. 
Owing to force reductions and commitments elsewhere they 
could not be reinforced. Finally, Palestine was no longer 
essential as a base area. Under such circumstances the 
British had no viable option but to withdraw. The Minister 
67 Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 4 Aug. 1947, Creech- 
Jones to Cunningham, 5 Aug. 1947, CO 537/2299. 
68 Trafford-Smith to Lloyd, 12 Aug. 1947, CO 537/ 
2299. 
69 'Conference no. 2: Palestine, and Discussion 
with General MacMillan', 7 Aug. 1947, and Crocker to 
Cunningham, 13 Aug. 1947, Pyman Diaries, 6/1/8. 
70 Charteris to Mathieson, 10 Sept. 1947, CO 537/ 
2299; Rosecrance, p. 63. 
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of Defence advised the cabinet that, even in the absence of 
an Arab-Jewish agreement, there were sufficient forces to 
maintain order during an immediate withdrawal. 
71 
The struggle between the British security forces and 
the Jewish insurgents reached its 'culminating point' in 
September 1947; the British conceded defeat. The difficulty 
in determining the reasons for this defeat is related both 
to understanding the nature of the war and the perspective 
from which the war is seen and examined. This is true not 
only for the participants in the conflict, but for those who 
attempt to analyse it after the fighting has ceased. The 
conflict in Palestine is a case in point: there is a 
general consensus among historians that insurgent terrorism 
played a role in persuading the British Government to 
relinquish the Palestine Mandate. There is less agreement 
on the significance of the insurgent role. Apologists for 
the Haganah insist that that the Irgun and the Lechi did not 
make a decisive contribution to the independence struggle. 
72 
Others, like Begin himself and some historians, attribute 
the British withdrawal solely to the actions of the insur- 
gents: J. Bowyer Bell, for example, describes the hanging 
of the two sergeants as 'the straw that broke the Mandate's 
back'. 73 
Both viewpoints are simplistic at best. Most 
serious scholars have concluded that even such dramatic 
events must be measured against the political and economic 
conditions surrounding Britain's involvement in the Mandate 
71 CM, 20 Sept. 1947, CAB 128/10. 
72 Allon, Making of Israel's Army, p. 29; Laqueur, 
p. 118. 
73 Begin, p. 329; Blaxland, p. 47; Marlowe, Seat of 
Pilate, p. 228; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 238. 
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at that time. 
74 
At a cursory glance the evidence presented 
in this thesis appears to support the view that the 
insurgents' strategy of leverage succeeded largely because 
of factors over which the insurgents had no control: the 
economic crisis in Britain and the changes in Middle East 
strategy which flowed from the independence of India. Yet 
this interpretation remains incomplete. For every vic- 
torious army there is a vanquished one. Even the serious 
scholars have failed to address in a critical way a central 
question raised by the conflict: why did the security 
forces fail to defeat the insurgents? The answer is, 
admittedly, complex. ' 
First, no military campaign, conventional or other- 
wise, will succeed unless guided by an overall strategy; 
the British Government and its security forces did not have 
a strategy for the Palestine conflict. The dual obligation 
imposed upon Britain by the Mandate precluded the formu- 
lation of a policy acceptable to both Arabs and Jews and 
consistent with Britain's perceived strategic interests in 
the Middle East. Britain's refusal to make concessions to 
the Jews that were unacceptable to the Arabs strengthened 
the hand of the Jewish insurgents; in the militarized 
political situation that ensued a negotiated settlement 
became impossible. Unwilling to impose a solution by 
force, embarrassed by the violence and plagued by economic 
crisis, the British Government sought an honourable exit 
from the Mandate. 
Security policy, however, did not reflect this 
political objective. Initially the security forces were 
to 'keep the peace' until the government had drafted its 
Palestine policy. But from June 1946 the government 
74 Hurewitz, p. 282; Bethell, pp. 358,360. Even 
Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 240, suggests in a muddled way 
that economic factors were an important consideration. 
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directed the security forces to defeat the insurgents, 
ostensibly to produce the political conditions conducive 
to the implementation of a solution. In the absence of 
a policy which would satisfy even the moderates in the 
Zionist movement the directive was ill-timed at best, 
irresponsible at worst. It demonstrates, moreover, another 
reason why there was no strategy: neither the political 
leaders nor the army understood the nature of the conflict 
in which they were involved, the former because of their 
distance from the war and their concentration solely on 
the political issues; the latter because their professional 
ethic, traditions, training and experience prevented com- 
prehension of the political nature of the war. Both the 
government and the army saw the two components of the 
struggle--politics and security--as separate entities, not 
as two battles mutually inderdependent, to be fought simul- 
taneously and in coordination. Each saw the conflict from 
his own perspective and acted as though the other dimension 
did not exist. Instead of supporting each other the 
political and military dimensions conflicted, making both 
tasks more difficult. Furthermore, neither the government 
nor the security forces recognized the need for the third-- 
psychological--component. The failure to understand the 
nature of the war left the political and psychological 
initiative entirely in the hands of the insurgents. Conse- 
quently, the government and the security forces lost the 
strategic battle virtually by default. This strategic 
failure, as much as the economic crisis and the skill of 
the insurgents, made the insurgent victory possible. 
Secondly, good intelligence is a prerequisite for 
successful military or security operations. For several 
reasons the security forces in Palestine operated without 
sufficient accurate intelligence. The army's internal 
security doctrine left to the police the task of gathering 
intelligence. But the Palestine Police were isolated from 
to l 
their principal source of information--the Jewish commun- 
ity--by linguistic barriers, widespread non-cooperation and 
effective insurgent propaganda and security. The army never 
became involved in the intelligence-gathering process to an 
extent sufficient to compensate for the weakness in police 
capabilities. Unable either to prevent attacks on them- 
selves or to penetrate and disrupt the insurgent organiz- 
ations, the security forces tended to become defensive, 
leaving the operational initiative in the hands of the 
insurgents. When the politicians insisted upon large-scale 
operations and approved special operations the dearth of 
intelligence ensured that they did not stop terrorism. The 
meagre results and the inevitable errors and excesses that 
ensued convinced the British Government that it could not 
govern Palestine by normal and moral means; since other 
means were neither possible nor appropriate abdication was 
the only alternative. Weakness in the intelligence field, 
therefore, ensured British defeat in the tactical battle for 
control of Palestine. Again, the success of the insurgents 
must be measured against security force shortcomings over 
which the insurgents had only partial'influence. 
Moving from the specific to the general, the 
Palestine case suggests some general propositions of 
counter-insurgency. First, the government and the security 
forces must coordinate their actions in order to achieve 
agreed political and security objectives. But this 
requires, in turn, that both elements of the incumbent 
regime understand that the nature of insurgency demands the 
integration of political and military means. Although this 
might require a major change in the way in which politicians 
and soldiers view the insurgent problem, the experience of 
Malaya and some campaigns since suggests that it is 
possible. Secondly, an honest and efficient police force 
is the government's most important tactical weapon. Well- 
trained, adequately protected and used with discrimination, 
to 
it is the sole means by which the government can enforce 
rule of law using minimum force. However, it is worth 
introducing a note of caution. T. E. Lawrence wrote in 
1920 that 'Rebellions can be made by two per cent active in 
a striking force and 98 per cent passively sympathetic. ' 
75 
The Palestine case supports this assertion. Where the 
insurgents have that degree of support from the population 
even an effective police force will have grave difficulties 
in gathering intelligence. Under such circumstances the 
government has lost the war even before the fighting has 
begun. 
75 Lawrence, 'Evolution of a Revolt', p. 160. 
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APPENDIX I 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF PALESTINE 
Figure 1. The Organization of Civil Government* 
High Commissioner 
Executive 1 Council1 
I 
Advisory Council2 
1 -1 
Secretariat3 District Administration4 
Notes: 1. The principal legislative body, consisting of: 
the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary, the 
Attorney-General, and the Financial Secretary. 
2. The legislative review body, consisting of: the 
Executive Council, the heads of some government 
departments, and the District Commissioners. 
3. The government departments and the civil service, 
under the direction of the Chief Secretary. 
4. The executive authority in six districts, 16 
sub-districts and 24 municipalities. District 
Commissioners, Assistant District Commissioners, 
and District Officers coordinate the activities 
and functions of civil government 
*Source: Government of Palestine, Survey, I, pp. 
1,3-10,17,108-13; HC[5479], 159, BPP (1937). 
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Figure 2. The Public Information office* 
Secretariat 
f Public Information Officer 
Deputy PlO 
Section I 
E Assistant Accountant 
Technical Services 
Rural Relations 
Haifa office 
Press Section 
Special Advisor 
Section II 
c Lydda District 
Accountant 
Publications and Distribution 
Subordinate Staff (all sections) 
Note: British Assistant PIO's directed the Press Section, 
Lydda District, and Publications and Distribution. 
Palestinians ran Technical Services and Rural 
Relations. 
*Source: Ryan to Middle East Division, Ministry of 
Information, 13 Aug. 1945, INF 1/430; see also Chapter VII. 
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APPENDIX II 
THE DEFENCE (EMERGENCY) REGULATIONS, 1945* 
Note: This is only a partial list, but it describes clearly 
the powers at the disposal of the security forces. 
Military Court Offences: (offences tried only before mili- 
tary courts) 
Regulation 58(1) - discharging firearms, throwing or 
depositing bombs or grenades, unlawfully 
carrying firearms, ammunition, or 
explosives. The death penalty may be 
awarded only for offences under this 
regulation. 
59(1) - unlawful possession of any firearm, bomb, 
or explosive. 
61 - unlawfully wearing the uniform of H. M. 
Forces, Police, or Arab Legion, or dress 
or equipment likely to be mistaken for 
the above. 
63 - training or drilling of persons, receiv- 
ing or being present at such training or 
drilling. 
64 - sabotage, of any means of transport or 
communications. 
Powers of Any Member of H. M. Forces: 
Regulation 72(1) - to arrest without warrant any person com- 
mitting or reasonably suspected of having 
committed an offence against the Defence 
(Emergency) Regulations. 
74 - to seize, or detain, any goods or things 
in relation to an offence. 
*Source: HQ Palestine, '0I no. 21', 27 Oct. 1945, 
WO 169/19745; HQ 21 Area, '0I no. 21', 21 Nov. 1945, WO 169/ 
19821. 
.. ) 
75 - to enter or board and search any premises, 
place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft 
reasonably suspected of being or having 
been used for any purpose prejudicial to 
the public safety. 
76 - to detain and search any person suspected 
of using or carrying any article liable 
to seizure under Regulation 74 above. 
132(1) - to arrest and detain pending enquiries 
any person suspected of. having acted or 
being about to act in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety, pro- 
vided that person has failed to satisfy 
him as to his identity or as to his pur- 
pose in the place where he is found. 
Offences under Regulation 72(1): 
Regulation 85 - being a member of, or having association 
with, an unlawful association. N. B. 
"An unlawful association is a body of 
persons which encourages the overthrow 
of the Government of Palestine and per- 
forms acts of terrorism; destruction of 
Government property and inciting dis- 
affection against H. M. Government. The 
specific offences include--attending or 
permitting a meeting, having documents of 
the association, and collecting or demand- 
ing donations on behalf of the associ- 
ation. " 
96 - publishing any notice, proclamation, etc., 
without a permit from the District Com- 
missioner. 
105 - illegal immigration. 
109 - disobedience of a restriction order made 
by a Military Commander. 
130 - contravening the High Commissioner's 
orders concerning restricted use of tele- 
phones. 
134 - performing any acts falsely suggesting 
that he or any other person is acting in 
service of H. M. Government, the Police, 
or undertaking the performance of 
essential services. 
136 - illegal possession of information in 
respect of armaments, or dispositions of 
H. M. Forces. 
v: 
139 - injury, etc. to public buildings, com- 
munications, or essential public supply 
services. 
140 - obstruction of any member of H. M. Forces 
or Police officer in the course of 
duties. 
142 - endeavouring to influence public opinion 
in a manner likely to be prejudicial to 
public safety. 
144 - failure to furnish or produce information 
or articles in possession on direction 
by the District Commissioner or Military 
Commander. 
Powers of Military Commanders: 
Regulation 109(1) - to prohibit any person from being in any 
specified area in Palestine; to require 
any person to notify the Military Com- 
mander of his movements; to prohibit or 
restrict possession of any specified 
articles by any person; to impose 
restrictions on any person regarding 
his employment, business association, 
communications with other persons, and 
on his activities in relation to dis- 
semination of news or propaganda. 
110(1) - to place any person under police super- 
vision for up to one year. 
111(1) - to detain without trial any person for 
up to one year. 
115(2) - to requisition, or to continue 
requisition of any chattel. 
116(2) - to prohibit or restrict specified works 
on any land. 
119(1) - to order forfeiture or demolition of any 
house, structure, or land from which it 
is suspected firearms have been dis- 
charged, bombs thrown, or have been 
party to any offence against the Defence 
(Emergency) Regulations. 
121 - to billet the police on inhabitants of 
any area who have failed to render all 
reasonable assistance to the Forces or 
Police in securing public safety. 
2IG 
122(1) - to prohibit, restrict, or regulate the 
use of roads; to require persons-owning 
or having control of vehicles to use 
the vehicle for conveyance of any 
specified goods to and from any speci- 
fied place; to prohibit persons or any 
class of persons from travel in any form 
of transport. 
124 - to impose a curfew. 
125 - to declare any area or place to be a 
closed area. 
129(1) - to order the opening or closing of shops 
and business premises. 
137(1) - to prohibit, restrict, and regulate the 
buying and selling of firearms, ammu- 
nition, and explosives; to direct all 
persons having firearms, etc., to keep 
them in an approved place; to cancel, or 
suspend any licence to carry a firearm. 
(3) - to grant to any person a licence to 
carry a firearm. 
144(1) - to direct any person to furnish or pro- 
duce any information or article in 
their possession. 
Powers of District Commissioners: 
Regulation 94(2) - to prohibit publication of a newspaper. 
96(1) - to permit or prohibit publication of any 
notice, proclamation, etc. 
114(1) - to take possession or retain possession 
of any land previously taken under 
Regulation 48 of the Defence Regulations, 
1939. 
Note: The District Commissioner has the same power as the 
Military Commander under Regulations 115(2) and 
144(1). 
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APPENDIX III 
THE PALESTINE POLICE FORCE 
Figure 1. The Organization of the Palestine Police* 
Inspector-General 
Personal Assistant 
Deputy IG. 
f 
AIG (Administration) AIG (CID) AIG (PMF) 
Transport District Forces 
Signals 
Stores 
Traffic 
Quartermaster 
Auxiliaries 
Force Welfare 
Personnel 
Paymaster 
Discipline 
Railway Division 
Marine Division 
*Source: 1 Armd. Div., 'Appendix A to IS 
Instruction no. 4', 6 June 1947, WO 261/178. 
Il? 
Figure 2. The Criminal Investigation Department* 
Assistant Inspector-General (CID) 
Administration and Public 
Relations 
Criminal Investigation Frontier 
Staff 
Narcotics 
Forensic Laboratory 
Records 
Control Politicäl Branch 
Records 
Jewish'Affairs Arab'Affairs 
k- 
f ---1 
Political Terrorism Illegal 
Intelligence Immigration 
European Affairs 
Communism 
Miscellaneous 
*Source: John Briance, interview with author, 
3 Mar. 1977. 
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APPENDIX IV 
THE BRITISH ARMY IN PALESTINE 
Figure 1. Forces Deployed with Effect from 1 Nov. 1945* 
North Sector: 1st Infantry Division, consisting: 
three infantry brigades of three 
battalions; 
two armoured regiments; 
five artillery regiments; 
five infantry battalions under command; 
Cavalry Regiment, Trans-Jordan Frontier 
Force; 
Mechanized Regiment, Arab Legion; 
divisional troops. 
East Sector: 185th Infantry Brigade, consisting: 
three infantry battalions and one 
independent company. 
South Sector: 6th Airborne Division, consisting: 
two parachute and one airlanding 
Brigades of three battalions; 
two armoured regiments; 
three artillery regiments; 
three infantry battalions under command; 
divisional troops. 
Source: WO 169/19656,19685,19697,19699,19701, 
19703,19705,19706,19717. 
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Figure 2. Forces Deployed with Effect from 6 Aug. 1947* 
North Sector: 6th Airborne Division, consisting: 
two parachute brigades of three 
battalions; 
two armoured regiments; 
two artillery regiments; 
divisional troops. 
Central sector: ist Infantry Division, consisting: 
two infantry brigades of three 
battalions; 
two armoured regiments; 
three artillery regiments; 
four infantry battalions under command; 
divisional troops. 
South Sector: 1st Armoured Division, consisting: 
one armoured brigade of four armoured 
regiments and'one infantry battalion; 
one infantry brigade of three 
battalions and one armoured regiment; 
five artillery regiments; 
divisional troops. 
Jerusalem: 8th Infantry Brigade, consisting: 
three infantry battalions. 
*Source: 'Appreciation by GOC Palestine', 5 Aug. 
1947, MacMillan Papers. 
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APPENDIX V 
INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS 
Figure 1. The Haganah* 
Jewish Agency 
Executive ' 
Security 
Committee 
National 
Command 
I 
General Staff Illegal immigration 
Propaganda Field, Force Palmach Intelligence 
Mobile Units Arms 
Acquisition 
Guard Force 
*Source: HHC [6873] , 2, BPP (1946) ; Bauer, 'Rommel's 
Threat of Invasion', pp. 225-6. 
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Date 
1945 
31 Oct. 
? Nov. 
23 Nov. 
25 Nov. 
1 Dec. 
17 Dec. 
27 Dec. 
APPENDIX VI 
INSURGENT OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE* 
Location Details 
across widespread damage to railway; some 
Palestine damage to oil refineries; two 
police launches damaged, one sunk; 
13 casualties to security forces, 
railway staff (Haganah, Palmach, 
Irgun, Lechi). 
Haifa theft of five tons of nitrate from 
chemical firm (Irgun). 
Ras El Ain major theft of arms from RAF camp. 
Givat Olga attack on coastguard station; four 
policemen wounded (Haganah). 
Sidna Ali attack on police post; 10 policemen 
wounded (Haganah). 
Tel Aviv textile robbery. 
Tel Aviv abortive diamond robbery. 
Jerusalem CID HQ badly damaged by bomb; 22 
security forces casualties (Irgun 
and Lechi). 
Jaffa CID HQ partially destroyed (Irgun 
and Lechi). 
Tel Aviv abortive arms theft at army work- 
shops; one insurgent killed. 
*Source: CO 537/2281; 
52565-6; WO 261/171,181; 'Jewish 
His Excellencies Arrival'in Pales- 
Papers, V/4; 1 Inf. Div., 'Report 
Moore Papers. 
Note: Unless otherwise specified 
out by Irgun and/or Lechi. 
CO 733/456; FO 371/52563, 
Terrorist Outrages Since 
tine', 1947, Cunningham 
on Operation ELEPHANT', 
operations were carried 
ýr 
ýý 
7y 
M 
Date Location Details 
1946 
12 Jan. Hadera 535,000 stolen from derailed train. 
14 Jan. Haifa robbery of chemical firm. 
19 Jan. Jerusalem abortive attack on prison and 
broadcasting studios; electric sub- 
station damaged; seven insurgent, 
six security force casualties 
(Irgun). 
21 Jan. Givat Olga coastguard station destroyed, 17 
soldiers wounded (Haganah). 
Mount Carmel abortive attempt to blow up radar 
station (Haganah). 
25 Jan. Tel Aviv theft of £6,000 worth of yarn. 
29 Jan. Aqir abortive theft of arms from RAF 
station (Irgun). 
3 Feb. Tel Aviv theft of small quantity of arms 
from RAF medical unit (Irgun). 
5 Feb. Safad abortive attempt to rescue 
prisoners; one policeman wounded 
(Palmach). 
6 Feb. Agrobank theft of arms and vehicle from army 
camp; three security force casu- 
alties (Lechi). 
15 Feb. Haifa abortive attempt to assassinate 
DSP (Lechi). 
16 Feb. Beit Nabala abortive attack on army camp. 
19 Feb. Mount Carmel radar station destroyed; eight RAF 
personnel wounded (Haganah). 
21 Feb. Sarona, some damage to PMF camps at two 
Kfar Vitkin, latter locations; four insurgents 
Shafr Amr killed, one policeman, two 
civilians injured (Palmach). 
25 Feb. Lydda, Petah attacks on airfields destroy five 
Tiqva, aircraft, damage 17; four insurgents 
Qastina killed (Irgun and Lechi). 
27 Feb. near Safad one policeman wounded in a shooting 
incident (Haganah). 
6 Mar. Sarafand theft of arms from army camp; two 
insurgents wounded, nine captured; 
one soldier killed, one civilian 
wounded (Irgun). 
%. 2, f. 
Date Location Details 
22 Mar. near Sarona assassination of German internee 
(Lechi). 
25 Mar. Tel Aviv, one person killed in disturbances. 
Sarona 
27 Mar. Sukreir abortive attack on railway station. 
2 Apr. railway line cut at several locations; five 
bridges destroyed (Irgun). 
7 Apr. Yibna shooting incident. 
13 Apr. Nathanya theft of arms from RAF camp; bridge 
blown up; some soldiers wounded. 
? abortive attempt to steal arms. 
23 Apr. Ramat Gan theft of arms from police station; 
four insurgent, three security 
force casualties (Irgun). 
Tel Aviv abortive attack on railway 
station (Irgun). 
25 Apr. Tel Aviv seven soldiers killed; some arms 
stolen (Lechi). 
1 May Haifa abortive attempt to blow up Royal 
Navy destroyer. 
. 14 May Tel Aviv two jeeps stolen, one damaged in 
three attempts; two soldiers 
wounded. 
15 May railway theft of 135,000 rounds of 
ammunition from train. 
20 May Nablus theft of £6,200 from bank. 
6 June Jerusalem rescue of captured leader from 
medical clinic (Lechi). 
10 June railway four trains seriously damaged; 
three security force personnel 
wounded. 
12 June Tel Aviv soldier stabbed, wounded. 
14 June Haifa Arab District Officer wounded in 
assassination attempt (Lechi). 
same bombing of Arab cafe; two civilians 
wounded. 
16 June across 11 bridges damaged or destroyed; 
Palestine eight insurgent, five security 
force casualties (Haganah and 
Palmach). 
2,7.7 
Date Location Details 
17 June Haifa railway workshops seriously 
damaged; 11 insurgents killed, 15 
captured (Lechi) . 
18 June Tel Aviv, kidnapping of six army officers 
Jerusalem (Irgun). 
26 June Tel Aviv ? theft of 140,000 worth of diamonds. 
4 July Haifa two Jews abducted and tortured as 
informers (Haganah). 
22 July Jerusalem bombing of King David Hotel; 91 
killed, 69 wounded (Irgun). 
21 Aug. Haifa sabotage of British ship used for 
transshipment of illegal immigrants 
(Palmach). 
8 Sept. railway some damage to communications. 
Haifa sabotage of oil pipeline; one 
British casualty (Lechi). 
same assassination of CID sergeant 
(Lechi). 
9 Sept. Tel Aviv assassination of Area Security 
Officer; several other British 
casualties (Lechi). 
same six soldiers wounded in shooting, 
mining incidents. 
13 Sept. Tel Aviv, three banks robbed, one police 
Jaffa station attacked; seven security 
force and civilian casualties. 
20 Sept. Haifa railway station blown up (Irgun). 
23 Sept. railway attack on oil train; abortive 
attack on railway bridge; one guard 
killed. 
30 Sept. ? two British personnel casualties 
in separate attacks. 
1 Oct. Haifa abortive attempt to blow up oil 
dock. 
6 Oct. Jerusalem two RAP personnel shot, one killed. 
8 Oct. across widespread road and rail mining, 
Palestine eight security force, civilian 
casualties. 
17 Oct. Jerusalem assassination of police officer 
(Lechi). 
ýý ý' 
Date Location Details 
17 Oct. across widespread road mining, two army 
Palestine vehicles damaged, five security 
force casualties. 
? cafe damaged by arson. 
20 Oct. Rishon army jeep blown up by mines, two 
Le Zion casualties. 
22 Oct. railway train derailed by mines. 
24 Oct. Jerusalem army checkpoint bombed, one soldier 
killed, 10 wounded; police billet 
bombed. 
26 Oct. Hadera army lorry blown up and bridge 
damaged. 
29 Oct. near Haifa two army vehicles mined, two 
casualties. 
30 Oct. Jerusalem two army, one civilian vehicle 
mined, fired on, 13 military, one 
civilian casualties. 
same railway station blown up, one 
policeman killed (Irgun). 
31 Oct. Petah Tiqva army lorry mined, two soldiers 
killed, two wounded. 
near Tel police vehicle fired on. 
Aviv 
Haifa army lorry mined, one casualty. 
District 
1 Nov. near Hadera engine of goods train mined, slight 
damage to engine and bridge. 
? army lorry blown up, four 
casualties. 
2 Nov. ? attacks on army lorries and 
bridges, 10 casualties. 
3 Nov. Qalqilya train derailed by mine, staff 
slightly injured. 
same area military vehicle detonated mine, 
no damage. 
4 Nov. south abortive attempt to mine railway. 
Palestine 
near Tel train derailed by mine, one train- 
Aviv man wounded. 
south train detonated a mine, no damage 
Palestine 
'r 4 
Date 
5 Nov. 
Location 
near Rishon 
Le Zion 
near 
Qalgilya 
6 Nov. Kiryat Haim 
7 Nov. Lydda 
District 
9 Nov. ? 
10 Nov. Ras El Ain 
11 Nov. near 
Qalqilya 
13 Nov. railway 
and roads 
15 Nov. near 
Benyamina 
17 Nov. railway 
near 
Sarona 
18 Nov. railway 
19 Nov. same 
Jerusalem 
Tel Aviv 
railway 
Details 
civilian car blown up by mine, no 
casualties. 
oil train mined and fired on, some 
damage, no casulaties; nearby 
blockhouse fired on (Lechi). 
abortive attempt to mine railway. 
troop train derailed by mines, no 
casualties. 
three policemen killed by booby- 
trap mine (Irgun). 
railway station blown up, four 
security force casualties (Irgun). 
railway damaged by mines at three 
locations. 
28 security force casualties from 
mines. 
police rail trolley derailed by 
mine; three soldiers wounded. 
two successful attempts to mine 
railway, two failures; two army 
casualties. 
10 security force casualties from 
road mine. 
army rail trolley blown up, one 
casualty, second bomb found nearby. 
five army casualties from attempt 
to remove mine. 
abortive attempt to blow up police 
vehicle; one civilian injured. 
assassination of Jewish policeman 
(Lechi). 
two abortive attempts to mine 
railway. 
20 Nov. Jerusalem Income Tax office destroyed by 
bomb; five security force 
casualties (Irgun). 
Tel Aviv Jewish civilian shot by Jews, 
believed to be for political 
reasons. 
22 Nov. railway section of line blown up. 
25 Nov. near Beit two military vehicles fired on in 
Dajan separate incidents; one casualty. 
"y, Ja 
Date Location Details 
30 Nov. Jerusalem attack on police barracks, four 
casualties; roads mined. 
2 Dec. near jeep blown up by mine; four 
Jerusalem soldiers killed. 
near jeep blown up by mine; four 
Benyamina casualties. 
3 Dec. Tel Aviv abortive attempt to rob welfare 
officer; two insurgent casualties. 
near Kfar jeep blown up by mine; two 
Vitkin casualties. 
Haifa jeep blown up by mines; one 
soldier killed. 
5 Dec. Sarafand truck bomb exploded in military 
camp; 30 casualties (Lechi). 
Jerusalem two insurgents killed in abortive 
car bombing (Lechi). 
same policeman wounded in shooting 
attack on police barracks. 
same abortive grenade attack on guards 
of GOC's residence. 
same two bombs discovered at different 
locations. 
17 Dec. samc army detonated bomb found in 
Jerusalem hotel; little damage. 
18 Dec. same insurgent killed in shooting 
incident. 
26 Dec. Tel Aviv, two diamond robberies. 
Nathanya 
29 Dec. Tel Aviv, four soldiers abducted, flogged in 
Rishon Le three incidents (Irgun). 
Zion, 
Nathanya 
1947 
2 Jan. Jerusalem grenades thrown at two locations, 
no casualties. 
same police patrol attacked with flame 
throwers, no casualties. 
same abortive attempt to mine road. 
Hadera one security force casualty in 
bombing, gunfire attack on army 
camp. 
ý.: 3 
Date Location Details 
2 Jan. Kiryat Hayim attack on army camp with bombs, 
gunfire (Irgun) . 
near Haifa army vehicle blown up by mine; 
five casualties. 
Haifa two security force vehicles blown 
up by mine; no casualties. 
Tiberias attack on military car park; no 
damage or casualties. 
Tel Aviv gunfire, mortar attack on army 
headquarters and police barracks; 
four casualties (Irgun). 
Jaffa attack on police headquarters 
(Irgun). 
near Hadera abortive attempt to mine two jeeps. 
Tel Aviv one policeman wounded in shooting 
attack on railway station. 
near Petah lorry blown up by mine; five 
Tiqva soldiers wounded. 
same jeep blown up by mine; three 
soldiers wounded. 
Tel Aviv police vehicle blown up; two 
casualties. 
near Tel taxi blown up'by mine; policeman 
Aviv wounded. 
3 Jan. Lydda two military vehicles blown up; six 
injured. 
near military vehicle blown up; three 
Wilhelma casualties. 
4 Jan. Jerusalem military vehicle blown up; three 
casualties. 
Haifa military vehicle blown up; two 
casualties. 
5 Jan. Jerusalem, military vehicles blown up by mines 
Haifa in two incidents; one casualty. 
6 Jan. Lydda military vehicle blown up; no 
casualties. 
12 Jan. Haifa bombing of District Police Head- 
quarters; 104 casualties (Lechi). 
23 Jan. ? bank robbery. 
26 Jan. Jerusalem judge, businessman kidnapped 
(Irgun) . 
Z. 3., L 
Date Location Details 
29 Jan. near Athlit textile robbery. 
13 Feb. Haifa sabotage of two government vessels 
in harbour. 
18 Feb. Jerusalem army lorry blown up by mine; five 
casualties. 
near army vehicle blown up by mine. 
Nathanya 
19 Feb. Haifa two army vehicles blown up by 
mines; no casualties. 
oil pipeline damaged by explosives. 
Ein Shemer mortar attack on airfield. 
Aqir abortive attempt to mine road. 
28 Feb. Haifa bombing of shipping agency; seven 
casualties. 
1 Mar. Jerusalem officers' club bombed; 29 casu- 
alties (Irgun) . 
Beit Lid two vehicles destroyed by mines. 
same mortar and gunfire attack on army 
camp; four casualties. 
Haifa four military vehicles damaged by 
bomb. 
same army jeep mined; four casualties. 
near Haifa army lorry mined. 
Rehovoth two bombs exploded outside police 
station. 
same army vehicle blown up; four casu- 
alties. 
Petah Tiqva slight damage to vehicle from road 
mine. 
same army vehicle blown up; two 
soldiers killed. 
Nathanya army vehicle blown up. 
Kefar Yona mortar and gunfire attack on army 
camp. 
Aqir government vehicle mined. 
2 Mar. Near Hadera army lorry mined; two casualties. 
3 Mar. Haifa grenades thrown into army camp. 
Hadera gunfire attack on army camp. 
ßi3 
Date Location Details 
4 Mar. Ramle/Aqir RAF lorry blown up; four casualties. 
road 
Rishon army lorry blown up; three casu- 
alties. 
5 Mar. Jerusalem armed robbery. 
Haifa sentry post bombed. 
Jerusalem one soldier wounded in grenade 
attack. 
same shooting at sentries. 
Rehovoth vehicle blown up; two casualties. 
Hadera mortar and gunfire attack on army 
camp; three casualties. 
6 Mar. Ramle/Aqir shooting at RAF vehicle. 
road 
near shooting at government vehicle. 
Benyamina 
7 Mar. near Hadera army vehicle blown up; four casu- 
alties. 
Rishon shooting at police station. 
near Rishon jeep fired on. 
8 Mar. Jerusalem police vehicle fired on; two casu- 
alties. 
Haifa grenades thrown into army camp. 
Jerusalem grenades thrown into army camp; two 
casualties. 
Sarona grenades thrown into army camp; 
three security force casualties. 
Jaffa gunfire attack on police HQ. 
Tel Aviv gunfire attack on army HQ; 20 
insurgent casualties. 
same gunfire attack on survey building. 
10 Mar. Ramat Gan two army vehicles mined. 
11 Mar. Nathanya government vehicle fired on; one 
security force casualty. 
Tulkarm government vehicle fired on. 
12 Mar. Ein Shemer gunfire, grenade attack on army 
camp. 
^3 
Date Location Details 
12 Mar. Jerusalem raid on government billet; nine 
army casualties, considerable 
damage. 
Rishon two civilian vehicles mined. 
Sarona army jeep mined, one casualty. 
13 Mar. Ras El Ain oil train mined and derailed. 
Battir goods train mined and derailed; 
two railway staff casualties. 
Tel Aviv grenades thrown at jeep. 
Kefar Yona gunfire, mortar attack on army 
camp. 
Haifa three oil pipelines blown up. 
14 Mar. Be'er railway mined. 
Ya'acov 
15 Mar. Hadera army club set on fire by arsonists. 
16 Mar. Nathanya gunfire attack on two army camps. 
Jerusalem Jewish Agency public relations 
office bombed. 
19 Mar. Zichron bomb thrown at security forces; 
. Ya'acov seven casualties. 
24 Mar. Tel Aviv bank robbery; £27,500 stolen, bank 
clerk wounded. 
28 Mar. near Ramle security forces ambushed; two 
killed. 
Haifa oil pipeline damaged by bomb. 
31 Mar. Haifa sabotage of oil, refinery; 16,000 
tons of petroleum products 
destroyed (Lechi). 
1 Apr. near arms theft; one soldier killed. 
Nahariya 
? shooting incident; one policeman, 
two civilian casualties. 
8 Apr. Jerusalem shooting incident; two police 
casualties. 
18 Apr. Tel Aviv police vehicle attacked; six 
casualties. 
Nathanya army medical post bombed; one 
casualty. 
2'7,7 
Date Location Details 
20 Apr. Nathanya army cinema bombed; four casu- 
alties, extensive damage. 
Ramat Zev military vehicle blown up by mine; 
four casualties. 
22 Apr. near train blown up, fired on, derailed 
Rehovoth 13 casualties. 
23 Apr. near Lydda two government vehicles blown up; 
four casualties. 
24 Apr. Tel Aviv British civilian abducted (Irgun). 
25 Apr. Sarona police barracks bombed; 10 casu- 
alties. 
Afula bank robbery. 
26 Apr. Haifa assassination of CID Superintendent 
(Lechi). 
30 Apr. near abortive attempt to mine road. 
Jerusalem 
4 May Acre prison escape. 
12 May Jerusalem assassination of two policemen. 
14 May railway seven incidents of sabotage. 
Jerusalem abortive attempt to bomb military 
court building. 
Sarafand army cinema bombed; two casualties. 
16 May Haifa CID car damaged by bomb; four 
casualties. 
19 May same assassination of policeman. 
20 May Tel Aviv CID car damaged by mine. 
Fejja, insurgent attack on two Arab vil- 
Yehudiyee lages; one insurgent, nine Arab 
casualties. 
27 May Ramle railway station blown up; one 
casualty. 
railway two explosions; no damage. 
28 May Haifa oil dock slightly damaged by bombs; 
one casualty. 
3 June Jerusalem bombing of military compound. 
4 June railway two trains derailed by mines in 
separate incidents; one casualty. 
I 
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Date Location Details 
5 June Athlit railway station bombed; extensive 
damage. 
? oil pipeline cut by explosion. 
9 June Ramat Gan two policemen kidnapped; recovered 
later. 
18 June Tel Aviv abortive attempt to blow up army HQ 
(Irgun). 
22 June Jerusalem abortive attempt to kidnap senior 
police officer (Irgun). 
25 June same abortive attempt to kidnap govern- 
ment official (Irgun). 
28 June Haifa shooting attack on soldiers; three 
casualties (Lechi). 
Tel Aviv shooting attack on soldiers; four 
casualties (Lechs). 
29 June Herzliyia shooting attack on soldiers; three 
casualties (Lechi). 
12 July Nathanya two soldiers abducted (Irgun). 
15 July Tel Jewish policeman assassinated. 
Litwinsky 
16 July Jerusalem two military vehicles damaged by 
mines; two casualties. 
near Hadera army car mined. 
Petah Tiqva army lorry mined; four casualties. 
same army jeep mined; two casualties. 
18 July Jerusalem gunfire attack on military vehicle; 
three casualties. 
same grenade thrown at military post; 
one casualty. 
same police vehicle set on fire by bomb. 
Kefar Bilu army lorry mined; four casualties. 
19 July Haifa two policemen assassinated. 
Jerusalem incendiary bombs thrown at two 
police vehicles; one casualty. 
20 July railway abortive attempt to mine railway. 
same train mined; slight damage. 
same goods train mined; slight damage. 
same oil train mined. 
t5 ? 
Date Location Details 
20 July Jerusalem policeman wounded in shooting. 
same two police vehicles mined; five 
casualties. 
Gan Menashe military vehicle mined; four 
casualties. 
Nathanya army car fired on. 
Tel gunfire, mortar attack on army 
Litwinsky camp. 
21 July Haifa gunfire, grenade attack on army 
camp. 
same attack on military installation; 
radio equipment damaged. 
same oil pipeline slightly damaged by 
bomb. 
same military vehicle blown up; two 
casualties. 
near Afula oil pipeline damaged by two bombs. 
? soldier fired on. 
near Hadera army lorry mined. 
22 July Haifa army vehicle mined; one casualty. 
Jerusalem shooting at RAF vehicle; one 
casualty. 
same fire bombs thrown at RAF, police 
vehicles. 
same attack on police barracks; general 
firing throughout city. 
23 July Haifa military vehicle mined; four casu- 
alties. 
same bombing of army billet; one 
casualty. 
same bombing of military car park; three 
casualties. 
near Haifa military vehicle mined; seven 
casualties. 
near Beit army jeep mined; four casualties. 
Lid 
near Rishon army lorry mined; seven casualties. 
Le Zion 
24 July Tel Aviv diamond robbery. 
Jerusalem shooting at officers' mess. 
i ýý 
Date Location Details 
24 July Jerusalem bombing of military vehicle; three 
casualties. 
same police car mined; one casualty. 
railway bridge damaged by bomb. 
25 July Haifa abortive attempt to mine road. 
Jerusalem two explosions in open ground. 
26 July ? two soldiers killed by mine. 
railway abortive attempt to mine railway. 
same same. 
27 July near Jaffa railway trolley mined; two casu- 
alties. 
Jerusalem gunfire, grenade attack on military 
convoy; two casualties. 
28 July near abortive attempt to mine military 
Rehovoth convoy. 
Sarafand abortive arson attempt at army 
camp. 
Jerusalem shooting at police vehicle. 
Tel bombing of cinema; three casu- 
Litwinsky alties. 
29 July Nathanya two soldiers (kidnapped 12 July) 
hanged by : rgun. 
near Haifa military post destroyed by bomb. 
Jerusalem grenade thrown at police vehicle. 
near Athlit railway considerably damaged by 
mine. 
30 July Jerusalem abortive mining. 
near military vehicle mined; five 
Nathanya casualties. 
31 July near Zichron train mined; considerable damage. 
Ya'acov 
2ý`ý 
Statistical Analysis of Insurgent Operations 
1. Monthly Rate of Operations 
1945 - November 4 
December 5 
1946 - January 7 
February 13 
March 4 
April 11 
May 6 
June 24 
July 2 
August 1 
September 13 
October 19 
November 35 
December 18 
1947 - January 29 
February 8 
March 58 
April 15 
May 19 
June 12 
July 60 
Total 363 
Average: 17.285 incidents per month 
United Resistance: 77 incidents (excluding the incidents 
of 31 Oct. 1945) 
2.1+0 
2. Location of Insurgent Operations 
a) Jerusalem 58 
b) Tel Aviv 34 
c) Haifa 47 
d) Lydda District' 69 
e) Other 155 
3. Types of Insurgent Operations (successful and abortive) 
a) Assassinations 26 
b) Other shooting incidents 31 
c) Bombings 87 
d) Mining incidents 119 
e) Robberies 32 
f) Kidnappings 14 
g) Other (including raids, mortar 54 
attacks) 
4. Targets of Insurgent Operations 
a) Security forces 212 
b) Government 16 
c) Railway 67 
d) Oil industry 12 
e) Other 56 
1Note: Apart from Tel Aviv (listed and counted 
separately), Lydda District includes the following major 
towns: Jaffa; Petah Tiqva; Ramat Gan; Rehovoth; Rishon Le 
Zion; Sarafand; Tel Litwinsky. 
2, f I 
Date 
1945 
23 Nov. 
25-27 
Nov. 
26 Nov. 
28 Dec., 
1946 
1 Jan. 
3 Jan. 
4 Jan. 
7 Jan. 
8 Jan. 
APPENDIX VII 
SECURITY FORCE SEARCH OPERATIONS* 
Location 
north of 
Tel Aviv 
Rishpon 
Shefayim 
Hogla 
Givat Hayim 
Jerusalem 
Ramat Gan 
Jerusalem 
same 
Tel Aviv 
Rishon Le 
Zion 
Jerusalem 
Formations 
company and 
police 
two brigades 
with units 
under command 
same 
Results 
nil. 
29 arrested, two 
killed, 16 
wounded. 
same 
one brigade 
plus 
battalion 
plus and PMF 
battalion 
and police 
10 wounded, 100 
arrested. 
26 detained for 
one month. 
59 detained for 
questioning. 
elements of 
two battalions 
and PMF 
four platoons 
and PMF 
company and 
police 
four bat- 
talions and 
police 
CID and army 
six suspected 
insurgents 
arrested. 
six detained. 
nil. 
55 detained, 
including one 
known insurgent. 
equipment and 
documents seized. 
*Source: WO 169/19656-23228; WO 261/171-219; CO 
733/456; Pyman Diaries, 6/1/8; Wilson, Cordon and Search, 
pp. 230-8. Search operations involving units of less than 
a platoon are not listed, owing to insufficient data. 
1. ßh2. 
Date 
13 Jan. 
17 Jan. 
20-24 
Jan. 
Location 
Yentini 
Formations 
brigade with 
units under 
command 
army 
army and 
police 
Results 
16 arrested, 
equipment and 
documents seized. 
Jerusalem 
same 
22 Jan. Hadera 
24 Jan. Tel Aviv 
29 Jan. Jerusalem 
30 Jan. same 
Tel Aviv 
31 Jan. Jerusalem 
5 Feb. Jib Yousef 
6 Feb. Tel Aviv ? 
7 Feb. Rosh Pinna 
Safad 
11 Feb. Rosh Pinna 
13 Feb. same 
Tiberias 
15 Feb. Haifa 
18 Feb. Tel Aviv 
brigade with 
units under 
command 
battalion 
and police 
platoon and 
police 
army, police 
and PMF 
brigade and 
police 
platoon plus 
and police 
company and 
police 
company and 
PMF 
elements of 
brigade and 
police 
same 
battalion 
and police 
same 
same 
brigade and 
police 
elements of 
battalion 
and police 
nil. 
47 detained, large 
quantity of arms 
and explosives 
seized, valuable 
intelligence 
gained, in six 
searches. 
27 arrested. 
nil. 
two detained. 
nil. 
11 detained. 
one detained, 
some equipment 
seized. 
nil. 
nil. 
nil. 
nil. 
nil. 
nil. 
nil. 
six arrested, 
equipment seized. 
20 arrested, 
weapons and 
equipment seized 
in capture of 
Lechi transmitter. 
113 
Date Location Formations 
22 Feb. Kfar Vitkin company and 
police 
28 Feb. Birya brigade and 
police 
Ein Zetim same 
Jerusalem elements of 
brigade 
6 Mar. Sarafand elements of 
area division 
3 Apr. south of elements of 
Rehovoth battalion 
and PMF 
25 Apr. Tel Aviv two battalions 
plus and PMF 
5 May Jerusalem platoon, PMF 
and police 
17 June across all army units 
Palestine and police 
18 June Tel Aviv battalion plus 
Jerusalem police 
19 June Kfar Giladi brigade 
20 June Beerot same 
Yitshaq 
22 June southern brigade and 
Palestine police 
24 June south of battalion and 
Rehovoth police 
25 June same company 
26 June same battalion 
29-30 across all for- 
June Palestine mations 
Results 
nil. 
25 arrested, two 
arms caches and 
documents seized. 
nil. 
large arms cache 
seized. 
nil. 
some suspects 
detained in two 
settlement 
searches. 
79 detained and 
equipment seized. 
nil. 
one large arms 
cache seized in 
large number of 
searches. 
nil. 
nil. 
nil; two killed, 
seven wounded. 
nil. 
nil. 
arms and ammu- 
nition seized, 
seven detained. 
four arrested, 
some arms and 
ammunition seized. 
nil. 
700 detained, 
large quantities 
of arms, equipment, 
documents seized 
in 18 separate 
searches. 
2.4 ý+ 
Date Location Formations Results 
23 July Jerusalem two battalions 46 detained. 
30 July- Tel Aviv division plus 787 detained, 
2 Aug. units under large arms cache 
command seized. 
26 Aug. Sedot Yam brigade ? 
28 Aug. - Dorot, two battalions large quantities 
2 Sept. Ruhama of arms seized at 
both locations. 
10 Sept. Ramat Gan brigade 47 detained for 
questioning. 
Sedot Yam, same ? 
Heftsi Bah 
13 Sept. Tel Aviv, same 27 detained. 
Jaffa 
23 Sept. near Petah battalion ? small quantity of 
Tiqva arms seized. 
3 Oct. Kfar Bilu battalion nil. 
9 Oct. Nathanya same four arrested, 
small quantity of 
arms seized. 
16 Oct. south of two platoons nil. 
Tel Aviv and police 
18 Oct. Tel Aviv company and one arrested. 
police 
21 Oct. Petah Tiqva company ? 
23 Oct. same battalion one suspected 
insurgent 
arrested. 
Rehovoth company four detained for 
questioning. 
31 Oct. Tel Aviv four platoons some equipment 
seized. 
Petah Tiqva two companies nil. 
30 Dec. same brigade plus 19 detained, small 
units under arms cache seized. 
command 
south of brigade plus 24 arrested. 
Nathanya 
31 Dec. Rishon Le battalion plus 18 detained. 
Zion 
zcr ý 
Date Location Formations Results 
' 1947 
1 Jan. Tel Aviv brigade plus 47 arrested. 
2 Jan. Rehovoth same 19 detained, -some 
arms seized. 
3 Jan. Lydda area brigade 34 arrested. 
Jerusalem same 30 detained, small 
quantity of equip- 
ment seized. 
26 Jan. same company nil. 
27 Jan. same battalion nil. 
Petah Tiqva brigade nil. 
29 Jan. same company and ? 
police 
Rishon same ? 
Tel Aviv platoon and ? 
" CID 
30 Jan. Jerusalem battalion and 
police 
same same ? 
2 Mar. same battalion 11 detained. 
7 Mar. Rehovoth brigade plus 12 detained. 
Hadera brigade six detained, 
including one sus- 
pected insurgent. 
Nathanya same two detained. 
17 Mar. near Rishon brigade plus five detained. 
Le Zion 
22 Mar. Jerusalem battalion arms and 
explosives seized. 
28 Mar. same company plus two detained. 
4-5 May Acre area brigade four separate 
searches, no 
results. 
6 May- across variable 46 separate search 
11 July Palestine operations, 
results undeter- 
mined. 
12 July Nathanya ? nil. 
2ýý 
Date Location Formations Results 
12-13 Nathanya brigade nil. 
July area 
15 July Nathanya same 18 detained, 
including three 
suspected 
insurgents. 
16 July same battalion nil. 
17-18 same same nil. 
July 
19-26 same same nil. 
July 
Total Number of Search Operations: 176 plus. 
At least 44 searches, or 25%, produced no results. Of 
these, 31 were carried out by battalions or larger for- 
mations. 
7-, ' 
Statistical Analysis of Security Force Search operations 
1. Monthly Rate of Operations: 
1945 - November - 
December - 
1946 - January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1947 - January 
February 
March 
April 
May-July 
5 
2 
19 
13 
1 
3 
1 
27 plus 
2 
3 
6 
9 
0 
3 
12 
0 
7 
0 
63 
2. ' Location of Search Operations: 
a) Jerusalem 
b) Tel Aviv 
c) Haifa 
d) Lydda District (less Tel Aviv) 
e) Other/undetermined 
- 27 
- 14 
-1 
- 32 
- 102 plus 
7. t+ e 
3. Size of Search Operations: 
a) Division -2 
b) Brigade or larger - 38 
c) Battalion or larger - 55 
d) Company or larger - 19 
e) Platoon or larger -5 
f) Other/undetermined - 58 
f 
APPENDIX VIII 
THE COST OF INTERNAL SECURITY 
1. The Human Cost* 
Casualties Sustained from August 1945 to August 1947: 
Killed Wounded Total 
a) British 141 475 616 
b) Jewish - 1) Insurgents 40 23 63 
2) Others 25 115 140 
c) Arabs 44 287 331 
d) Others 10 12 22 
Totals 260 912 1172 
*Source: High Commissioner to British Embassy, 
Washington, 18 Sept. 1947, CO 537/477. Of these casualties, 
1,089 occurred between 31 Oct. 1945 and 31 July 1947. 
ý.. Itr 
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2. The Financial Cost* 
a) Palestine Government 
Expenditures Estimates 
1945/47 "1947/48 
1) Police and Security £9,206,179 £5,700,000 
2) Damage to Railway 304,9811 255,0192 
3) Internment of Illegal 
C i i 2 2 3 grants n yprus Imm , 00,000 900,000 
4) Evacuation and 
Cantonment 300,000 
5) Compensation for King 
David Hotel Incident 400,000 
6) Repairs to buildings 
i db t d 5 4 error amage y sm 00,000 
7) Compensation to Shell 
Oil Company for damage 
from terrorism 400,000 
Totals £11,711,160 . 68,455,019 
Revenue for 5 period . 
644,737,774 n. a. 
Percentage 
expenditure on 
Internal Security 26% n. a. 
b) British Government 
1) Expenditures on Armed Forces in Palestine, 1 July 
1945 to 31 Jan. 1947: X55,600,000 (Army: 
£48,000,000) 
2) Estimate for Calendar Year 1947: £23,500,000 
(Army: ., 621,000,000) 
Notes: 1. Total cost of damage to 31 Mar. 1947. 
2. Deficit charged against next Fiscal Year owing 
to damage and loss of revenue in 1946/47. 
3. Total cost to 31 Mar. 1947. 
4. Cost of repairs undertaken for damage incurred 
in 1946/47. 
5. No figures available. 
*Source: CO 537/2279; CO 814/17,40; FO 371/61770, 
61941. 
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